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Abstract:
Philosophy in Verse: Competition and Early Greek Philosophical Thought
Nicolò Benzi
This thesis is a study of Archaic and Early Classical philosophical poetry within the
competitive  context  which  characterized  the  poetic  production  of  that  period.  In
particular, I evaluate the ideas and arguments of Xenophanes, Parmenides, Epicharmus
and Empedocles  in  the  context  of  the  social  and cultural  aspects  of  Archaic  poetic
performance in order to evaluate their response to traditional agonism. As I argue, these
figures entered the poetic contest not only to defeat their poetic adversaries, but also to
transform and redefine the terms of the competition itself.
Chapter 1 is devoted to the analysis of three institutionalized forms of poetic
agonism: sympotic games, rhapsodic contests, and dramatic performances. In chapter 2,
I  evaluate  the  socio-political  import  of  Xenophanes'  poetry  and  argue  that  his
conception of the greatest god serves to substantiate his moral prescriptions aimed at
eliminating  civic  conflict.  In  chapter  3, I  examine Parmenides'  original  notion  of
alētheia  as logical deduction,  whereby he provides a solution to the problem of the
truth-status of poetry stemming from the Muses' ability to inspire both genuine and false
accounts,  as  narrated  in  Hesiod's  Theogony.  Chapter  4  provides  an  analysis  of
Empedocles' polemic allusions to his poetic and philosophical predecessors. I argue that
Empedocles'  confidence  in  his  poetic  authority  is  ultimately  grounded  on  his  self-
declared divine status, which grants him a unique and comprehensive poetic knowledge.
In chapter 5, I evaluate Epicharmus' philosophical fragments against the background of
early rhetoric and argue that, through the use of philosophically inspired arguments,
Epicharmus aimed to make manifest philosophy's agonistic potential and to show how it
could be exploited to one's own advantage.
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Introduction
This doctoral thesis is a study of Archaic and early Classical philosophical poetry within
the  competitive  context  that  characterized  the  poetic  production  of  that  period.  In
particular,  I  focus  on  the  works  of  Xenophanes,  Parmenides,  Empedocles  and
Epicharmus. I reconstruct these philosophical poets' arguments and ideas by situating
them within the social and cultural institutions of Archaic poetic performance in order to
evaluate their approach to traditional agonism, since, as I claim, they entered the poetic
contest not only to defeat their adversaries, but also to transform and redefine the terms
of poetic competition itself.
The importance of competition for our understanding of early Greek thought has
been the object of increasing interest,  especially thanks to pioneering works such as
those of Lloyd, who, in his studies on ancient science and medicine, has pointed out
how agonism informed the beginnings  of scientific  speculation.  In  particular,  Lloyd
argues that the origins of Greek science must be traced to the competitive socio-political
dimension which marked the development of the life of the polis towards the end of the
Archaic  Age1.  Within  such  a  context,  doctors,  philosophers  and,  broadly  speaking,
wisdom practitioners engaged in a public “game” in order to prove their primacy and
thereby win the favour of the audiences which they addressed.  Indeed, some of the
extant texts of the period show remnants of this fiercely agonistic debate: for example,
in his fragments Heraclitus attacks Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Hecataeus for their
lack  of  understanding2;  Xenophanes  criticizes  Homer  and  Hesiod  for  their
representations  of  the  gods3;  Hecataeus  remarks  that  the  stories  of  the  Greeks  are
ridiculous  and  corrects  traditional  versions  of  myth4;  the  author  of  the  treatise  On
1 Cf. Lloyd 1979, pp. 226-267. This idea was proposed also by Vernant, cf. Vernant 1982, esp. pp. 49ff. 
2 Cf. DK 22 B40.
3 Cf. DK 21 B11, B12. See further infra, Chapter 2, pp. 65-66.
4 Cf. BNJ 1 F a; F19.
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Ancient Medicine  attacks philosophers, among whom he enumerates Empedocles, and
other physicians for their new methods of healing, and pointedly denounces their lack of
medical expertise5.
Competition  was  a  prominent  feature  of  Archaic  poetry  as  well.  As  long
recognized by scholars,  a  complete  understanding of  Archaic  poetry is  not  possible
without considering the competitive context in which poets composed and performed
their  works.  Poetic  production  was  characterized  by  an  “agonistic  mannerism”6
observable  in  both  the  form and  content  of  poetry:  correction  and  contradiction  of
rivals, rhetorical figures such as priamel, recusatio and praeteritio, and confrontational
forms of composition found in different poetic genres, from lyric to drama, all providing
a vivid portrayal of the manifold ways in which poets competed to prove the superiority
of  their  poetic  skills7.  Most  significantly,  poets,  rhapsodes  and  playwrights  also
participated  in  institutionalized  agōnes  held  during  civic  and  Panhellenic  festivals,
which provided them with a unique opportunity to compete directly with adversaries
and display their ability8.
Despite  the  scholarly consensus  on the  competitive  character  of  early Greek
intellectual  speculation  and  poetic  production,  when  we  turn  to  consider  the
phenomenon of philosophical poetry, it is quite striking to notice that poetic agonism
usually is not taken into account as an interpretative and heuristic category to employ in
order  to  better  understand  the  works  of  philosopher-poets.  Indeed,  it  is  generally
recognized that philosopher-poets competed with other wisdom practitioners and poets,
but a comprehensive analysis  of how these thinkers engaged with traditional poetry
within the context of traditional poetic competition has not yet been conducted. The aim
5 Cf. VM 20.1. On competition in early medical writings, see further Lloyd 1987, 61-70. On the agonistic
stance of early Greek thinkers, see also Gemelli Marciano 2002; Sassi 2009, 107-118.
6 Griffith 1990, p. 191 and passim.
7 For an overview of these examples of poetic agonism, see  Griffith 1990, pp. 192-200. For a detailed
analysis of the poetic game, see further Collins 2004.
8 Cf. infra, Chapter 1, pp. 31-46.
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of this thesis is precisely to evaluate how agonism informed philosophical speculation
in the poetry of Xenophanes, Parmenides, Empedocles and Epicharmus. In particular, I
will focus on the ways which philosopher-poets devised to challenge the authority of
their poetic predecessors, especially Homer and Hesiod, and thereby demonstrate the
superiority  of  their  wisdom.  As  I  will  show,  such  an  enterprise  involved  a  critical
appraisal and redefinition of the very terms and forms of competition, which eventually
changed the rules of intellectual debate forever. 
The thesis  is  structured in  five chapters:  chapter  1  is  mainly historical,  as it
provides an account of three institutionalized forms of poetic competition – namely
sympotic  poetic  games,  and rhapsodic  and dramatic  contests.  As regards  the  poetic
games at the symposium, I will consider examples of verses composed for competition
provided by the Theognidean corpus and the Attic skolia. In particular, I will examine
the practice of  metapoiēsis, the correction and alteration of other poets' verses, which
testifies to the agonistic character of sympotic poetic performances. I will next consider
how symposiasts used poetry to attack rivals both within and outside their hetairia, and
thereby  show  the  potential  socio-political  consequences  which  poetic  games  might
have. Then, I will present the main features of rhapsodic competitions, especially as
emerging from Plato's description in the  Ion, with particular attention devoted to the
rhapsodes' ability to understand and then communicate the dianoia of the poet, and their
capacity  to  improvise  and  innovate  on  traditional  poetic  material.  With  regard  to
dramatic contests, I will provide an overview of the tragic and comic agōnes which took
place during the Athenian festivals in honour of Dionysus, and illustrate how, through
the institution of chorēgia, they could be exploited by private citizens to gain political
influence to the detriment of their adversaries.
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In chapter 2, I will consider Xenophanes' overt attacks on Homer and Hesiod,
which  offer  a  striking  example  of  the  intersection  of  poetic  and  philosophical
competition.  Xenophanes  targeted  Greece's  two most  influential  poets  because  their
stories  about  the  gods  nurtured  peoples'  (false)  beliefs  in  anthropomorphic  deities.
Xenophanes was particularly concerned with the negative moral impact which could
derive from depicting the gods as committing illicit acts. As further illustrated by the
ban on poems about divine and civic strife from the symposium, the danger posed by
this  kind of  story lay in  their  being  potentially harmful  for  society as  a  whole.  By
contrast, Xenophanes proposed a series of precepts aimed at promoting civic eunomia,
which,  I  will  argue,  he  grounded  on  his  original  conception  of  the  divine.  For
Xenophanes'  greatest  god,  being  morally  perfect,  all-powerful  and  omniscient,
guarantees the dispensation of justice and thereby the punishment of those who threaten
social  peace.  In  addition  to  such moral  implications,  I  will  argue  that  Xenophanes'
rejection of anthropomorphism served to eliminate the premises of traditional poetic
agonism, since poets usually competed in providing, for example, different versions of
myths  concerning  the  gods'  birth  or  deeds.  Even  more  significantly,  by  criticizing
traditional  forms  of  divine  disclosure,  including  poetic  inspiration,  Xenophanes
undermined the validity of any claim to authority based on divine inspiration, to which
he opposed a new criterion of poetic reliability based on the notion of appropriateness.
In chapter 3, I will begin my analysis of Parmenides' competitive stance against
his  poetic  and  philosophical  rivals  by  considering  the  proem  of  On  Nature.  The
beginning  of  the  poem,  I  argue, features  a  complex  system  of  allusions  whereby
Parmenides hints at his predecessors, whom he challenges by presenting the truth about
Being which the goddess has revealed to him. Besides providing an exposition of the
basic properties of reality, I will argue that the subsequent deduction of the attributes of
14
What-Is constitutes a redefinition of the notion of truth (alētheia) which, by solving the
problem of the ambiguous status of poetry posed by the Muses' declaration in the proem
of Hesiod's  Theogony,  substantiates  the  validity  of  Parmenides'  poetic  account.  For,
since the properties of What-Is  which Parmenides apprehends from the goddess are
deduced  a priori  from the assertion “it is and is not for not being”9, the poet and the
audience can actually test the correctness of divine revelation and thus be assured of its
truth. Parmenides' doctrine of What-Is also provides the framework for the second part
of the poem – the Doxa – in which he expounds a cosmology whereby he demonstrates,
so I will contend, his superiority over competitors in two ways. For he not only presents
the best possible  cosmology,  but he also declares it,  and de facto any other  similar
attempt, deceitful, since it is grounded on assumptions such as the reality of generation
and change which, in the light of his ontology, must be rejected as logically impossible.
In chapter 4, I will evaluate Empedocles' opposition to Parmenides' rejection of
cosmology  as  an  essentially  sterile  and  misleading  enterprise  by  examining  the
polemical allusion to his predecessor contained in the description of his account of the
interactions of the four roots as a non-deceptive “expedition” (stolos). As I will show,
the term  stolos  has strong agonistic connotations, as it relates to the field of nautical
metaphors which Archaic and Classical poets traditionally employed to express their
polemic stance against their competitors. In fact, Empedocles' use of the term  stolos
conveys a critical allusion not only to Parmenides, but also to Homeric and Hesiodic
epic, which he sought to emulate and eventually overcome. Empedocles' competitive
attitude towards his rivals is further emphasized by the epithet polymnēstē attributed to
the Muse, whereby he not only stresses his privileged relationship with the goddess, but
he  also  implies  that  she  deceived  his  poetic  predecessors.  Such  an  assertion  of
confidence on the part of Empedocles, I will argue, is ultimately grounded on his self-
9 Tr. Coxon.
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declared divine status, since, as a theios anēr, he possesses a knowledge superior to that
of ordinary men which guarantees the reliability of his poetic account. Indeed, thanks to
his all-inclusive vision of reality, Empedocles is able to provide a unique account of the
cosmos which encompasses even the doctrines of his competitors. Thus, by showing the
necessity of integrating his rivals' theories in his  logos about the cosmos, Empedocles
demonstrates  their  intrinsic  limitations  and,  at  the  same  time,  his  own  poetic  and
philosophical supremacy.
In chapter 5, I will consider Epicharmus' philosophical fragments, in which he
alludes to contemporary philosophical debate. In particular, I will focus on fragments
B1, which features an Eleatic-style argument to prove that gods are eternal, and B2, on
the  so-called  Growing Argument,  in  which  Pythagorean speculation  is  employed to
demonstrate the impermanence of personal identity. Next, I will examine fragments B4
and B5, in which Epicharmus makes use of the notion of nature to illustrate that animals
too  possess  wisdom and are  attracted  by what  is  similar  to  them.  I  will  argue  that
Epicharmus'  fragments  reveal  an  original  approach  to  poetic  and  philosophical
competition which reflects the increasing importance of rhetorical argumentation in 5th-
century  Syracuse.  Indeed,  as  eloquently  shown  by  the  example  of  the  Growing
Argument,  Epicharmus  represented  philosophy  as  an  instrument  which  could  be
exploited  to  defeat  adversaries  in  verbal  disputes.  Rather  than  competing  with
philosophers on doctrinal grounds, as some scholars have argued, Epicharmus aimed to
make manifest philosophy's agonistic potential and to show how it could be exploited to
one's own advantage. In fact, Epicharmus himself artfully made use of philosophically
inspired dialogic for comic purposes, with the goal of gaining the favour of the public
and eventually overcoming rival playwrights.
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Chapter 1
Poetry and institutions of competition
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the competitive nature of poetic performances in
Archaic and early Classical Greece by examining three different institutionalized forms
of competition.  I will  start  from the private and enclosed setting of the symposium,
where  poetry  served  as  a  means  of  confrontation  both  among  the  friends  gathered
together at the feast and towards other political and social groups (1.1). Then, I will
consider the rhapsodic competitions which took place during civic festivals, especially
those at the Great Panathenaia in Athens. The analysis of the different forms of contest
between rhapsodes will  exemplify some of the most important features of the lively
agonistic character of poetic compositions and displays  (1.2).  The final  part  will  be
devoted to the dramatic competitions in Athens, which were the central event of the
festivals held in honour of Dionysus, namely the Great Dionysia, the Lenaia and the
Rural  Dionysia.  Dramatic  contests  will  provide  a  striking  example  of  the  close
interrelation between competition and civic life, as their results could have important
repercussions on the political influence of the citizens who sponsored the plays (1.3).
1.1 – Poetic competition at the symposium
In Archaic Greece the symposium represented an important moment for the political,
social  and cultural  life  of the  polis.  As implied by the term itself,  it  consisted in  a
drinking-party which usually took place after an evening banquet and was attended by
men of aristocratic origin linked together by family bonds and/or by the same political
ideas  (hetairoi of  the  same  hetairia)1.  Owing  to  this  group-selected  character,  the
1 Beside the hetairia, another important context for the symposium were the courts of tyrants, see Vetta
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symposium functioned as a ritual which continuously created and reinforced the sense
of belonging of the participants, as it provided them with the opportunity to differentiate
themselves from other political or social groups, with which they were, more or less
directly, in competition2. Moreover, through a close interrelation between  paideia  and
pederasty, the symposium was crucial for the education of boys and their official, and
thus socially recognized, coming-of-age3. The importance of the occasion was further
reinforced by the religious framework in which it was inserted, as it was opened with a
libation to the gods, often accompanied by a paean sung by all the participants together,
and marked by a series of ritualized gestures which strengthened the link between the
group by making it assume a sacral connotation4.
In  addition  to  its  social  and  political  value,  the  symposium  was  of  central
importance even from a cultural point of view, because of its inextricable connection to
poetry5. According to a shared scholarly consensus, the symposium was actually the
original performing context for most of Archaic monodic poetry and, at the same time,
the  place  where,  by means  of  successive  performances,  poems  were  preserved  and
diffused  and  eventually  came to  form a  traditional  poetic  corpus6.  Sympotic  poetry
covered a great variety of themes and functions, depending on the specific occasion. In
what  follows,  I  will  focus  on  the  competitive  context  in  which  the  poems  were
performed,  especially  considering  its  role  as  a  form of  entertainment  and as  a  key
communicative medium for the values of the group. As to the first aspect, I will present
1992, pp. 28-214. For a detailed study of the symposium in the Archaic Age, see Wecowski 2014, in
particular pp. 19-80 on its organization, participants and its social and cultural function.
2 Cf. Vetta 1992, pp. 178-179; Murray 1990, p. 7.
3 On the link between education and pederasty, see Brenner 1990.
4 Cf. von der Mühll 1983, pp. 10-12. 
5 The presence of poetry at  the Greek symposium was the distinctive trait  that  differentiated it  from
similar gatherings in non-greek societies: cf. Anacreon 356 Page: “Come now, this time let's drink/ not in
this Scythian style/ with din and uproar, but sip/ to the sound of beautiful songs”. On this point, see Vetta
1983, pp. XXXIX-XL.
6 For a general introduction on the sympotic destination of monodic poetry, see Vetta 1983, pp. XIII-
XXXIV.  On  specific  genres:  elegy:  Bowie  1986,  1990;  iambic:  Vetta  1992,  199-205;  Rosen  2003;
Rotstein 2010, pp. 276-278; others: Pellizer 1990, pp. 178-180 and Ford 2002, p. 25, with references.
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the main features of poetic games, by using examples of verses produced for sympotic
contests provided by the Theognidean corpus and the Attic skolia. This will lead me to
describe the practice of metapoiēsis, the correction and alteration of other poets' verses,
which  is  emblematic  of  the  highly  agonistic  stances  involved  in  the  production  of
poems.  Then,  I  will  point  out  how sympotic  competition  could  have  consequences
which went beyond the simple victory in poetic games, as the guests exploited contests
to test other people's fidelity to the hetairia and to identify possible enemies. Regarding
the use of poetry as a communicative medium of values, I will show how it was used to
strengthen  and  continuously  reaffirm  the  group's  identity,  both  by  teaching  and
preserving the ideals which tied together the hetairoi, and by attacking external groups
which  were  considered  as  rivals.  Elegiac  and  iambic  poems  will  provide  eloquent
examples of this double function, as they were the privileged means of, respectively,
ethico-political  reflections  and  invective7.  Theognis'  sphragis will  exemplify  the
pedagogic role of elegy and show how the corpus was used as a deposit of values to be
preserved. As to iambic poetry, I will first discuss a iambic trimeter by Solon composed
to  attack  his  political  adversaries.  Then,  I  will  present  different  forms  of  invective
directed to individuals, ranging from mockery to insult, and conclude with Semonides'
iambic poem directed against women.
The basic form of poetic entertainment at the symposium consisted in the guests'
performing poems in turn, so as to show their intellectual and executive abilities. As
displays of excellence, such poetic performances were characterized by a high level of
competitiveness and could also assume the character of a real and proper game, where
the most skilled performers improvised lines of poetry while taking up another guest's
7 The borders between elegy and iambos were not so neatly defined, especially in the Archaic and early
Classical period, so that we can find iambic poems which deal with topics which later became exclusive
to elegy. Thus, at this early stage, iambic poetry as a genre could not be totally identified with invective,
even though it represented the privileged medium for blaming purposes. On this issue, see Carey 2009(a),
pp. 21-22; 149-151; Kantzios 2005, pp. 100-131; Rotstein 2010, pp. 88-97 and passim. On iambos, see
also Carey 2009(b). On elegy, see Aloni 2009 and Budelmann-Power 2013.
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verses8.  The  Theognidean  corpus  and  the  Attic  skolia  preserve  the  traces  of  this
improvisational  game  in  the  so-called  “agonistic  couplets”,  groups  of  two  verses
performed in sequence, with one being the response to another by means of antithesis,
or  correction  and  variation  (metapoiēsis)9.  For  example,  two  skolia  play  with  the
opposition between homosexual and heterosexual love through a variation on the basic
form “I wish I were”: “I wish I were a lovely lyre of ivory/ and lovely boys would take
me to their dithyrambic dance” (carm. conv. 900); “I wish I were a lovely pendant, big,
fine gold,/ and a lovely lady would wear me with purity in her heart” (carm. conv.
901)10.
The succession of different couplets might also produce real and proper chains
of verses,  examples of which are preserved in the Theognidean corpus11. Three distichs,
for instance, are linked by the theme of reputation and the consequent praise or blame
which it generates12. The initial couplet states that, among fellow citizens, some will
speak well  and some ill  of a person, independently from his actual  merits  or faults
(“Enjoy yourself. As for the wretched townsfolk,/ some will speak ill of you and some
good”, ll. 795-796). The reply is that praise and blame are addressed only to good men,
with blame, we can infer,  due to envy, whereas bad people are not spoken of at all
(“Some carp at men of worth, others approve of them:/ bad people are not spoken of at
all”, ll. 797-798). As response, the last couplet expresses the idea that nobody is actually
free from fault, but generally it is better not to be the object of other people's attention
(“There is no one born on earth with whom no fault is found./ But it is best with fewest
people  paying  heed”,  ll.  799-800).  This  sympotic  chain  is  noteworthy  because  it
8 Cf. Ford 2002, p. 32; Griffith 2009, pp. 89-90. Theognis 993-996 describes the beginning of a poetical
competition where the prize is a young boy: “Just set us, Academus, to compete in song,/ and let there be
a boy in choicest bloom/ for prize, as you and I contest in artistry”.
9 Cf. Vetta 1992, pp. 196-198. For a detailed analysis of the game of skolia, see Collins 2004, pp. 84-134.
10 On this couplet, see Vetta 1983, pp. XXXII-XXXIII and Collins 2004, pp. 122-124.
11 For an overview of the chains identified in the corpus, see Colesanti 1998, p. 220, n. 52.
12 Thgn. 795-800. Tr. West, modified.
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contains an instance of reuse of another poet's verses, as the couplet 795-796 derives
from an elegy by Mimnermus (Mimn.  7 W).  The practice  of  reuse was a  common
stratagem used by guests  as  alternative to  extemporary compositions,  but  it  did not
completely exclude personal intervention, since the original lines could be modified and
adapted to the context13.
The partial correction and transformation of renowned verses is another instance
of  metapoiēsis,  which has  been already mentioned as  operating in  the formation of
agonistic  couplets.  This  practice  well  represents  the  high  degree  of  competitiveness
which informed poetic performances and could also be used by poets to challenge other
poets. This is the case, for example, in these lines by Mimnermus, also corrected by
Solon:
αἲ γὰρ ἄτερ νούσων τε καὶ ἀργαλέων μελεδωνέων 
ἑξηκονταέτη μοῖρα κίχοι θανάτου.
I pray my fated death may catch me
hale and hearty at threescore years.
                                                       Mimn. 6 W   
This is Solon's reply:
ἀλλ᾽ εἴ μοι καὶ νῦν ἔτι πείσεαι, ἔξελε τοῦτο
μηδὲ μέγαιρ᾽, ὅτι σέο λῶιον ἐπεφρασάμην
καὶ μεταποίησον Λιγιαστάδη, ὧδε δ᾽ ἄειδε·
“ὀγδωκονταέτη μοῖρα κίχοι θανάτου”. 
If you'll still obey me, take that out,
don't mind me having better thoughts than you,
and change it, Ligyastades, and sing,
“I pray my death may catch me at fourscore years”.
                                                        Sol. 20 W
                                                                     
Solon criticizes Mimnermus for having expressed the desire of dying at the age of sixty
and asks him to change (metapoiēson) the final line of his elegy replacing ʻsixtyʼ with
ʻeightyʼ. The poem was in all probability composed in response to another symposiast
13 This is the case, for example, of 153-154, a modified Solonian distich (fr. 6.3-4 W), or 1003-1006
which reprise Tyrtaeus' fragment 12.13-16 W. In some cases, variants might be attributed to involuntary
mnemonic errors, cf. Colesanti 1998, pp. 210-211.
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who quoted Mimnermus, presumably to sing a poem about the theme “the right age for
dying”14. The tone conveys Solon's firm belief in his superiority, as he not only invites
his  adversary  to  obey him,  but  also  not  to  bear  grudge  against  him  for  his  better
thoughts.  The  agonistic  stance  is  further  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  two  levels  of
competition merge here, as the poem is composed with the desire of outperforming the
other  guest  and,  at  the  same  time,  Mimnermus  himself.  Solon  is  thus  engaged  in
something more than a simple party game. Actually, he enters in direct confrontation
with another poet and challenges his authority. However simple the correction which he
makes might appear, just by substituting a word he demonstrates himself to be a poet as
skilful as his rival, and, more importantly, to be capable of better thoughts.
Being a way to demonstrate one's own superiority, poetic games were a direct
reflection  of  the  aristocratic  ideal  which  closely  linked  competition  and
excellence/virtue  (aretē).  Actually,  the  symposium  itself  was  considered  by  the
participants  as  an  opportunity to  show their  aretē.  The  following anonymous  elegy
(dated to the 5th century BCE) eloquently illustrates this idea:  
χαίρετε συμπόται ἄνδρες ὁμ[ήλικες ἐ]ξ ἀγαθοῦ γὰρ
ἀρξάμενος τελέω τὸν λόγον [ε]ἰ̣ς ἀγα̣[θό]ν̣.    p    . αἲ ς ἀγα̣[θό]ν̣.    p    . αἲ γὰρ ἄτερ νού[θό]ν. 
χρὴ δ᾽, ὅτα̣[θό]ν̣.    p    . αἲ γὰρ ἄτερ νούν εἰ̣ς ἀγα̣[θό]ν̣.    p    . αἲ ς τοιοῦτο συνέλθωμεν φίλοι ἄνδρες 
πρᾶγμα, γελᾶν παίζειν χρησαμένους ἀρετῆι, 
ἥδεσθαί τε συνόντας, ἐς ἀλλήλους τε φ[λ]υαρεῖν 
καὶ σκώπτειν τοιαῦθ᾽ οἷα γέλωτα φέρειν. 
ἡ δὲ σπουδὴ ἑπέσθω, ἀκούωμέν [τε λ]εγόντων 
ἐν μέρει· ἥδ᾽ ἀρετὴ συμποσίου πέλετα̣[θό]ν̣.    p    . αἲ γὰρ ἄτερ νούι. 
τοῦ δὲ ποταρχοῦντος πειθώμεθα· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν
ἔργ᾽ ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, εὐλογίαν τε φέρειν. 
Hail my fellow drinkers [and age-mates]; as I begin with a good
I will bring my speech to a close with a good.
It behoves us, when we come together as friends on business
such as this, to laugh and sport with excellence,
being happy in each other's company and teasing each other
with such jokes as can be borne with a laugh.
Let serious pursuits follow, and let us listen to those who speak
in turns; this is the excellence of a symposium.
14 Cf. Noussia Fantuzzi 2010, p. 400. For a use of the poem independent from sympotic practice, see
idem, pp. 401-402.
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And let us obey the toastmaster; for this
is the work of good men, and to contribute fair speech15. 
                                                                 Adesp. eleg. 27 W
Addressing his fellow symposiasts, the speaking persona delineates the characteristics
of an ideal symposium, which should be marked by appropriateness (as the term chrē
implies) and excellence in behaviour (aretē).  Aretē is, at the same time, the governing
principle of the gathering and its aim. If the participants behave with excellence, the
symposium becomes a manifestation of aretē and thus a proof of their moral goodness,
as  emphasized  by the  repetition  of  agathos at  the  beginning  and at  the  end  of  the
poem16. The excellence of the symposium is achieved through orderliness: the comrades
are invited to obey the toastmaster17 and to respect measure both in entertainment, here
connected  to  jesting  (phluarein)  and  mocking  (skoptein),  and  in  serious  reflection:
mockery should be confined to what can be borne with a laugh and people must pay
attention to each other when they are speaking. It is important to notice that competitive
stances had a prominent role even in these moments. As to entertainment, the use of the
verb  paizō emphasizes  the  idea  of  a  game  which  momentarily  saw  the  friends  as
contestants18.  But  even serious reflection entailed a form of confrontation,  since,  by
speaking  in  turn,  the  hetairoi  expressed  their  own  ideas  and  feelings  which  were
subjected  to  the  others'  judgement  and  possible  criticism19.  This  confrontational
atmosphere  was  likely  to  get  out  of  control,  as  implied  by  the  repeated  appeal  to
15 Text and translation (slightly modified) as in Ford 2002, p. 33.
16 Cf. the ideal symposium in Xenophanes discussed in Chapter 2, pp. 51-63.
17 The toastmaster, or symposiarch, elected or chosen by lot among the guests, was responsible for all the
aspects related to wine drinking. On his duties, see von der Mühll 1983, pp. 12-16. The importance of the
symposiarch for the order of the symposium is an aspect discussed also by Plato: cf. Lg. 639d-641a.
18 The verb paizō in sympotic contexts usually indicate real and proper poetic games, cf. Collins 2004, pp.
63-66. Even though it was a game, it could have serious consequences, see below. It is worth noticing that
Gorgias will define his Encomium of Helen as a paignion (DK 82 B11.21), thus conveying the idea that
the work was produced for a competitive context.
19 Cf. Ford 2002, pp. 41-42.
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virtuous conduct and self-restraint. In fact, quarrels caused by unrestrained mockery or
aggressive speech frequently occurred20. Theognis, at 491-495, effectively describes the
risks involved in overcompetitive confrontations and urges his fellow symposiasts to
avoid strife, both when they address an individual or the group as a whole: the real
winner of sympotic competition is the man who, although he has drunk too much, does
not  say  anything  reckless,  but  contributes  to  the  peace  of  the  party21.  The  danger
originating from speaking too much was a common concern for the symposiasts, as it
could also have consequences on their victory in a subtler type of game, taking place
behind  the  façade  of  conviviality.  For  the  symposium,  besides  functioning  as  an
occasion to strengthen the bond among its members, was, at the same time, the perfect
context to test other people's intentions and to detect possible enemies and traitors22.
Poetic games could function as a useful means of evaluation, since the extemporary
performances they required, combined with the relaxing effects of wine, might reveal
participants' inner thoughts to others23. Therefore, considering that the  hetairiai were
socially and politically influential, sympotic agonism was far from being a plain and
simple game, as it could have repercussions on the life of the polis itself24.
An  example  of  the  importance  attributed  to  mutual  trust  among  friends  is
provided by Alcaeus' poems against Pittacus, a former member of the poet's  hetairia
who betrayed his comrades to share power with Myrsilus, the tyrant of 7 th-6th century
Mytilene whom Alcaeus' group wanted to overthrow, and who eventually became the
20 On sympotic quarrels, see Pellizer 1983.
21 Thgn. 491-495: “You do not know how to win praise; that man will emerge unvanquished/ who, though
he has drunk much, lets no reckless word fall;/ but speak well as you abide by the mixing bowl,/ keeping
strife far away from each other/ as you speak in the middle to one and all alike” (tr. in Ford 2002, p. 39).
22 The  loyalty  of  friends  is  the  theme  of  many Theognidean  elegies;  see  Ford  2002,  pp.  40,  with
references. For examples of the severe attacks reserved to traitors of friendship oaths, see below.
23 On the serious consequences of sympotic games, see Collins 2004, pp. 70-71; 109-110; Ford 2002, pp.
39-41. 
24 According to a common motif, there existed a close relationship between sympotic and civic order. I
will discuss this issue in Chaper 2, pp. 58-59.
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tyrant of the city after Myrsilus' death25. In one of his poems, Alcaeus invokes Zeus,
Hera and Dionysus for vengeance on Pittacus who has betrayed the oath he had made: 
Let Hyrrhas' son be visited 
by our friends vengeance, for we swore 
stern oaths that none of us would e'er 
betray a member of our company, 
but either lie in cloaks of earth,
killed by those men who then held power, 
or else put them to death, and save 
the people from its burden of distress. 
But this Potbelly gave no thought
to that. He's trampled on his oaths 
without a qualm, and devours 
our city [...]26.
                                      Alc. 129 Voigt
These lines effectively convey the importance of unity among hetairoi, and the sacral
significance of the oath binding them, since breaking it is considered a fault which must
be punished by the gods27. Moreover, the poem emphasizes the connection between the
hetairia  and  the  city,  as  the  violation  of  the  oath  which  established  the  group  is
considered as a betrayal of the  polis  itself: instead of saving the city with his former
comrades, Pittacus is actually ravaging it like an animal, as indicated by the use of the
verb ‘to devour’ (daptein) to describe his conduct28. 
Having  presented  the  main  characteristics  of  poetic  performances  at  the
symposium as a form of entertainment, I will now turn to the role of poetry as a medium
for strengthening the bonds among the hetairoi, resulting from its being used to preserve
the group's values and to attack external adversaries. The Theognidean corpus of elegies
is probably the most famous example of how sympotic poetry could be used to establish
a set  of rules  of  behaviour  informed by the ideals  of  the  hetairia.  The pedagogical
25 Myrsilus  too is  the  target  of  Alcaeus'  attacks:  in  a  fragment,  he  exhorts  his  companions  to  resist
Myrsilus' conspiracy, inviting them to stay firm in their battle position and not to accept the rule of one
single man (129.13-24 V). In another poem, he celebrates Myrsilus' death as a joyful event: “Now we
must drink with might and main,/ get drunk, for Myrsilus is dead!” (332 V; tr. West).
26 Tr. West.
27 On the imagery of oath and punishment in this fragment, see Bachvarova 2007. For another curse
against an oath breaker, cf. Hippon. 115 W, discussed below.
28 On the use of animal imagery in blaming poetry, cf. below.
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function of the corpus is stressed by the fact that many poems of ethical and political
content are addressed to Cyrnus, the young lover of the speaking persona. As stated in
one of the elegies, Cyrnus is the last recipient of a series of good counsels which the
speaker himself learned in his childhood from worthy men (“It is with good intent to
you, Cyrnus, that I will give you good advice/ that as a boy I learned from men of
worth”,  ll.  27-28).  Thus,  the teachings  of the group are continuously preserved and
reaffirmed generation after  generation,  making the elegies the deposit  of a series of
values which become a possession common to all the people who share them29.
 As to the use of poetry to attack rival groups or individuals,  iambic poems
provide  some of  the  most  striking  examples  of  the  aggressiveness  which  could  be
conveyed by means of verse. An iambic trimeter  by Solon (36 W), for example,  is
directed against his political adversaries and, simultaneously, serves as a defence for his
conduct. In the poem, Solon responds to the critics of his policy, both the dēmos and the
nobles/rich faction opposing his reforms, in a severe and confrontational language. The
fragment opens with a question directly replying to those who assert that Solon has not
achieved all that he has promised: “Those aims for which I called the public meeting/
which of them, when I stopped, was still  to achieve?” (36. 1-2 W). The tone of the
question implies that, contrary to what is asserted by his adversaries, Solon has carried
out all his promises, a claim emphasized by the initial position of egō de30. Next, Solon
lists his achievements, stressing his ability in mediating between the different parts of
the city by writing laws for all (36.18-20 W). After defending his results, he starts to
attack harshly the dēmos and the rival aristocratic party. He argues that if someone else
had been in power in his place, this man would have not restrained the dēmos, with all
29 Note that the exclusive character of the teachings is recognized by the poet himself: “I cannot please all
my fellow citizens” (l. 24), cf. Vetta 1992, p. 195. Another example of transmission of values through
poetry is provided by the exhortatory elegies of Tyrtaeus and Callinus which exalt the aretē gained on the
battlefield.
30 The initial  egō de may indicate that the poem was conceived as part of a sympotic chain, with Solon
taking up the remarks of another symposiast, cf. Noussia Fantuzzi 2010, pp. 460-462.
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the  consequent  risks  for  the  social  order:  “But  if  another  man  had  got  the  goad,/
someone impudent or acquisitive,/ he'd not have checked the mob” (36. 20-22 W). The
use of the term ‘goad’ (kentron)  immediately conveys a negative characterization of the
dēmos, compared to an animal which needs both to be incited and restrained, because it
is not able to guide itself31. For this reason, it was a good thing that Solon ruled the city
and not someone else who, guided by imprudence and desire of gain, would have been
ready to grant the people everything they wanted. Besides the  dēmos, Solon did not
comply with the requests of the members of opposing aristocratic factions, to whom he
refers as adversaries (enantioi, 36. 23 W). Then, in the final lines, Solon's invective
reaches its peak when he portrays himself as a wolf and his critics as dogs surrounding
him on every side. “[...] I turned to guard my every side,/ a wolf at bay amid a pack of
hounds” (36. 26-27 W32). This animal metaphor is rich in meaning, but here I would
only like to highlight its invective function33: the use of animal imagery and epithets,
already hinted at in the previous lines by ‘goad’, is a common feature of blame poetry,
which  can  be  found,  for  example,  in  the  iambs  of  Archilochus,  Semonides  and
Hipponax34. Moreover, according to a common poetic image already present in epic,
‘dog’ is  used  as  an  epithet  to  announce  a  person's  shamelessness,  especially  in
quarrels35. As to the figure of the wolf – besides being usually reputed better than dogs,
in  Archilochus'  iambs it  is  the very symbol of blame poetry36.  Thus,  by identifying
himself with a wolf, Solon further accentuates the invective character of his poem37. 
31 On this point, see Noussia Fantuzzi 2010, p. 479-481.
32 Tr. West.
33 For a detailed discussion of the metaphor and its possible interpretations, see Noussia Fantuzzi 2010,
pp. 482-485.
34 Cf. Kantzios 2005, pp. 35-38. On iambos and invective, see below.
35 Cf. Nagy 1999, pp. 226-227. 
36 For a survey of the connotations of the terms ‘dog’ and ‘wolf’, see Noussia Fantuzzi 2010, pp. 482-485.
37 Similar stances are present in another Solonian trimeter, 37 W, where the statesman points out  the
limited insight of the dēmos and the aristocracy, the two competing parts he must balance to avoid strife.
However,  differently from the other poem, where the critics receive a common treatment, here Solon
addresses the aristocratic faction with more conciliatory tones, while the dēmos is made object of harsher
reproaches. For a commentary, see Noussia Fantuzzi 2010, pp. 487-496.
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Solon's use of trimeter to attack political enemies is an instance of the many
possible uses of iambic poetry for the purposes of blaming38. Invective could also be
more personal, i.e. directed to specific individuals, and spanned from mockery to violent
blame and insult39. The tradition according to which Archilochus' attacks on Lycambes
and his daughters led them to commit suicide well exemplifies the level of violence that
could  be  reached40.  Another  example  is  provided  by Hipponax's  fragment  115 W41,
which contains a violent curse against a former friend who has betrayed an oath of loyal
friendship. The tone resembles that of Alcaeus' poem against Pittacus (129 V), in which
the traitor is described as trampling on the oath he made42, but here the violence is more
explicit, as the punishment for the traitor is crudely and minutely described: the poet
wishes him to suffer shipwreck and to be driven by the waves to the land of Thracians,
naked, covered in seaweed, with chattering teeth and lying prostrate with the face in the
sand  like  a  dog.  Moreover,  he  desires  to  see  him  enslaved  by  the  Thracians  and
suffering a multitude of woes43.
 Besides  these  more  brutal  examples,  iambs  were  also  employed  for  those
moments of sympotic entertainment based on mockery towards friends44, and for playful
invective against people outside the group. Although entertaining, it is worth noticing
that  these  examples  are  not  entirely  devoid  of  confrontational  aspects:  mockery  of
38 On the relationship between blame and iambos, see Rotstein 2010, pp. 88-97.
39 Blame poetry against individuals had a specific social function, complementary to that of praise (see
Nagy 1999, pp. 222-242). Both types of poetry were performed at the symposium, but here I will focus on
the overt aggressive character of blame. For an overview of the different types of praise, see Bowie 2002.
40 This independently of the historical existence of Lycambes: on the tradition, see Carey 2009(b), p. 153;
on Lycambes as stock character of Archilochus' poetry, see Nagy 1999, p. 248. A similar story is narrated
about Hipponax and his privileged victim, Boupalos. In an interesting article, R. Gagné argues that the
figure  of  Lycambes  represents  the  breach  of  the  oath  between  sumpotai.  Because  of  his  conduct,
Lycambes deserves  the expulsion from the symposium and,  consequently,  social  isolation (cf. Gagné
2009, pp. 264-267). 
41 The poem is one of the Strasbourg Epodes which some have attributed to Archilochus. For an overview
of the debate,  see Kirkwood 1961, pp. 269-270. See also the critical edition of Hipponax by Degani
(Degani 1991, p. 168).
42 Hippon. 115. 14-16 W: “That's what I'd like to see done/ to my betrayer who has trampled on his oaths,/
who was my friend in the past” (tr. West).
43 Cf. Hippon. 115. 4-13 W.
44 Cf. above. On invective against friends, see Nagy 1999, pp. 243-245. 
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comrades was actually a controlled form of aggression, while invective addressed to
external elements served to stress the differentiation of the group from the outside45. An
example of friendly mockery is provided by a poem by Archilochus, where the poet
chastises Pericles for his immoderate love for drinking, which made him completely
forget the most basic sympotic manners: not only did he come uninvited, but he also
drank a great quantity of unmixed wine, without contributing to the common expenses46.
As to mockery aimed at external targets, it was often directed to people belonging to the
class of craftsmen. Two of Hipponax's fragments, 4-4a and 28 W, provide an eloquent
example: in the first one, the soothsayer Cicon is referred to as an “ill-starred priest”
who prophesies only misfortunes47, whereas the second contains a ferocious invective
against  the  painter  Mimnes48.  The  artist  is  attacked  for  his  incompetence,  as,  in
decorating a ship, he painted a serpent that was turned from the prow to the stern. Since
this was considered a bad omen, the painter is harshly insulted for his social origin and
his  sexual  behaviour:  he  is  called  “base-born”  and  katomochanos,  a  term  which
indicates someone so debauched that he is literally ‘opened up to his shoulders’49.
Another  external  target  of  invective  were  women,  who  could  be  attacked
individually, or generically, as in these trenchant lines by Hipponax: “Two days in a
woman's life give greatest pleasure:/ those of her wedding and her funeral” (68 W50).
However,  it  is  with  Semonides  that  female  sex  is  condemned  without  appeal.  In
fragment 7 W, he lists different types of woman on the basis of their resemblance to a
45 On the implications of mocking friends, see Pellizer 1983, Aloni 2006, pp. 88-89. On the significance
of invective against external people, see Aloni loc. cit. p. 92.
46 Archil. 124 W: “Like Mykonos people/ You drank a great quantity of unmixed wine/ and brought no
contribution.../  and  you  didn't  wait  to  be  invited,  like/  a  friend;  your  belly  led  your  wits  astray/  to
shamelessness”. Cf. Kantzios 2005, pp. 23-24. For other examples, see Aloni 2006, p. 89.
47 Hippon. 4-4a W: “Cicon […] the ill-starred priest/ prophesying nothing auspicious” (tr. Gerber).
48 Hippon. 28 W: “Mimnes, you who gape open all  the way to the shoulders  don't  paint  again on a
trireme's many-benched side a serpent that runs from the ram to the helmsman; for this is a dangerous
omen for the helmsman, you slave born of a slave and […] if the serpent bites him on the shin” (tr.
Gerber).
49 Cf.  Kantzios 2005, p. 47. For examples of Archilochus' attacks on craftsmen, see Aloni 2006, p. 89.
50 Tr. West.
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certain animal51. Each type is actually said to have been created from the specific animal
from which it has inherited its characteristics. For example the woman originating from
the sow is dirty, that from the fox is cunning, that from the monkey is ugly, and so on.
The only woman who possess good qualities is the one originating from the bee, as she
is affectionate and makes the life of her husband prosperous (7. 83-93 W). Despite this
apparently virtuous example, however, the final part of the poem is categorical: women
are the greatest evil that Zeus has created and even those who appear respectable are, in
fact, responsible for the greatest outrage52. The succession of vignettes portraying the
vices of the different kinds of women has an amusing effect which makes the poem apt
to entertain the men gathered at the symposium53. However, the poem also betrays more
serious contents, as it is the result of an androcratic perspective trying to cope with the
idea that women, despite all the problems they cause to men, are nonetheless the object
of desire and thus an essential part of men's life54. 
The various examples of poetry previously examined are the result of the intense
competitive atmosphere pervading the symposium. Competition took place between the
group and the outside, but also within the group itself. In both cases, poetry represented
a  privileged  means  of  confrontation.  As  to  the  former,  the  poetic  expression  and
preservation of the ideals of the group, combined with the concomitant invective against
targets external to it (women, political factions or social classes), was decisive for the
continuous reaffirmation of its identity in opposition to the outside. Regarding internal
competition,  poetical games and mockery were the battlefield on which symposiasts
confronted each other, often with the aim of testing their real intentions and discovering
51 Two types of woman originate from natural elements: earth and sea, respectively described at ll. 21-26
and 27-42.
52 Semon. 7. 96-99: “The worst plague Zeus ever made/ is women. Even if they look to be of some benefit
to the one who has them,/ to him especially do they turn out to be a plague”.
53 On the place of the poem in the symposium, and the possible modes of performance, see Kantzios
2005, p. 25.
54 Cf. Carey 2009(b), pp. 161-162. Burzacchini 2002, pp. 207-208.
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possible  traitors.  Thus,  in  the  fiercely  agonistic  arena  of  the  symposium,  poetry
represented one of the most versatile and efficacious weapons for a competition which,
on  a  minor  scale,  reflected  the  wider  agonism  which  characterized  the  social  and
political life of the polis.
1.2 - Rhapsodic contests
Ancient evidence presents rhapsodes as essentially engaged in competitive activities55.
One of the earliest references to rhapsodic competition is an edict of Cleisthenes, the
tyrant of Sicyon, banning rhapsodic contests in the city after the war against the Argives
(approximately at the beginning of the 6th century)56 and it is reasonable to think that the
agōnes which Heraclitus mentions in B42 DK are competitions among rhapsodes57.
Apart from these brief hints, that competition was rhapsodes' primary activity is
made evident at  the very beginning of Plato's  Ion,  probably our most extensive and
influential ancient source about the figure of the rhapsode58. Socrates meets Ion just as
he has arrived at Athens from Epidauros, where he has competed and won the first prize
at the rhapsodic competition held on the occasion of the festival of Asclepius. Ion hopes
to do the same at the Panathenaia, the festival in honour of Athena held in Athens every
four  years,  which  culminated  in  the  offering  of  the  peplos to  the  goddess59.  The
55 Davison points out the lack of evidence, except for the literary one, about rhapsodic competitions:
“rhapsodic  competitions are known only to  the literary tradition” (Davison 1958,  p.  37,  n22). Nagy
responds providing an inscription from Eretria  in  Euboea (ca.  341/40 BCE) relating to  a  festival  of
Artemis, in which rhapsodic contests are explicitly mentioned as a part of the music competitions which
took place during the festival (see Nagy 2002, pp. 39-40).
56 Cf. Hdt. V 67. 3-7.
57 Heraclit. B42 DK: τόν τε Ὅμηρον ἄξιον ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ ῥαπίζεσθαι καὶ Ἀρχίλοχον
ὁμοίως,  “Homer is  worth of  being banished from the contests  and of being beaten with a  stick and
Archilochus too”. The reference to rhapsodes is given by the verb  rhapizō (ʻbeat with a stickʼ, from
rhapis,  ʻrodʼ), linked to the etymology that connects the term ʻrhapsodeʼ with rhabdos (ʻstaffʼ). On this
point, cf. Graziosi 2002, p. 29.
58 Plato's account of rhapsodic activity is influenced by his hostility against the importance ascribed to
poetry in Greek society, but, apart from some dramatizations, there are no compelling motives to consider
it unreliable, at least for the information related to the mode of performance.
59 This festival was also known as the Great Panathenaia (megalē Panathēnaia), in order to distinguish it
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language is rich in terms conveying the sense of battle,  rivalry and the conquest of
opponents:
{ΣΩ.} Τὸν Ἴωνα χαίρειν. πόθεν τὰ νῦν ἡμῖν ἐπιδεδήμηκας; ἢ οἴκοθεν ἐξ Ἐφέσου;
{ΙΩΝ.} Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ Ἐπιδαύρου ἐκ τῶν Ἀσκληπιείων. {ΣΩ.} Μῶν
καὶ ῥαψῳδῶν ἀγῶνα τιθέασιν τῷ θεῷ οἱ Ἐπιδαύριοι; {ΙΩΝ.} Πάνυ γε, καὶ τῆς ἄλλης
γε μουσικῆς. {ΣΩ.} Τί οὖν; ἠγωνίζου τι ἡμῖν; καὶ πῶς τι ἠγωνίσω; {ΙΩΝ.} Τὰ πρῶτα
τῶν  ἄθλων  ἠνεγκάμεθα,  ὦ  Σώκρατες.  {ΣΩ.}  Εὖ  λέγεις  ἄγε  δὴ  ὅπως  καὶ  τὰ
Παναθήναια νικήσομεν. {ΙΩΝ.} Ἀλλ᾽ ἔσται ταῦτα, ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ. 
{S.}  Welcome,  Ion.  From  where  have  you  just  come  to  us?  From  home,  from
Ephesus? {I.} Not at all, Socrates, but from Epidaurus, from the festival of Asclepius
{S.} Surely the Epidaurioi do not dedicate also to the god contests of rhapsodes? {I.}
Certainly, and even [contests] of other types of musical art. {S.} What then? Did you
compete on our behalf? And how did it go? {I.} We have won the first of the prizes,
Socrates. {S.} Well spoken. Come on, then, so that we will win the Panathenaia too.
{I.} But this will be, if the god wants.
                                                                                                                       Pl. Ion 530a1-b3
It is important to notice the close connection between agonism and the institution of
religious festivals emerging from the passage. Both occasions of Ion's performances are
feasts in honour of a god, and it is expressly said that the contests were dedicated to the
divinity. Thus, competition was a form of celebration of the god and, consequently, an
essential part of the events in the programme60. This holds in the case of both local and
Panhellenic  festivals,  which hosted different  types  of  agōnes,  including athletic  and
musical competitions. At the Panathenaia, for example, there were also sporting contests
and, except for the Olympiad, all of the Panhellenic Games reserved a space for contests
in music61. As a result of being part of a festival, the agōnes were placed under the strict
from the annual Panathenaia (Panathēnaia ta kath'ekaston eniauton  or  mikra).  Usually,  ʻPanathenaiaʼ
alone refers to the Great Panathenaia (cf. Davison 1958, p. 23). On the origin of the festival and the
relationship between the two Panathenaia, see Davison 1958, p. 26. On the structure of the festival, see
Arist. Ath. 60. 1-3; Nagy 2002, pp. 40-41. Rhapsodic competitions are attested by literary sources starting
from the 6th century, but contemporary archaeological evidence is lacking, as stressed by Davison (cf.
Davison 1958, p. 39 and Collins 2004, pp.168-169). 
60 The relationship to the divine is stressed by Ion when he says that his victory depends on the god's will.
Plato will turn this idea against poetry itself through the theory of enthousiasmos, expounded later in the
dialogue  (533c9-535a2). According  to  it,  rhapsodes  and  poets  are  inspired  by  the  divinity  and,
consequently, they are not in their mind during the performance. But this is equivalent to say that poetry
is not a form of knowledge, with the result that rhapsodic activity, despite Ion's initial claim, cannot be
considered an art.
61 On the athletic contests at the Panathenaia,  see Kyle 1992, pp. 77-102. Musical competitions were
integral  part  of the Pythian and the Isthmian Games, as the presence of a theatre on the sites of the
festivals suggests. According to Pausanias (Paus. X 7.2-8), the very foundation act of the Pythian games
was the assignment of prizes for the singing of hymns to Apollo; the importance of musical competitions
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control of the political and religious authorities responsible for the organization of the
event. This means that competition was institutionalized, and that it assumed a precise
configuration with definite rules and structures. The musical contests of the Panthenaia
provide an example of this organization, since they were divided in different categories,
each with specific prizes62. There were competitions not only between rhapsodes, but
also between kithara and flute players, and kitharodes and aulodes. The prizes were in
gold and silver and the most valuable were assigned to kitharodes who could win up to
1500 drachmas63.
With  regard  to  the  structure  of  the  contests,  the  rhapsodic  agōnes of  the
Panathenaia offer an important testimony of the level of organization of the festival, as
they were regulated by the so-called “Panathenaic Rule” about  the recitation of  the
Homeric poems64: 
[…] Ἱππάρχῳ, ὃς τῶν Πεισιστράτου παίδων ἦν πρεσβύτατος καὶ σοφώτατος, ὃς ἄλλα
τε πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα σοφίας ἀπεδείξατο, καὶ τὰ Ὁμήρου ἔπη πρῶτος ἐκόμισεν εἰς
τὴν γῆν ταυτηνί, καὶ ἠνάγκασε τοὺς ῥαψῳδοὺς Παναθηναίοις ἐξ ὑπολήψεως ἐφεξῆς
αὐτὰ διιέναι, ὥσπερ νῦν ἔτι οἵδε  ποιοῦσιν.
[…] To Hipparchus, who was the oldest and the wisest of the sons of Peisistratus, who
made a public demonstration of many and beautiful deeds of wisdom, and was the first
to  bring  to  this  land  the  poems  of  Homer,  and  compelled  the  rhapsodes  at  the
Panathenaia to go through these in sequence, by relay, just as they still do nowadays65.
                                                                                                           [Pl.] Hipparch. 228b5-c1
is also stressed by Pindar's  Pythian 12, dedicated to the flute player Midas of Acragas. There were also
contests in drama and in poetry and prose composition, but the date of their introduction is uncertain (they
are attested in the first century AD; cf. Miller 2004, pp. 84-86). Nemean Games included musical contests
only in the Hellenistic period, when the games were transferred to Argos (mid-third century BCE). As to
the Olympian Games, the only non-athletic competitions were those for heralds and trumpeters, added for
the first time in 396 BCE and held on the first day of the games (cf. Lee 2001, pp. 32-34). On other
festivals including musical contests, see Rostein 2012 and the relative bibliography.
62 Another striking example of organization is provided by the dithyrambic and dramatic contests of the
Great Dionysia (see section 1.3).
63 This was a great sum, taking into account that the average daily wage of an artisan was one drachma
(cf. Kerferd 1981, p. 28). On the prizes in silver for the winners in musical competition, see Arist. Ath. 60
3.7-8; see also Davison 1958, pp. 37-38; Shapiro 1992, p. 58 and Rostein 2012, pp. 105-106. 
64 Cf. Davison 1955, p. 7. Rhapsodic contests at the Panathenaia are closely connected to the Homeric
poems (see also Lycurg.  In Leocratem  102), but rhapsodes' repertoire was not limited to Homer only:
Plato mentions also Hesiod and Archilocus (Pl. Ion 531a2); the latter, as previously shown, is named by
Heraclitus too. Herodotus' report on Cleisthenes, despite the explicit reference to Homer, suggests that the
performances involved material from the Theban cycle (see Nagy 1990, p. 22n22).
65 I follow here, with some modifications, Nagy's translation (cf. Nagy 2002, pp. 9-10).
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Τά  τε  Ὁμήρου  ἐξ  ὑποβολῆς  γέγραφε  ῥαψῳδεῖσθαι,  οἷον  ὅπου  ὁ  πρῶτος  ἔληξεν,
ἐκεῖθεν ἄρχεσθαι τὸν ἐχόμενον. 
He  [Solon]  has  written  a  law  that  the  works  of  Homer  are  to  be  performed
rhapsodically, by cue, so that wherever the first left off, from that point the next should
start66.
                                                                                                                    D. L. 1.57.6-7
Setting aside the question related to  the authorship of the rule emerging from these
testimonies67, it is important to focus on what appears to be the basic structure of the
contest, i.e. performance in sequence and by relay/cue68. Nagy points out the essential
agonistic character of the relay mechanism, consisting in a “competitive exchange”69 in
which each rhapsode started his performance from the point where his opponent left off,
with  the  final  aim  of  beating  him.  The  intrinsic  bond  between  sequencing  and
competition is also stated in the myth about the origin of the word ʻrhapsodeʼ, contained
in a scholia to Pindar's Nemea 2.1. There the commentator says that the competitors, by
contrast to the past when they competed singing whichever part of the Homeric poems
they  wanted,  contended  by  reciting  the  parts  in  a  determined  sequence  so  as  to
reproduce the poems in their  entirety.  Their  activity was described as a stitching of
songs and,  consequently,  they were called  rhapsodes  (from  rhaptein,  ʻto  stitchʼ  and
aoidē,  ʻsongʼ)70.  In order to succeed in this  kind of competition,  rhapsodes'  primary
66 I follow here, with some modifications, Nagy's translation (cf. Nagy 2002, p. 14).
67 Beside Solon and Hipparchus, another candidate for the institution of the rule is Pericles (cf. Plu. Per.
13.6); for a discussion of the evidence, see Davison 1955, pp. 7-15 and Davison 1958, pp. 38-39; on the
role of Pericles in the organization of the musical contests, see also Shapiro 1992, p. 57. A different
approach  to  the  question  is  adopted  by Nagy (see  Nagy 2002,  pp.  14-15).  As  to  the  nature  of  the
innovation  represented  by  the  rule,  Davison  and  Collins  argue  that  it  has  to  be  understood  as  a
reorganization of preceding contests and not as their first institution (cf. Davison 1958, p. 39 and Collins
2004, p. 168). On these issues, see also Nannini 2010, pp. 22-24.
68 Nagy translates the expressions ex hupolēpseōs and ex hupobolēs as ʻby relayʼ; ex hupobolēs usually is
translated  as  ʻby  cueʼ,  but  see  Nagy's  justification  in  Nagy  2002,  pp.  20-22.  I  agree  with  Collins'
traditional  translation,  accepted  on  the  consideration  that  ʻby  cueʼ  does  not  necessarily  involve  the
presence of an external prompter, since “in competitive poetic contests oral cues can be given by one
singer to another in performance” (cf. Collins 2004, p. 195).
69 Collins 2004, p. 174.
70 Cf. Schol. Pind. N. 2.1d: οἱ δὲ, ὅτι κατὰ μέρος πρότερον τῆς ποιήσεως διαδεδομένης τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν
ἕκαστος ὅ τι βούλοιτο μέρος ᾖδε, τοῦ δὲ ἄθλου τοῖς νικῶσιν ἀρνὸς ἀποδεδειγμένου προσαγορευθῆναι
τότε μὲν ἀρνῳδούς, αὖθις δὲ ἑκατέρας τῆς ποιήσεως εἰσενεχθείσης τοὺς ἀγωνιστὰς οἷον ἀκουμένους πρὸς
ἄλληλα τὰ μέρη καὶ τὴν σύμπασαν ποίησιν ἐπιόντας, ῥαψῳδοὺς προσαγορευθῆναι. ταῦτά φησι Διονύσιος
ὁ Ἀργεῖος, “others [say] that before, since the poem had been handed down in parts and each of the
competitors sang the part he wanted, and a lamb was assigned as prize for the winners, at the time they
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ability  had  to  be  relay  mnemonics,  that  is  the  capacity  of  readily  making  mental
connections so as to continue the narrative from the point where their opponent has
stopped. 
However, readiness of memory was not the only ingredient necessary for the
success of a rhapsode, as Plato suggests when he makes Ion explain to Socrates the
emotional effect of his performance on the audience:
καθορῶ  γὰρ  ἑκάστοτε  αὐτοὺς  ἄνωθεν  ἀπὸ  τοῦ  βήματος  κλάοντάς  τε  καὶ  δεινὸν
ἐμβλέποντας καὶ συνθαμβοῦντας τοῖς λεγομένοις. δεῖ γάρ με καὶ σφόδρ᾽ αὐτοῖς τὸν
νοῦν προσέχειν·  ὡς  ἐὰν μὲν κλάοντας  αὐτοὺς  καθίσω,  αὐτὸς  γελάσομαι  ἀργύριον
λαμβάνων, ἐὰν δὲ γελῶντας, αὐτὸς κλαύσομαι ἀργύριον ἀπολλύς. 
For, every time I look down to them from the stage above, I see them crying, looking
terrible  and  astounded  at  what  has  been  said.  For  it  is  necessary that  I  turn  my
attention to them: since if I make them cry, I myself will laugh all the way to the bank,
but if I make them laugh, I will be the sad sack, since I will have squandered my cash.
                                                                                                                Pl. Ion 535e1-e6
From this passage it is evident that what assured the final victory was to succeed in
making the audience feel the emotions proper to the particular episode as narrated by
the  rhapsode;  in  this  case,  for  example,  Ion  is  describing  himself  dealing  with  a
sorrowful scene and says that he will laugh (that is, he will win the prize) only if he will
be able to make the public cry. What here is at stake is the vividness created during the
performance: more vividness makes the recital more effective, as it grasps and involves
the audience in a sort of spell which grants the triumph to the rhapsode71. 
Another important aspect of the rhapsodic activity portrayed by Plato's Ion is the
fact that rhapsodes were expected to have a complete knowledge of the dianoia of the
poet  whose  verses  they  recited  (ἐκμανθάνειν  τὴν  διάνοιαν  τοῦ  ποιητοῦ)72.  Poetic
were called lamb-singers. Later, when each of the poems was introduced, the competitors, so to speak,
mending  the  parts  to  each  other  and  coming  to  the  whole  poem,  were  called  rhapsodes”.  On  the
etymology presented in this testimony, see Nagy 1996, pp. 61-62 and Graziosi 2002, p. 23. Collins points
out the matters about the exact definition of what the rhapsodes sewed together and raises doubts about
the fact that during the Panathenaia the  Iliad and the Odyssey  were recited in their entirety (cf. Collins
2004, p. 180 and p. 193).
71 As regards the impact on the public, one should also mention the rhapsode's way of dressing, which
Plato describes at Ion. 530b5-c1. On the effects of poetry, cf. also Grg. B11 DK and Romilly 1975, pp. 5-
22.
72 Cf. Pl. Ion 530b10-c1. 
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dianoia appears to be the poet's thought or intention at the moment of the composition73,
and to know it is the necessary condition of being a good rhapsode, as explained by
Socrates in the following passage:
οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτό ποτε ἀγαθὸς ῥαψῳδός, εἰ μὴ συνείη τὰ λεγόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ.
τὸν γὰρ ῥαψῳδὸν ἑρμηνέα δεῖ  τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῆς διανοίας γίγνεσθαι τοῖς  ἀκούουσι·
τοῦτο δὲ καλῶς ποιεῖν μὴ γιγνώσκοντα ὅτι λέγει ὁ ποιητὴς ἀδύνατον.
For a rhapsode would never be good without understanding the things said by the
poet. For the rhapsode ought to be a mediator of the poet's intention to the audience:
but it is impossible to do this well for one who does not know what the poet is saying.
                                                                                                          Pl. Ion 530c1-c5   
A rhapsode is good only if he is able to perform well his primary function, namely to be
the intermediary (hermēneus) between the poet's intention and the audience and thereby
to connect what is distant in space and time (Homer's thought, in the specific case) to
the  present  of  the  public  attending  the  performance74.  But  in  order  to  do  this  the
rhapsode first has to understand (sunienai) and know (gignōskein) what the poet says or,
better, what he wanted to say when he composed his poetry, which is to fully grasp his
intention75.  Ion  affirms  that  for  him this  has  been  the  most  demanding  part  of  the
rhapsodic art,  but that he has finally become able to speak about Homer better than
anyone  else,  even  than  the  most  renowned  experts  in  the  field  like  Metrodorus  of
Lampsacus and Stesimbrotus of Thasos (5th century BCE)76. Metrodorus was a follower
of Anaxagoras who gave an allegorical interpretation of the Homeric poems according
to which the heroes and the gods represented, respectively, physical elements and parts
of the human body: for example Agamemnon is the aether, Achilles the sun and Helen
73 Cf. Pl.  Prot. 347a3-5:  ταῦτά μοι δοκεῖ [...] Σιμωνίδης διανοούμενος πεποιηκέναι τοῦτο τὸ ᾆσμα, “it
seems to me [...] that Simonides has composed this song intending these things”  (on this point, see Ford
2002, p. 85). Cf. also Arist. Po. 1450a6. For another interpretation of dianoia, see Nagy 2002, p. 29.
74 The translation of hermēneus as ʻmediatorʼ and not as ʻinterpreterʼ is more compatible with the passive
role of the rhapsode outlined by Plato's theory of (cf. Capuccino 2011, pp. 67-70 and Gonzales 2011, pp.
94-95).
75 But this is what, according to Plato and contrary to the common point of view, is impossible. Rhapsodes
do not understand and know Homer's thought, because, being inspired by the divinity, they are not in
possession of their mental faculties.
76 Pl. Ion 530c8-d3. Beside Metrodorus and Stesimbrotus, Ion mentions a certain Glaucon, whom it is not
possible to identify with certainty (for some hypotheses, see Murray 1996, p. 103).
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the moon, whereas Demeter is the liver, Dionysus is the spleen and Apollo the bile77.
This method of interpreting Homer was part of a tradition which, according to ancient
sources, dated back to Theagenes of Rhegium (6th century BCE), the first to argue that
the scene of the gods' battle in the  Iliad  was an allegory for the strife of the natural
elements78. As to Stesimbrotus, there is no clear evidence of his activity as an allegorist,
but in Xenophon's Symposium it is implied that he was an expert in Homer's huponoiai
(ʻunder-thoughtʼ or ʻhidden meaningʼ)79, a term which refers to any thought which lies
beneath the words  of  the poet  and applied to  a  wide variety of critical  approaches,
including  allegories,  etymologies,  wordplays  and  the  interpretations  given  by  the
Sophists80. Stesimbrotus is numbered alongside Theagenes among the earliest to inquire
into  Homer's  poetry,  birth  and  chronology81,  and  different  sources  preserve  his
contributions  in  explaining  Homeric  cruces and  in  offering  uncommon  versions  of
myths,  often  accompanied  by unusual  and  strange  etymologies82.  The  fact  that  Ion
mentions these Homeric experts to exalt his abilities is an indication of their fame and it
is  noteworthy that,  even  in  this  occasion,  the  rhapsode  is  presented  as  engaged  in
intellectual competition: Ion's boast implies that he would be able to defeat any possible
expert of Homer, since he knows and can express the poet's many fine thoughts (kalai
dianoiai)  like  no  one  ever  did.  Thanks  to  this,  he  has  also  managed  to  embellish
(kosmein) Homer in a way that should grant him a crown from the Homerides83. In other
77 DK 61 A4. According to some testimonies, Anaxagoras was the first to argue that Homer's poetry was
about justice and virtue (cf. D. L. 2.11). On Metrodorus, see Janko 1997, pp. 76-79 and Califf 2003. 
78 Cf. DK 8 A2. The scene referred to is in Hom. Il. 20 67ff. The traditional account sees in Theagenes'
allegory a means of defending Homer from the rationalistic attacks of critics like Xenophanes. For a
discussion on the evidence and the tradition, see Ford 1999, pp. 35-38. 
79 X. Smp. 3.6.
80 Cf. Ford 2002, pp. 72-73; Sammons 2012, p. 58 and Califf 2003, p. 26. 
81 DK 8  A1.  It  has  been  argued  that  Stesimbrotus  and  Theagenes  were  rhapsodes,  but  the  issue  is
controversial (cf. Ford 2002, pp. 70-72 and Janko 1997, pp. 72-73). Moreover their kind of activity does
not fit with other testimonies about rhapsodic profession (see below, n. 84). On the distinction between
rhapsodes and these Homeric experts, cf. Graziosi 2002, pp. 45-46.
82 Stesimbrotus was also the teacher of the poet Antimachus of Colophon and wrote a political pamphlet
On Themistocles, Thucydides and Pericles, where Thucydides is the politician, son of Melesias, not the
historian (cf. Janko 1997, pp. 72-75). 
83 Pl. Ion 530d6-d8. On the embellishment of Homer, see Capuccino 2011 pp. 70-71 and Nannini 2010, p.
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words, Ion is saying that he can offer and present to his  audience the best possible
Homer, capable of beating the rival versions of other performers and experts84.
In addition to these elements of rhapsodic performance, Collins, who strongly
argues  for  the  rhapsodes'  capacity  for  improvisation  and  innovation85,  draws  the
attention to two other types of skill included in their competitive repertoire. The first
type was the composition of new verses or portions of verses to be inserted in the pre-
existing Homeric material, so as to embellish it or to achieve unexpected effects on the
audience86.  The  second  type  involved  various  aspects  related  to  different  modes  of
poetic competition, examples of which can be found in the description of the legendary
contest between Homer and Hesiod contained in the  Certamen87. The contest is set at
the funeral games for king Amphidamas88 and it sees the poets displaying their skills
through a series of challenges which includes hexameter exchanges of philosophical
questions, riddles and capping (the completion of verses aptly interrupted by one of the
23; see also Murray 1996, p. 104. The Homerides were a  guild of Homeric performers of Chios, who
claimed a descent from the poet himself (on their relationship with rhapsodes, see Graziosi 2002, pp. 208-
217). 
84 There are some issues related to what exactly the dianoiai the rhapsodes dealt with are: the fact that Ion
mentions  Metrodorus  and  Stesimbrotus,  could  hint  that  rhapsodes  were  engaged  in  allegorical
interpretations  of  Homer  as  well,  but  this  hypothesis  is  undermined  by  the  passage  of  Xenophon's
Symposium cited above, where it is evidently stated that rhapsodes are silly, because they can only repeat
Homer's verses without knowing his huponoiai (like Stesimbrotus does, for example). Thus, we can infer
that  dianoiai  and  huponoiai  refer  to  different  kind  of  interpretations.  Theories  have  been  advanced
according to which the term  huponoia applies  to a  specialized knowledge not attainable by ordinary
people and professional performers like rhapsodes (cf. Ford 2002, pp. 76-85 and Sammons 2012, p. 58).
On the other  hand,  the  kalai  dianoiai  Ion  speaks of  would be more superficial  (that  is,  not  hidden)
observations on the wisdom detectable in the poems, for example regarding ethics (cf. Ford 2002, p.71
and p. 79). But the distinction is not always clear, as Ford notices about an interpretation of Simonides
given in the Republic at 332b2-c3 (see Ford 2002, p. 85). For another reading of the rhapsodes' different
approach to Homeric poetry, see Nagy 2002, pp. 29-30.
85 ʻImprovisationʼ is taken in the sense of “the spontaneous  recomposition of traditional  material  [...]
rearranged in a novel way” (Collins 2001, p. 130).
86 Cf. Collins 2004, pp. 183-184 and pp. 203-218. Rhapsodes were eager to attribute their own creations
to the poets whose poetry they performed; for example Cynaethus is said to have composed verses and
the  Hymn to Apollo,  but  to  have  attributed  them to  Homer  (cf.  Schol.  Pind.  N.  2.1c);  the  Hesiodic
fragment 357 MW was very probably composed in rhapsodic circles, but it was attributed to Hesiod. On
this issue, see Graziosi 2002, pp. 33-34.
87 It  is  commonly acknowledged that the contest  part  of the  Certamen  is taken from the  Museion  of
Alcidamas, the fourth century sophist pupil of Gorgias. For a discussion of the problems related to the
text, its origin and dating, see Richardson 1981; see also Graziosi 2001, pp. 58-62. On the use of the
Certamen as a source about rhapsodic performances, see Collins 2004, pp. 185-187.
88 The place of the contest is derived from a passage of the Works and Days where Hesiod describes his
victory at the games of Amphidamas and his dedication of the prize tripod to the Muses (cf. Hes. Op. 654-
659).
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competitors,  so  that  it  was  left  to  the  other  competitor's  dexterity  and virtuosity  to
complete them in a meaningful way)89. At last, the two poets are requested to recite the
most beautiful passage from their poems and king Panedes assigns the victory to Hesiod
because in his verses he has praised agriculture and peace, whereas Homer has narrated
a scene of war and slaughter90. 
Since  it  provides  an  illustration  of  different  characteristics  of  that  “agonistic
mannerism”91 which is an integral part of Archaic Greek poetry, the  Certamen can be
seen as an archetype of poetic competition. Beside this, it emphatically points to the
strong bond existent between poetry and agonism, because even the two most important
and honoured poets of Greece could not but be depicted as contenders. In a society
where agonism was so deeply rooted, even the ability, skills and wisdom of its two most
influential poets had to be judged. A winner had to be established, as well as a loser,
without exceptions92. Rhapsodic performances were structured exactly around the same
89 For instance, Hesiod starts the contest asking what is the best thing for mortals and Homer replies that it
is never to be born or, once born, to die as soon as possible (Certamen 75-79). At 97-101, Hesiod poses a
riddle asking Homer to sing him nothing of the past, the present or the future, but to sing something all
the same. Homer answers with two verses about the the tomb of Zeus (something impossible to exist). An
example of capping is at 107-108, where Homer complete the verse “Then they took as meal flesh of
cattle and necks of horses” with “they unyoked [the necks] covered in sweat, because they were sated
with war”, to avoid an improper meaning (cf. Griffith 1990, p. 192; Graziosi 2001, pp. 62-70 and Graziosi
2010, pp. 126-127). For an analysis of the challenge and its relationship with rhapsodic performances, see
Collins 2004, pp. 184-191. Collins argues that capping dates back to the 6th century BCE (at least), but
evidence is lacking. There are also no proofs of the actual display of capping at the Panathenaia, but
Collins argues that it could well fit within the restrictions imposed by the Panathenaic Rule (cf. Collins
2004, p. 185 and pp. 193-194).
90 Cf. Certamen 207-210. Hesiod recites lines 383-392 of the Works and Days, while Homer chooses two
passages from Iliad XIII, lines 126-133 and 339-344. It has to be noticed that Hesiod tells us that, after
his victory, he dedicated the tripod to the Muses who initiated him into “sweet song”, using the traditional
adjective liguros, -a, -on. This suggests that aesthetic factors, not moral ones, as shown in the Certamen,
have been decisive to his victory (cf. Nannini 2010, p. 45).  On the verdict and its meaning, see also
Graziosi 2002, pp. 172-180.
91 Griffith  1990,  p.191.  Griffith's  article  offers  a  good survey of  the different  manifestations of  this
mannerism (idem, pp. 192-200).
92 Graziosi argues that the contest depicted in the  Certamen  is not presented as a zero-sum game (cf.
Graziosi  2001, pp. 68-72).  I  think that  the question is all  about perspective: if  we look at the whole
contest, it is true that we are reluctant to see Homer as the loser, since he proves on many occasions the
extent of his ability, obliging Hesiod to change his offensive strategies, moreover he gains the public's
approval. But if we consider who takes the prize in the end, we have here a clear example of a zero-sum
game. Of the two contenders, one wins only if the other one loses. Had king Panedes chosen Homer,
probably we would have felt less at odds with the final result and we would have been more ready to say
that there was a unique winner. More generally, Griffith correctly points out that the question of the final
verdict in contests like this relates to the parameters and to the judge selected for the decision; once these
have been decided, the competition cannot but have a winner and a loser, independently from the apparent
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principle, since rhapsodes employed and  displayed their skills chiefly with the aim of
beating  every  possible  opponent.  They  were  engaged  in  intellectual  and  technical
struggles, where victory and prizes were at stake. In the end, rhapsodic contests were
nothing but one of the numerous manifestations of the widespread competition present
at every level of Greek society and culture.
1.3 - Dramatic festivals
The competitive element characteristic of rhapsodic performances was a central feature
of dramatic festivals as well. As in the case of rhapsodes, it is Athens which provides
the  most  known and  best  documented  examples  of  drama contests,  which  were  an
integral part of the festivals dedicated to Dionysus: the City Dionysia (also known as
the Great Dionysia), the Lenaia and the Rural  Dionysia93.
The City Dionysia was held in honour of Dionysus Eleutheros and celebrated the
transfer of the god's image from Eleutherai, a village on the borders between Attica and
Boeotia, to his temple in Athens94. The festival took place in the month of Elaphebolion
(corresponding roughly to March) and saw a high participation of Athenians as well as
of a great number of people from all over Greece, who could travel more safely thanks
to the favourable weather conditions of the period95. The celebrations began with a great
procession to the god's precinct where a sacrifice of a bull and other victims took place.
rightness or not of the verdict (a similar case occurs in the contest between Aeschylus and Euripides in
Aristophanes' Frogs; cf. Griffith 1990, pp. 188-192). 
93 In Athens there was another Dionysiac festival called the Anthesteria, from the name of the month in
which it took place (Anthesterion, corresponding approximately to the end of February), but it did not
feature dramatic performances, except for a contest of comic actors dating back to the third quarter of the
third century BCE (cf. Pickard-Cambridge 1988, pp. 10-25).
94 The transfer was attributed to Pegasos, probably an emissary of the cult of Dionysus. Actually, the
circumstances of the event have legendary traits inserted in the wider account of the diffusion of the god's
cult in Greece. However, it is quite sure that the festival gained more importance in the sixth century
BCE, under Peisistratus' tyranny, but it was after the Cleisthenic reform that it became a central event in
the social and civic life of the polis. On the origins of the City Dionysia, see Pickard-Cambridge 1988, pp.
57-59 and Cartledge 1997, pp. 22-23.
95 Cf. Rehm 2007, p. 188. On the audience of the City Dionysia, see Goldhill 1997, pp. 57-66. 
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The  following  days  were  reserved  for  choral  competitions,  both  dithyrambic  and
dramatic, the latter including tragedy and comedy96. Dithyrambic contests were between
ten choruses of men and ten of boys, each counting fifty members and representing one
of the ten phylai of the city. As to dramatic contests, the competitors were three tragic
playwrights, each presenting three tragedies and a satyr play, and five comic poets, each
contending with only one play97.  Competition of dithyrambic and tragic choruses date
back at the end of the 6th century, whereas comic contests started in 486 BCE. From c.
449 BCE, there was also a contest for the best tragic actor, while its comic equivalent
was introduced only between 329 and 312 BCE98. The centrality of theatrical contests in
the festival structure was further stressed by the ceremony of the proagōn, a prelude to
the  forthcoming competitions  held  before  the  official  beginning of  the  celebrations,
during which the poets,  with the actors and the members of the chorus (choreutai),
mounted a temporary platform in the Odeion and announced to the public the content of
the plays they were to present99. At the end of the festival, the winners in each category
were appointed by a complex method of judgment, strictly directed and controlled by
the polis in order to avoid possible frauds. After the performances, ten judges, one for
each phylē, wrote their order of merit on tablets which were placed in an urn. Then, the
final verdict was decided on five tablets drawn by lot and winners were proclaimed by
an herald and crowned in front of the whole public100. 
96 Contests in comedy were introduced in 486 BCE, see Pickard-Cambridge 1988, p 82.
97 There  were  exceptions  to  the  rule:  for  example,  during  the  Peloponnesian  War,  the  number  of
contending comic poets was reduced to three. In 340 BCE tragic poets presented only two tragedies and
in many years of the second century comic contests were omitted (cf. Pickard-Cambridge 1988, p. 73 and
p. 83).
98 For the dating and the extant evidence, see Pickard-Cambridge 1988, pp. 71-73.
99 Ancient sources link the proagōn with tragedy only and it is very probable that it was solely associated
with the advertising of tragic theatre, given its centrality in the festival programme. The Odeion was built
in c. 444 BCE, but it is unknown whether and where the proagōn was held before this date. There is also
uncertainty about the content of the poets' presentations and the audience attending the event. A famous
proagōn  was that of 406 BCE, when, according to an anecdote, Sophocles appeared in mourning after
having heard  the  news  of  Euripides'  death.  On the  proagōn and  the  related  questions,  see  Pickard-
Cambridge 1988, pp.67-68; Goldhill 1997, p. 55 and Wilson 2000, pp. 96-97 with notes. 
100 The  entire  procedure  is  not  clear  and  many  points  remain  obscure,  even  regarding  the  initial
appointment of judges. For a general survey, see Pickard-Cambridge 1988, pp. 95-99 and Wilson 2000,
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The City Dionysia represented a moment of great importance also from the point
of  view of  civic  identity  and  relationships  with  other  cities,  especially  in  the  fifth
century,  when  the  Athenian  empire  reached  its  highest  splendour.  This  fact  is  well
represented by four ceremonies hosted in the theatre before competitions: the first was a
libation poured by the ten generals, the leading military and political figures of the polis
– a rare act which stressed the power and the capacity of organization of the state. The
second was the announcement on the part of an herald of the names of the citizens who
had been awarded for having rendered services to the state. Thirdly, there was a display
of tribute from the cities under the Athenian empire and, at last, a parade of the ephebes
whose fathers had been killed in war. These young people were maintained by the state
and, once they reached manhood, paraded in the theatre in full military panoply and
swore they would fight and die for the  polis as their fathers had done.101 Since these
ceremonies  regarded  the  city  as  a  whole  and  were  performed  in  the  presence  of
foreigners,  they  obtained  the  double  effect  of  increasing  the  citizens'  sense  of
participation in the life of the  polis  and of showing to other cities the great power of
Athens.
The Lenaia festival was dedicated to Dionysus Lenaios, an epithet whose origin
could be linked to the name of the winepress (lēnos) or to an appellative of the maenads
(lēnai), the female worshippers of the god102. Compared to the City Dionysia it had a
more local aspect, chiefly due to its being held in the month of Gamelion (January-
February), a fact which prevented foreigners from coming and attending it, because of
the  storms  so  frequent  in  that  period103.  Little  is  known  about  the  nature  of  the
ceremonies which took place during the festival, but there is evidence of a procession
pp. 98-102. The best actors received also a money prize (see Cartledge 1997, p. 26).
101 Cf. Goldhill 1997, p. 56.
102 On the origin of the name, see Pickard-Cambridge 1988, p. 29 and Cartledge 1997, p. 8. 
103 A fact mentioned by Aristophanes in the Acharnians (Ar. Ach. 504-505).
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conducted by the Archon Basileus and the  epimelētai104. Dramatic competitions at the
Lenaia date back to the middle of the fifth century: the first one introduced was the
contest of comic poets (c. 442-440 BCE), followed by that of tragic playwrights (c. 440-
430 BCE). Prizes were assigned also to the best actor in each genre. Five comic poets
competed  at  the  Lenaia,  each with one  play,  while  the number of  tragic  poets  was
limited to two, with two tragedies (but no satyr play) apiece105.
The Rural Dionysia consisted of a set of festivities celebrated and organized by
each deme of Athens in the month of Poseidon (approximately December). Their central
event  was  a  procession  escorting  a  phallos,  a  ceremony  aimed  at  promoting  and
favouring the fertility of  the soil  in  the wintery period.  The date  of introduction of
dramatic contests is not known and their organisation is not clearly reconstructable but,
according to the evidence, they were on a smaller scale compared to those of the other
two festivals and often were limited to tragedy or comedy only; dithyrambic contests
were  not  regularly  held  either106.  The  most  important  celebration  was  that  of  the
Peiraeus, already mentioned in the fifth century and put at the same level of the City
Dionysia and the Lenaia according to a fourth century law107. Evidence for the other
demes  is  from  the  fourth  century  onwards  and  very  scarce,  since  it  regards
approximately  fourteen  of  the  139  attic  demes,  but  thanks  to  a  passage  of  Plato's
Republic, it is arguable that the festivals took place on different days, so as to permit
people to attend them at ease108.
104 On the procession and other ceremonies, see Pickard-Cambridge 1988, pp. 34-35.
105 The higher number of comic poets stresses the fact that comedy had a special relevance at the Lenaia,
differently from the Great Dionysia where the greatest importance was reserved to tragedy.  During the
Peloponnesian War the number of competing comic poets was reduced to three (see Pickard-Cambridge
1988, p. 41). 
106 Cf. Rehm 2007, p. 188. For a survey of the events in the demes, see Pickard-Cambridge 1988, pp. 42-
54.
107 The law of Euegoros prohibited the exaction of debts and taking of security in the period of the three
festivals (cf. Pickard-Cambridge 1988, p. 46).
108 The passage is in Pl. R. V 475d5-8.
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As argued above, the celebrations of Dionysiac cult represented a moment of
great importance for the life of the polis. So great was the significance of choral contests
that they were placed under the direct control of the city through the institution of the
chorēgia. The chorēgia fell within the category of the leitourgiai109 and consisted in the
maintenance and training of a chorus on the part of a wealthy citizen, who took the title
of  chorēgos.  The  appointment  of  this  functionary  was  the  responsibility  of  the
Eponymous Archon (the Basileus in the case of the Lenaia)110, who chose among the
richest citizens of Athens, often voluntarily offering themselves to undertake this task,
which,  even though expensive and demanding,  represented an occasion for personal
promotion111. The number of  chorēgoi  depended on the amount of choruses necessary
for the different performances of the festival: as to the Great Dionysia, for example, it
was  necessary  to  enlist  twenty  chorēgoi  (two  for  each  phylē)  for  the  dithyrambic
choruses, three for tragedy and five for comedy112.
 After the appointment, the Archon assigned the  chorēgoi to the poets he had
previously selected for the composition of the plays113. In order to avoid any kind of
favouritism, or the least suspect of it, this assignment was made by lot, but it is unclear
109 Leitourgiai  were  public  services  performed  and  financed  by  private  citizens,  as  in  the  case  of
triērarchia. On other leitourgiai, see Wilson 2000, pp. 32-49.
110 The appointment of chorēgoi for tragedy always remained in the hands of the Archon, whereas that for
comedy passed to the phylai in the last part of the fourth century (cf. Pickard-Cambridge 1988, p. 86 and
Wilson 2000, p. 51). The chorēgoi for dithyrambic choruses were selected by the phylai and it seems that
the choice was free from personal interventions on the part of the Archon, who limited himself to a formal
designation (cf. Wilson 2000, p. 52 and notes). In the case of Rural Dionysia the chorēgoi were appointed
by the demarch (see Pickard-Cambridge 1988, p. 46).
111 There could be even cases of chorēgoi of limited resources who borrowed money from richer men. The
requirement of citizenship was valid for the Great Dionysia only, since at the Lenaia also metics could
serve as  chorēgoi  (on these points, see Wilson 2000, p. 53 and p. 29, respectively). It  has also to be
remembered that the person chosen by the Archon could not accept the service on the grounds of one of
the different recognized causes of exemption (a process called  skepsis). Otherwise, he could claim that
another man had better conditions for performing it than he and start a procedure (antidosis) to solve the
question. In both cases, it was the Archon who had to make the final decision (cf. idem, p. 57).
112 The total number of  chorēgoi  could change in particular occasions, especially of economic nature,
when it was  necessary to distribute the burden of the task among two or more men (which, consequently,
were called synchorēgoi). This practice was common in the Rural Dionysia, but it took place also at the
City festival in 406/5 BCE, nearly at the end of the Peloponnesian War (cf. Pickard-Cambridge 1988, p.
87 and Wilson 2000, p. 265).
113 The selecting procedure of poets remains obscure, but the scarce evidence points out that it consisted in
a real competition. On this point, see Wilson 2000, pp. 61-65. Poets, as well as actors, were paid by the
polis (cf. Pickard-Cambridge 1988, p. 90 and Rehm 2007, p. 189).
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if this procedure allocated the chorēgos directly to a poet or an order of choice on the
part  of  the  chorēgoi114. At any rate,  once  the  procedure  was  completed,  it  was  the
chorēgos' duty to provide everything necessary for the best possible result of his task:
he  had  to  prepare  a  place  where  his  team could  train  (choregēion), to  recruit  the
members  of  the  chorus115 as  well  as  an  expert  (hupodidaskalos)  in  music,  diet  and
physical exercise to support the poet during the preparation of the performance. He also
supplied the costumes for the members of the chorus, and in the case of drama, the
masks and the remaining material required by the staging of the play.
The great effort required of the  chorēgoi  was amply repaid by the high social
visibility they obtained, which obviously reached the maximum in the case of victory.
For example, they occupied a privileged position in the procession that began the City
Dionysia, an opportunity which was certainly well exploited, as shown by the reports on
Alcibiades  and  Demosthenes  on  such  an  occasion116.  Moreover,  if  victorious,  the
chorēgos had the great satisfaction of being crowned not only in front of the audience,
but  also  before  the  other  chorēgoi,  who had  to  suffer  the  heavy burden  of  defeat.
Victories  were  also  followed  by  great  celebrations  (the  epinikia),  which  can  be
considered, even though informally, the culmination of the agonistic programme of the
festivals117. However, the full solemnization of the success was achieved through the
choregic  monument,  dedicated  to  Dionysus  as  a  thanksgiving  for  the  victory  and
114 See Wilson 2000, p. 68. Actors were chosen by the state and assigned by lot to the poets as well, at
least from the middle of the fifth century. Previously either the poet recited in his own play or hired
professional actors (cf. Pickard-Cambridge 1988, p. 81).
115 Foreigners were not admitted in the city choruses. At the Lenaia there were foreigners, but they were,
in effect, metics; this was certainly due to the possibility that, as seen, metics could serve as chorēgoi (cf.
Wilson 2000, pp. 80-81).
116 It seems that Alcibiades wore a purple robe and captured the attention of the public, who gazed at him
in adoration. Demosthenes was said to have paid a goldsmith to make a golden garland and robe for him
to wear during the procession (cf.  Wilson 2000, p.  98).  During public occasions,  appearance was an
important element exploited even by Sophists and other intellectuals, see Tell 2007.
117 References to epinikia can be found in Aristophanes' Acharnians, where he talks of a Lenaian victory
(Ar. Ach. 1154-1155) and in Plato's Symposion, set during the celebration of Agathon's victory in a tragic
contest. It is debated whether Agathon won the Lenaia or the City Dionysia: Pickard-Cambridge thinks
the Lenaia (Pickard-Cambridge 1988, p.  41),  whereas  Goldhill  and Cartledge  the Dionysia (Goldhill
1997, p. 57 and Cartledge 1997, p. 5). For a discussion, see Wilson 2000, p. 103 and p. 345, n. 206.
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representing an everlasting sign of the fame gained in the contests118. Thus,  chorēgia
was configured as a deeply competitive institution, nourished by those intense desires of
honour (philotimia) and victory (philonikia), upon which the entire system of Athenian
leitourgiai was based. Since the honour gained was one of the most precious steps in the
construction of one's own civic identity and people used it to promote themselves before
the eyes of the polis, the risk of an increasing personal power was so concrete that in
many cases it  was hard to distinguish whether the task was undertaken only for the
common  interest  or  whether  it  was  a  sign  of  more  obscure  and  anti-democratic
tendencies119. With all these issues at stake, it is not surprising that in ancient sources the
term stasis, the same used for ʻcivil warʼ, is often employed to describe the context of
choral performances and contests120.
All  these features related to theatrical production then portray a multilayered
agonism which concerned and affected not only poets, but also choruses and chorēgoi,
the  phylai and the  polis  in  its  entirety.  Many aspects of society and civic life  were
represented  on  the  stage  of  dramatic  festivals,  but  competition  was  the  only,
irreplaceable protagonist of the play.
Conclusion
The examination of poetic performances in different institutionalized settings has shown
the high degree of agonism which characterized the production and delivery of poetry.
118 The richest and most common monuments were those for dithyrambic victories: this was an effect of
the  custom of  awarding a  prize  bronze  tripod,  a  traditional  symbol  of  wealth  and  prestige,  only to
dithyrambic winners and not to those of drama. The monuments for dramatic victories were limited to the
Lenaia  and  the  Rural  Dionysia.  On  choregic  monuments,  see  Wilson  2000,  pp.  198-252;  for  an
explanation  of  the  different  treatment  of  theatrical  success  at  the  City Dionysia  and  the  consequent
absence of choregic monuments, see idem, pp. 251-252.
119 Cf. Goldhill 1997, p. 57 and Wilson 2000, pp. 172-184. 
120 Cf. Wilson 2000, p. 169 and p. 315 n. 42. Choregic competition came to an end only during the regime
of  Demetrios  of  Phaleron  (317/316-308/307  BCE),  when  chorēgia  was  suppressed  and  replaced  by
agonōthesia,  a  single  office  which  administered  all  the  tasks  previously distributed  among different
chorēgoi (cf. idem, pp. 270-276).
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Poetic competitions were of great importance from a social, cultural and political point
of view: in the more private, but not less socially relevant context of the symposium,
poetry  represented  a  means  of  reaffirmation  and  preservation  of  the  values  of  the
hetairia and,  at  the  same time,  an  instrument  to  attack  adversaries  both  within and
outside the group. In the case of rhapsodic and dramatic contests, competition explicitly
assumed a public character and relevance, as it was organized, and thus controlled, by
civic  authorities.  Moreover,  the  direct  involvement  of  private  citizens  in  the
organization of the events, as in the sponsorship of plays during the Dionysia, could
have significant consequences on the political life of the city, since it was a means of
gaining visibility and influence. Besides their being performed in competitive settings,
poetic compositions were often characterized by overt agonistic traits, as exemplified by
the practice of metapoiēsis in the sympotic games, which consisted in the correction of
renowned verses of other poets, and by the different forms of contest of the rhapsodes'
repertoire, which reflected the traditional modes of poetic competitions. 
With a grasp of this competitive context, I will now move on to evaluate how
Xenophanes,  Parmenides,  Epicharmus and Empedocles  entered the poetic  game and
what innovations they introduced with their poetical productions.
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 Chapter 2
Xenophanes' poetry and the eradication of stasis
Xenophanes' thought and poetic production are deeply influenced by the competitive
context which, as shown in the previous chapter, characterized Archaic Greek poetry.
Ancient  testimonia portray him as engaged in a harsh criticism of traditional religious
beliefs,  exemplified  by  his  attacks  at  the  representations  of  the  gods  found  in  the
Homeric and Hesiodic poems. His polemic stance is well represented by the production
of  Silloi (‘satires’, ‘lampoons’), brief poems in hexameters with insertions of iambic
trimeters,  in  which  he  ridicules  anthropomorphic  conceptions  of  the  divinity  and
censures  Homer  and Hesiod  for  having  portrayed  the  gods  as  committing  immoral
deeds1. But his criticism and mockery go beyond such traditional poetic representation
of gods,  as shown by two elegies in which he,  respectively,  appears to poke fun at
Pythagoras and attacks the honours reserved to the winners of athletic competitions2. 
Besides the overt polemic tone of some of his fragments, a report by Diogenes
Laertius seeks to place Xenophanes directly in the middle of actual contests, as it states
that he recited his own poems rhapsodically (ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐρραψῴδει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ,
“But he also used to recite as rhapsode his own poems”)3. This testimony is debated and
much depends on how we translate the verb rhapsōdeō, which, as argued by Ford, can
simply  indicate  a  public  performance  of  poetry  (usually  without  musical
accompaniment) without specific reference to rhapsodic profession4. On the contrary,
Gentili maintains that Xenophanes was indeed a rhapsode whose activity was similar to
1 See below. In antiquity, Xenophanes was considered the actual inventor of the genre (cf. Nannini 2011,
p. 81). 
2 On Pythagoras: “And they say that once as he was passing by a puppy being beaten,/ he felt compassion
and said this:/ ‘Stop, don't beat it, since in truth it is the soul of a friend/ which I recognized upon hearing
it cry out’” (DK 21 B7, tr. Lesher). For a commentary of the fragment, see Lesher 1992, pp. 78-81 and
Schäfer 2009. On athletes, see below.
3 D. L. 9.18.10ff.
4 Cf. Ford 1988, p. 303; 2002, p. 50. On this point, see also Granger 2007, p. 424, n. 43.
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that  of  Theagenes  of  Rhegium,  with  the  difference  that,  instead  of  allegoric
commentaries, he accompanied his recitation of Homeric poems with critical remarks5.
Some considerations seem to exclude the idea that Xenophanes was a rhapsode: besides
the fact that Diogenes Laertius' use of rhapsōdeō is not decisive evidence, ancient views
on rhapsodic activity,  as we discussed in  the previous  chapter,  are at  odds with the
critical, autonomous and original traits of Xenophanes' poetry and thought6. It is perhaps
more accurate to classify Xenophanes as an itinerant sage-poet, who recited his poems
at  symposia  in  order  to  disseminate  his  new and  critical  ideas7.  Elegy DK 21  B1,
discussed  later  in  the  chapter,  well  exemplifies  the  use  of  such  occasions  as
opportunities for presenting his thought and marking his distance from the tradition of
the  Homeric  and Hesiodic  poems8.  For  the  following discussion,  however,  it  is  not
necessary to  solve  the  issue  related  to  Xenophanes'  activity,  or  to  adopt  a  specific
reading, since the analysis will focus on the competitive stances present in his poetry,
and thus leads  to  conclusions which hold independently of  his  being a  professional
rhapsode or not.
I  will  start  by  examining  Xenophanes'  elegy  B1,  where  he  describes  the
characteristics the ideal symposium should have, with particular regard to the guests'
behaviour and the prescriptions about the right poetic contents to recite, which exclude
narrations of human and divine strife. As I will argue, such an exclusion is based upon
moral considerations about social and civic life, which I will further evaluate through
the analysis of elegy DK 21 B2, where, by attacking the excessive honours reserved to
5 Cf. Gentili 2006, p. 241. On Theagenes of Rhegium, see Chapter 1, p. 37.
6 See Chapter 1, p. 38 n. 84.
7 Cf. Ford 2002, p. 67; Granger 2007, p. 427. On the role of the symposium in the dissemination of
poetry, see Chapter 1, pp. 18-19. Xenophanes talks of his wandering activity in DK 21 B8: “Already there
are seven and sixty years,/ tossing about my counsel throughout the land of Greece,/ and from my birth up
till then there were twenty and five to add to these,/ if I know how to speak truly concerning these things”
(tr. Lesher). For a commentary, see Lesher 1992, pp. 69-71. The use of the symposium as the main means
of diffusion of his poetry does not exclude the possibility that he publicly recited some of his poems. His
Foundation of  Colophon,  for example,  has  been taken to be as destined to public performances,  see
Bowie 1986, pp. 31-32.
8 See below.
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athletes, Xenophanes stresses the importance of his poetry for the welfare of the polis,
since his teachings, by contrast with athletic victories, effectively contribute to the city's
eunomiē  (2.1).  Furthermore,  the  ban  on  poems  about  battle  among  divine  beings,
defined as “fictions of men of old”9, is motivated by Xenophanes' original notion of the
divinity, which is highly critical against the traditional beliefs about gods, and offers
important consequences on Xenophanes' ethic-religious conceptions (2.2). Then, I will
point out the implications of Xenophanes' thought on competition and how it represents
a novel way of approaching the problem of conflict both in the intellectual and social
sphere (2.3).
2.1 – Xenophanes' symposium
Xenophanes'  elegy B1 is  devoted  to  the  description  of  an  ideal  symposium which,
although  containing  various  elements  traditionally  belonging  to  sympotic  imagery,
presents original traits related to his moral and theological conceptions. In what follows,
I will analyse the poem by drawing the attention to the ethical-religious framework in
which the prescriptions for the appropriate realization of the feast  are embedded. In
particular,  I  will  focus  on the recommendation about  the proper  poetic  contents  the
guests  should  perform.  As  I  will  show,  the  exclusion  of  violent  topics  from  the
symposium,  like  the  stories  about  struggles  of  Titans,  Giants  and  Centaurs  which
Xenophanes condemns, was a practice shared by other poets as well, but in Xenophanes
this choice is motivated by moral considerations, which ultimately rest upon his original
theological views. 
9 DK 21 B1.22.
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The  poem can  be  divided  in  two  main  parts:  the  first  (ll.  1-12)  contains  a
description of the sympotic setting,  while the second (ll.  12-24) delineates the ideal
features the symposium should have. The text runs as follows:
νῦν γὰρ δὴ ζάπεδον καθαρὸν καὶ χεῖρες ἁπάντων
 καὶ κύλικες· πλεκτοὺς δ᾽ ἀμφιτιθεῖ στεφάνους,
 ἄλλος δ᾽ εὐῶδες μύρον ἐν φιάληι παρατείνει·
   κρητὴρ δ᾽ ἕστηκεν μεστὸς ἐυφροσύνης·
 ἄλλος δ᾽ οἶνος ἑτοῖμος, ὃς οὔποτέ φησι προδώσειν,   5
   μείλιχος ἐν κεράμοις, ἄνθεος ὀζόμενος· 
ἐν δὲ μέσοις ἁγνὴν ὀδμὴν λιβανωτὸς ἵησιν,
   ψυχρὸν δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὕδωρ καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ καθαρόν·
 παρκέαται δ᾽ ἄρτοι ξανθοὶ γεραρή τε τράπεζα
   τυροῦ καὶ μέλιτος πίονος ἀχθομένη·                       10
 βωμὸς δ᾽ ἄνθεσιν ἂν τὸ μέσον πάντηι πεπύκασται,
   μολπὴ δ᾽ ἀμφὶς ἔχει δώματα καὶ θαλίη.
 χρὴ δὲ πρῶτον μὲν θεὸν ὑμνεῖν εὔφρονας ἄνδρας
   εὐφήμοις μύθοις καὶ καθαροῖσι λόγοις, 
σπείσαντάς τε καὶ εὐξαμένους τὰ δίκαια δύνασθαι   15
   πρήσσειν· ταῦτα γὰρ ὦν ἐστι προχειρότερον,
 οὐχ ὕβρεις· πίνειν δ᾽ ὁπόσον κεν ἔχων ἀφίκοιο
   οἴκαδ᾽ ἄνευ προπόλου μὴ πάνυ γηραλέος.
 ἀνδρῶν δ᾽ αἰνεῖν τοῦτον ὃς ἐσθλὰ πιὼν ἀναφαίνει,
   ὡς ἦι μνημοσύνη καὶ τόνος ἀμφ᾽ ἀρετῆς,              20
οὔ τι μάχας διέπειν Τιτήνων οὐδὲ Γιγάντων
     οὐδὲ < > Κενταύρων, πλάσμα<τα> τῶν προτέρων,
 ἢ στάσιας σφεδανάς· τοῖς οὐδὲν χρηστὸν ἔνεστιν· 
  θεῶν <δὲ> προμηθείην αἰὲν ἔχειν ἀγαθήν10. 
For now the floor is pure, as are the hands of all,
and the cups; one [servant] places plaited garlands on us,
while another proffers fragrant myrrh in a dish;
the mixing bowl is in place, brimming with festivity,
and other wine stands ready, promising never to run out on us, 
mild in its jars, giving out its bouquet.
In our midst, frankincense wafts its holy scent;
and there is water, cool, sweet, and pure;
at hand are golden loaves and a lordly table,
groaning with cheese and thick honey; 
the altar in the middle has been decked on all sides with flowers,
and song and celebration fill the hall.
Now it behooves men at the feast first to hymn the god
with reverent words and pure speeches
after they have made libations and prayed to be able to do
what is right; for this is at hand – 
not acts of hubris. And each must drink only so much as to get back
home without a servant guiding the way, except if he be very old.
As for the guests, applaud him who gives a show of noble deeds when 
drinking as memory and striving for excellence enable him, 
one who does not summon up battles of Titans, Giants, 
or Centaurs—fabrications of men of old—
10 The text is that of West's IEG.
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or violent civil strife; in such things there is no good11.
But always keep a good attentiveness for the gods12.
                                                                DK 21 B1
The descriptive section focuses on the typical elements of the sympotic scene, from the
concrete objects  used in the party (like the cups,  the mixing bowl, the table) to the
atmosphere  of  merriment  (euphrosunē)  and  celebration  (thaliē)  which  united  the
guests13.  But  these  traditional  topics  are  dealt  with  in  a  particular  perspective,  as
Xenophanes emphasizes their close relationship to religious practice through a precise
vocabulary  choice14.  For  example,  the  repetition  of  the  term  katharos, used to
characterize the floor, the guests' hands, the cups, the water and, in the second part, the
speeches appropriate to the occasion, conveys a notion of purity which is not merely
material, but also spiritual15. Moreover, the incense is said to emanate a “holy scent”
from an altar placed in the middle of the room, a position which further strengthens the
image of a situation that is first and foremost considered as an offering to the divinity16.
This specific depiction of the sympotic surroundings and the stress laid on the purity of
the  setting  in  all  its  details  function  as  a  prelude  to  the  call  to  piety  and  correct
behaviour  developed  in  the  second  part:  exactly  like  the  concrete  elements  of  the
sympotic surroundings, the participants must be pure and keep a conduct proper to the
honouring of the gods17.
11 On chrēston, see below.
12 I follow, with modifications, Ford's translation (cf. Ford 2002, pp. 53-55).
13 On euphrosunē as a key concept in the description of sympotic atmosphere, see Vetta 1983, pp. XXXV-
XXXVI.
14 For an analysis of the religious connotation of the terms employed by Xenophanes, see Defradas 1962,
pp.  351-355.  He  argues  that  Xenophanes  is  actually  describing  a  religious  symposium  of  Eleatic
philosophers (see Defradas 1962); for a criticism of this position, see Marcovich 1978, pp. 15-16. Vetta
agrees with Defradas on the accentuation of the religious aspects, but thinks that the symposium takes
place at the presence of a tyrant or of regal patron, probably after a solemn sacrificial meal (cf. Vetta
1983, p. XLIX and Vetta 1996, p. 207).
15 Cf. Defradas 1962, pp. 351-352. 
16 On the function of the altar, see Vetta 1996, p. 207.
17 Cf. Lesher 1992, p. 51.
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The set of precepts in the second half of the elegy is introduced by chrē, which
immediately conveys the idea of appropriateness18. Furthermore, the central importance
of piety is reinforced by the fact that the first and the last line of the section contain a
reference to the divinity, thus producing a ring structure which functions as a frame for
all the rules of conduct19. As a consequence, each of them is directly linked to the basic
principle which invites us to respect the gods stated in the first and final line20. The other
prescriptions are, in order, to hymn the god with pure words after having made libations
and prayed for the ability to act justly (ll. 13-17); to drink moderately (ll. 17-18); to
praise the guest who, speaking properly and pursuing excellence (aretē), displays virtue
(ll. 19-23). As usual, aretē is referred to as the aim to which the participants must tend,
but here, being inserted in a framework of piety, the call for excellence acquires special
significance, since the striving for aretē also includes the desire to act justly for which
the guests pray to god. The prayer marks a novelty as it does not ask merely for success
or  divine  protection,  but  for  the  power  to  act  according  to  what  is  right,  or,  more
precisely,  for the ability to choose to do the right action and avoid acts  of  hubris21.
Acting rightly regards also the guests' conduct at the symposium, which, I would like to
stress, is considered as a manifestation of piety22. Morality is thus doubly linked to the
divine sphere, as god is invoked to assure the achievement of what is right and, at the
same time, is honoured by appropriate behaviour at the feast. 
The prescriptions for  the correct  sympotic  conduct  pertain also to the poetic
performances  appropriate  to  the  solemnity  of  the  context23.  For,  as  shown  in  the
18 Cf. Adesp. eleg. 27 West discussed at pp. 22-24.
19 Cf. Marcovich 1978, p. 4.
20 For an alternative reading of the final line, see Fränkel 1975, p. 327. 
21 Cf. Fränkel 1975, p. 327; Marcovich 1978, p. 8; Lesher 1992, p. 52. For an alternative reading of line
17, deriving from accepting the variant hubris instead of hubreis, see Lesher 1992, p. 49.
22 Lesher sees an ambiguity in the scope of the prayer, as it is not specified whether it concerns only the
symposium or one's daily conduct outside of it (cf. Lesher 1992, p. 52). As I will show in the following,
this distinction does not hold, as acting justly at the symposium is a necessary condition for being a good
citizen. See below.
23 For a commentary on the other points, see Marcovich 1978, pp. 7-10 and Lesher 1992, p. 52.
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previous chapter, the recitation of poetry represented an opportunity for the guests to
display themselves24.  According to Xenophanes,  the choice of the poetry to be sung
during the feast ought to be determined both by memory and the moral teaching it could
transmit  (ὡς  ἦι  μνημοσύνη  καὶ  τόνος  ἀμφ᾽  ἀρετῆς,  “as  memory  and  striving  for
excellence enable him”)25. Indeed, the mention of memory (mnemosunē), the mother of
the Muses, conveys the importance attributed to poetic recitations and, at the same time,
is a direct reference to one of the performing modalities used by the guests, namely, the
reuse of pre-existing compositions instead of improvised songs26. But not all content are
admitted,  as Xenophanes explicitly rejects  poems dealing with the battles of Titans,
Giants and Centaurs, and civic strife27. Different factors motivate this choice, and in
order  to  better  understand  the  import  of  Xenophanes'  position,  it  is  first  useful  to
consider it in the context of other similar rejections. The exclusion of violent topics
from the symposium is found, for example, in an elegy by Anacreon, where the poet
says that he does not love the man who, while drinking, speaks of war and strife, but
rather the man who sings of love, thus contributing to the general merriment28. The ban
on these themes has been interpreted as a formal rejection of the genre of epic which the
poets made to promote their  own poetry:  moral and parainetic for Xenophanes,  and
erotic for Anacreon29. Another refusal of epic has been identified in the Encomium for
Polycrates by Ibycus, where, by means of a long praeteritio of the Trojan war and of its
24 See Chapter 1, pp. 22-23.
25 B1.20.  For a  discussion of  the textual  problems and the possible interpretations of  this  verse,  see
Marcovich 1978, p. 14.
26 Cf.  Chapter  1,  pp.  20-21.  Memory  is,  for  example,  mentioned  also  by  Solon  (Sol.  13.1  West).
Marcovich suggests that, alongside his own, Xenophanes could here refer to the recitations of Solonian
elegies (cf. Marcovich 1978, p. 11).
27 Others have interpreted stasias  as referring to mythical strife, whether among gods or humans. For a
discussion of this point, see Ford 2002, p. 56, n. 50.
28 Anacr. 56 Gent.: “I do not like the man who while drinking his wine beside the full mixing-bowl/ talks
of strife and tearful war:/ I like him who by mingling the splendid gifts of the Muses and Aphrodite/
remembers the loveliness of the feast” (tr. Campbell). Similarly, Stesichorus (210 Page): “Join me, Muse,
in rejecting stories of battle,/  and celebrate weddings of gods and banquets of men/ and feasts of the
blessed” (tr. West).
29 Cf. Vetta 1983, pp. L-LI.
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heroes, the poet alludes to,  and thus praises, the beauty and the naval power of the
future tyrant of Samos30. However, despite the appearance, these cases do not represent
an exclusion of epic tout court. In Anacreon, for instance, the ban on war topics appears
to  be  based  upon  considerations  about  the  occasion  of  performance:  since  the
symposium is essentially a moment of cheerfulness, the content of poetry should not
deal with subjects which could spoil the atmosphere of the party. Bacchylides explicitly
states this principle in one of his epinicians, where he says that in each human activity
what counts most is the right moment (kairos): as a consequence, war subjects are not
appropriate to festivities, nor cheerful songs to battles31. As to Ibycus' Encomium, much
more than signifying a total rejection of epic, the initial  praeteritio  is rather a skilful
rhetorical move used to exalt the characteristic of the praised person: refusing to speak,
for  example,  of  the  beauty  of  an  epic  character  in  order  to  concentrate  on  that  of
Polycrates, is equivalent to stating that the youth is as beautiful as a hero, if not more32. 
Even in the case of Xenophanes' elegy the idea that he is rejecting epic qua epic
is to be excluded. For the choice of Titans, Giants and Centaurs as symbol of the type of
song which must  be avoided hints at  a specific  type of  conduct  which ought to  be
condemned, rather than at epic as a genre. On the one hand, Centaurs are traditionally
characterized by violence and, more importantly,  by the incapacity of respecting the
rules of social life, including the right behaviour at banquets: in the Odyssey is narrated
the episode of the centaur Eurytion who, as a guest of Peirithous, drank too much and
committed evil acts which eventually led to the feud between humans and centaurs33,
30 Cf. Vetta 1983, p. LI-LII; Gentili 2006, pp. 201-205.
31 B. Ep. 14. 12-18: “In battles with their load of sorrow the note of the lyre and/ clear-voiced choirs are
not  fitting,  nor  in  festivities  the clang of/  clashing bronze:  for  each men's  activities  the appropriate/
moment is best” (tr. Campbell). 
32 Cf. Nannini 2011, pp. 83-85. A similar stratagem is used by Sappho: “Some think a fleet, a troop of
horse/ or soldiery the finest sight/ in all the world; but I say, what one loves” (Sapph. 16.1-4 Voigt, tr.
West). On Ibycus' Encomium, see further Chapter 4, pp. 129-130.
33 Hom. Od. 21.295-304. On the Centaurs as symbol of incivility, see Babut 1974, p. 102. Ford notes the
irony in making Antinous, the criminal suitor, narrate the story of Eurytion at a banquet (Cf. Ford 2002,
pp. 56-57).
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while Theognis chooses Centaurs as a symbol of the  hubris which might lead to the
destruction  of  cities34.  On  the  other  hand,  the  battles  of  Giants  and  Titans  are
emblematic cases of strife internal to a community, as these divine creatures rebelled
against the cosmic order established by Zeus35. The preoccupation with strife is further
stressed  by  the  fact  that,  alongside  these  mythical  subjects,  Xenophanes  explicitly
rejects  those poems about civic discords and political  rivalry which were frequently
sung at the symposium36. The poetic topics excluded by Xenophanes thus represent the
exact opposite of the moral and right behaviour invoked in the previous lines. They are
not appropriate to the occasion, not merely on the grounds of an opposition between
cheerful moments and tearful stories, as in other poets, but, more importantly, because
they are not consistent with the moral conduct the guest should adopt. 
 The  above  considerations  show  that  Xenophanes'  concern  about  poetic
performances goes much further than the simple choice of songs appropriate to a festive
occasion.  For  Xenophanes  is  interested  in  the  practical  consequences  which  poetry
might  have  on individual  behaviour  and,  consequently,  on society as  a  whole.  This
aspect  is  stressed  by describing  the  poems  about  divine  and  civic  struggles  as  not
possessing anything chrēston. Since the term chrēston generally indicates what is good,
including what is considered as morally good, Xenophanes' characterization poses these
poems directly in opposition to those dealing with noble and virtuous deeds previously
mentioned as the appropriate performances for the symposium37. In other words, to sing
about antisocial behaviour and staseis contradicts the moral injunctions contained in the
previous lines, which prescribe purity both in action and speech38.  It is important to
34 See Thgn. 541-542.
35 Cf. Ford 2002, p. 56.
36 Cf. Chapter 1, pp. 24-28. This passage has also been interpreted as an allusion to Alcaeus' poetry, but
since songs on political strife were quite common, it is not necessary to see here a direct reference to the
poet of Mytilene (on this point, see Ford loc. cit.).
37 See B1.19. On chrēstos, see Dover 1974, pp. 51-53; 63.
38 This explains why Xenophanes does not take into account the possibility of admitting descriptions of
staseis which could serve as a condemnation of civic strife or a warning against it, as it later happened in
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notice that the notion of moral good indicated by chrēston possesses a civic dimension
as well.  For, since the adjective  chrēstos can also signify  ‘useful/beneficial’ and the
rejected stories are about about social discord, Xenophanes' use of the term anticipates
its later employment to designate the good citizen who is useful to the city, by caring for
the common interest and social harmony39. Poems like those about Centaurs and civic
strife are not  chrēston  exactly because they provide examples of a behaviour which
contrasts with civic cohesion and has a negative effect on the community. Thus, such
poems ought to be rejected as immoral and potentially harmful to the life of the polis. 
By condemning specific poetic contents as not possessing anything  chrēston,
Xenophanes further  emphasizes  the  close  interrelation  between  private  and  public
conduct, since a lack of morality and piety in the symposium is precursory to the city's
ruin. In other words, there exists a correspondence between sympotic and civic order.
This is an idea present in other poetical texts and made explicit by Solon in one of his
elegies:
δήμου θ᾽ ἡγεμόνων ἄδικος νόος, οἷσιν ἑτοῖμον
ὕβριος ἐκ μεγάλης ἄλγεα πολλὰ παθεῖν·
οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστανται κατέχειν κόρον οὐδὲ παρούσας 
εὐφροσύνας κοσμεῖν δαιτὸς ἐν ἡσυχίηι.
And unjust is the mind of the people’s rulers, and for their great hubris
much suffering is in store.
For they do not understand how to keep down excess, nor how to arrange
the delights that are present before them in a peaceable feast40.
                                                                                        Sol. 4.7-10 West
The  passage  expresses  a  preoccupation  about  moral  conduct  similar  to  that  of
Xenophanes: injustice is identified with acts of hubris, which consists in the incapacity
to restrain one's own insatiable desire of having more than enough (koros)41. This lack
5th-century Athenian tragedy. 
39 Cf. Bowra 1953, pp. 10-11; Dover 1974, pp. 296-299. On this point cf. also Babut 1974; Marcovich
1978, pp. 11-12; Lesher 1992, p. 54.
40 Tr. in Ford 2002, p. 36.
41 On the concept of koros in Solon, see Noussia Fantuzzi 2010, pp. 230-232.
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of measure is also manifest in the absence of order (kosmos) in banquet, a fact that is
considered as the precursor of the future suffering of the city42. That good conduct is an
essential prerequisite for civic welfare is further stressed later on in the elegy, where the
beneficial  effects  of  eunomia  (‘good  conduct/customs’,  ‘good  order’,  ‘good
government’) are praised (4.33-40 West). The term eunomia indicates the condition of a
city where the laws are good and citizens are ready to obey them43, and it is antithetical
to dusnomia, which Solon blames as responsible for the evils of the state (4.32 West).
The  social  import  of  eunomia  and  dusnomia is  already  implicit  in  their  divine
genealogy, as in Hesiod's  Theogony the former is  sister  of Justice (Dikē)  and Peace
(Eirenē),  while  the latter  is  one of the daughters of Strife  (Eris)44.  Eunomia  is  also
opposed to hubris: in the Odyssey, the gods are said to visit men in disguise in order to
observe whether they behave with  hubris  or  eunomia towards their  guests, and thus
whether they respect the basic rules granting a peaceful social life45. Without eunomia,
the city is destined to be ruined, since there would be no means of curbing the violence
and the excesses which are the primary causes of civic strife (stasis) and all its negative
consequences46.
The  eunomia  of the city is also a concern of Xenophanes, as shown by elegy
B247, where he criticizes the honours reserved to athletes. Xenophanes opens the poem
with a list of Olympic winners in various disciplines who, according to him, do not
deserve the preferential treatment they receive at public expense, as none of them is as
42 I follow, with modification, Ford's translation (Ford 2002, p. 36). On this point, see Ford 2002, pp. 35-
39, with references to other poetic passages. A correspondence between banquet and city is implicit in the
Odyssey,  where  Odysseus  speaks  of  the  merry  atmosphere  which  reigns  among  people  when  the
banqueters sit in proper order in the halls and listen to a minstrel's song (Od. 9.5-11). 
43 Cf. Lesher 1992, p. 56. Noussia Fantuzzi argues that the second aspect, i. e. the citizens' obedience,
prevails  here (cf.  Noussia  Fantuzzi  2010,  p.  258).  According  to  Aristotle  (Pol.  1307a1)  and  Strabo
(8.4.10), eunomia was also the name used to indicate Tyrtaeus' elegy on the Spartan form of government.
44 Cf. respectively,  Th.  902; 230. It  is beyond the scope of the chapter to discuss the implications of
Hesiod's identification of two types of  Eris  in the  Works and Days  (Op.  11-26). For an analysis of the
socio-political import of this notion, see Thalmann 2004.
45 Od. 17.487.
46 On stasis as a consequence of hubris, see line 19 of the elegy.
47 DK 21 B2.
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worthy of it  as the poet himself.  The reasons behind his claim are explained in the
following lines: 
                                ῥώμης γὰρ ἀμείνων                
 ἀνδρῶν ἠδ᾽ ἵππων ἡμετέρη σοφίη.
 ἀλλ᾽ εἰκῆι μάλα τοῦτο νομίζεται, οὐδὲ δίκαιον 
 προκρίνειν ῥώμην τῆς ἀγαθῆς σοφίης·
 οὔτε γὰρ εἰ πύκτης ἀγαθὸς λαοῖσι μετείη                15
 οὔτ᾽ εἰ πενταθλεῖν οὔτε παλαισμοσύνην,
 οὐδὲ μὲν εἰ ταχυτῆτι ποδῶν, τόπερ ἐστὶ πρότιμον,
 ῥώμης ὅσσ᾽ ἀνδρῶν ἔργ᾽ ἐν ἀγῶνι πέλει,
 τούνεκεν ἂν δὴ μᾶλλον ἐν εὐνομίηι πόλις εἴη· 
 σμικρὸν δ᾽ ἄν τι πόλει χάρμα γένοιτ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶι,         20
 εἴ τις ἀεθλεύων νικῶι Πίσαο παρ᾽ ὄχθας· 
 οὐ γὰρ πιαίνει ταῦτα μυχοὺς πόλεως. 
For our art [or wisdom] is better than the strength of men and horses. 
Nay, this is an utterly gratuitous custom, and it is not right
to prefer strength to the good art [or wisdom]. 
For suppose there is a man among the people good at boxing,
or at wrestling, or at the five-contest, 
or even in swiftness of his feet (which is most honored
of all men's deeds of strength in the contest): 
not for that reason would the city enjoy a better government (eunomiē).
Small, indeed, is the source of joy for a city 
coming from a victorious athlete in the contest at the banks of the river of
Pisa: for this is not what fattens the chambers of the city48. 
                                                             DK 21 B2.11-22
Xenophanes'  criticism  revolves  around  the  opposition  between  physical  strength
(rhomē) and his own sophia (‘art/wisdom’). The term sophia can indicate both ‘art’, in
the sense of ‘poetic skill’, and ‘wisdom’. Scholars have long debated about which of the
two meanings prevails here, but I agree with Marcovich in taking the term as indicating
Xenophanes' wisdom, i.e. his teachings, which was conveyed by means of his poetry49. 
Xenophanes claims that his  sophia is better than physical strength, and, even
though a customary practice, it is not right (dikaion) to prefer strength to good (agathos)
wisdom. For a good (agathos) athlete, even if of the best type, that is a good racer,
would not improve the  eunomia  of the city, like Xenophanes claims to be able to do
with  his  own  sophia.  The  comparison  between  good  art/wisdom and  good  athletic
48 Tr. in Marcovich 1978, pp. 17-18.
49 Cf. Marcovich 1978, p. 21-22. On this point, see also Lesher 1992, pp. 55-56; Bowra, 1953, p. 18.
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prowess is significant, as it involves the notion of the superiority of public over private
interest50.  A  good  athlete  is  capable  of  achieving  great  merits,  but  the  practical
consequences  of  his  ability,  besides  a  small  and ephemeral  joy for  the  citizens,  are
actually limited to the personal gains described in the first part of the elegy. By contrast,
Xenophanes' sophia can effectively contribute to the good order of the polis and thus to
its prosperity51. Even though the elegy does not contain an explicit explanation of how
Xenophanes' sophia leads to eunomia, it is reasonable to think that he is referring to his
moral teachings like those provided in elegy B1, which exhort people to virtue and
promote civic cohesion. An indication in this sense is provided by the passage from
Euripides'  Autolycus which Athenaeus says was inspired by Xenophanes' elegy. There,
after a harsh attack on athleticism, it is said that, along wise and good men, and the just
rulers of the city, one ought to honour those who, by means of words, remove battles
and civic strife, and thus prevent evil acts52. On the contrary, the celebration of athletes,
by exalting individual deeds which bring material advantage only to the winner, might
lead to envy and resentment among citizens and thus create disharmony in the civic
body53.  To honour  strength  more  than  good  wisdom is  thus  not  right  because  it  is
equivalent to affirming that private interest comes before public welfare. What is good
or capable (agathos), then, should be measured on the basis of the benefits it bestows on
the community from the point of view of  eunomia.  The innovative character of this
notion can be appreciated by the comparison with other attacks against athleticism, for
example that of Tyrtaeus (12 West), who says that athletes are not useful to the city
50 Cf. Lesher 1992, pp. 59-60.
51 Similarly, in the Works and Days Hesiod describes the beneficial effects of justice on civic prosperity
(see Op. 225-237).
52 Cf. E. 282.23-28 TGF: “Wreathing with leaves should be for men who are wise and brave,/ and for the
man who leads a city best through being prudent and/ just, and whose words deliver it from evil acts by
removing feuds/ and factions: such are the things good for every city and all Greeks” (tr. Collard and
Cropp). On the relationship between the passages, see Giannini 1982; Lesher 1992, p. 61.
53 Cf. Lesher 1992, p. 60. Similar consequences were the result, for example, of dramatic competition, see
Chapter 1, pp. 45-46. 
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because  they  are  not  good  warriors54.  According  to  this  view,  aretē coincides  with
military prowess and represents a common good (xunon esthlon) for the city and the
dēmos55. Differently, for Xenophanes the aretē which leads to civic peace, and thus to a
real and lasting common good, consists in a conduct which conforms to the principles of
justice,  moderation  and  piety.  It  is  by  promoting  them that  Xenophanes'  sophia  is
superior to any possible athletic success.
The discussion so far has shown that Xenophanes'  rejection of certain topics
from the poetic performances at  the symposium is motivated by the negative social
consequences they might have. But there is another point in Xenophanes' criticism that
deserves attention, namely the fact that he defines the stories about Centaurs, Titans and
Giants as “fabrications of men of old” (plasmata tōn proterōn, B1.22). Xenophanes is
thus attacking other poets for having said false things about the gods. In Archaic Greek
poetry,  this  was a  common competitive stance,  examples  of  which can be found in
Hesiod's  Theogony,  where  the  Muses  say  they  can  inspire  “false  things  similar  to
genuine ones”56, Solon (“Poets say much that is false”)57, at the beginning of the Hymn
to Dionysus (“Some say you were born in Dracanum, some in windy Icarus, and some
in Naxos […] they are all lying”)58, and in Stesichorus' Palinode (“This tale they tell is
not true: you did not sail in those benched ships or come to the towers of Troy”)59.
However, even in this case, Xenophanes' position presents novel characteristics. For,
while his predecessors competed by simply replacing the poetic contents they judged to
54 Solon is reported to have limited the amount of the prizes for athletic victories, because they could not
be honoured more than the dead on the battlefield (see D.L. 1.55). In the Autolycus, athletes are attacked
for  the same reason  (see  E.  282.1-22  TGF).  On the relationship between Tyrtaeus'  and Xenophanes'
elegies,  see Marcovich  1978,  pp.  24-25.  I  have  no space to  discuss  the role of  aretē in  Pindar:  for
reference, see Nagy 1990a; Hornblower and Morgan 2007.
55 “This is excellence, the finest human prize/ and fairest for a bold young man to win./ It is a benefit for
the whole city and community,/ when with a firm stance in the foremost rank/ a man bides steadfast, with
no thought of shameful flight,/ laying his life and stout heart on the line,/ and standing by the next man
speaks encouragement.” (Tyrt. 12.13-19 West, tr. West, with modifications).
56 Hes. Th. 27 (tr. Most). For a detailed discussion of this passage, see Chapter 3, pp. 89-98.
57 Sol. 29 W (tr. West).
58 Hom. Hymn 1. 1-6. 
59 Stesich. 192 PMGF (tr. West). 
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be false with other alternative versions of myths,  as in the case of the birthplace of
Dionysus  or  Helen'  departure  to  Troy60,  Xenophanes'  criticism is  supported  by  his
original  theological  views,  which  substantiate  his  moral  injunctions  and  ultimately
eliminate the premises of traditional competition. In order to better illustrate this point, I
will now turn to examine Xenophanes' conception of the divine.       
2.2 - Xenophanes' greatest god and the dispensation of justice
In presenting his conception of the divine, Xenophanes criticizes a series of traditional
religious  beliefs,  especially  regarding  the  representation  of  the  gods  found  in  the
Homeric and Hesiodic poems. To these beliefs, he opposes his own original theology,
centred on the notion of one greatest god, as expressed in these verses:
εἷς θεὸς ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος, 
οὔ τι δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίιος οὐδὲ νόημα. 
 One god is greatest among gods and men,
 not at all like mortals in body or in thought.
                                                      DK 21 B23
For  our  purposes  here,  it  is  not  necessary  to  discuss  the  much  debated  issue  of
Xenophanes' monotheism arising from these verses, since the following considerations
hold  regardless  of  the  specific  reading adopted61.  What  I  want  to  focus  on  are  the
characteristics which Xenophanes attributes to the  ʻgreatest godʼ, especially from the
point of view of its dissimilarity from mortals, expressed in the second verse. God is
said to be completely different from humans as to bodily frame (demas) and thought
60Another example is provided by Pindar, when he presents an alternative version of the myth of Pelops,
see Pi. O. 1.28-51. On the correction of rivals and the competition about alternative versions of myths, see
Griffith 1990, pp. 195-200.
61 In what follows I will then use  ‘god’ or ‘gods’, depending on the specific fragment examined.  For a
commentary on the fragment and a good survey of the possible interpretations, see Lesher 1992, pp. 96-
100. Barnes provides the reconstruction of an argument for monotheism, see Barnes 2005, pp. 84-94. For
a polytheistic reading, see Lesher loc. cit. and Granger 2013, pp. 237-238.
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(noēma)62.  The  emphasis  put  on the difference  between god and mortals  is  directly
opposed to one of the aspects of traditional religion Xenophanes criticizes, namely the
anthropomorphic representation of gods63. For, in depicting the divinity, men portray it
with  traits  identical  to  their  own,  a  custom vividly  illustrated  and  attacked  in  two
fragments  from the  Silloi. In  the  first  fragment  (B16),  it  is  pointed  out  that  gods'
representations vary depending on ethnic group: according to Ethiopians gods are snub-
nosed and black, while for Thracians they are blue-eyed and red-haired64. In the other
fragment (B15), the idea that each group depicts gods after its own physical features is
brought to its extreme consequences, as Xenophanes states that animals, if they could,
would portray gods resembling themselves65. It has been noticed that, according to the
fragments as they are, we cannot be sure of their polemic character and that, at any rate,
they do not constitute a proper argument against this kind of representations66. Some
considerations  might  help  us  to  clarify  the  function  of  these  verses:  first,  the
hypothetical scenario in which animals are imagined to depict gods implies a polemical
attitude in the form of mockery, since animal figures were frequently used in Archaic
poetry as a means of blaming and criticizing adversaries67. Recited along with verses
about  the  many  and  various  images  of  gods  that  humans  fabricate,  like  B16,  the
hexameters on animals make these beliefs appear ridiculous. It is true that this is not an
62 On divine  noēma, see below. As to the god's body, Clement, who quotes the fragment, attributes to
Xenophanes the notion of divine incorporeality, but his reading is unlikely (cf. Lesher 1992, p. 100). Still,
it remains unclear what kind of body the god has; for an overview of possible interpretations, see Lesher
1992, pp. 100-102. On this point, see also Granger 2013, pp. 242-245.
63 Lesher notes that Xenophanes does not reject anthropomorphism tout court, but only those accounts
which represent gods as too similar to humans. In other words, between gods and men there is complete
dissimilarity, not complete incomparability. That is why Xenophanes can speak both of men and gods as
having body, thought and moral qualities (cf. Lesher 1992, p. 94). On this point, see also Granger 2013, p.
242. 
64 DK 21 B16: “Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and black;/ Thracians that theirs are blue-
eyed and red-haired ” (tr. Lesher).
65 DK 21 B15: “But if horses or oxen or lions had hands/ or could draw with their hands and accomplish
such works as men,/ horses would draw the figures of the gods as similar to horses, and the oxen similar
to oxen,/ and they would /make the bodies/ of the sort which each of them had” (tr. Lesher).
66 Cf. Lesher 1992, pp. 93-94.
67 See above.
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argument  proper,  but,  if  we  read  the  fragment  in  the  broader  context  of  poetic
competition, we probably should simply accept the idea that Xenophanes' intent here is
not to dispute, but to attack68. Or, better, we should say that he is arguing, but in the
traditional competitive way, where mockery and, broadly speaking, any type of attack
were considered effective means of undermining the adversaries' position and authority.
Humans' tendency to attribute to the gods their own characteristics is the target
of another fragment, where Xenophanes, along with beliefs regarding the gods' physical
appearance, mentions the conviction in divine births: “But mortals suppose that gods are
born, have their own clothes, voice and body”69. Regarding the belief that gods are born,
Aristotle  reports  that  Xenophanes  used  to  say  that  speaking  of  divine  births  is  as
impious as affirming that they are mortal, since both entail that at a certain moment they
did not exist70. As argued by Granger, Xenophanes' criticism may be interpreted as a
refinement of the traditional beliefs on the gods, which despite their being referred to as
“always existing” (aiei eontes), where nonetheless thought to be born, as in Hesiod's
Theogony. Thus, by attacking divine generation, Xenophanes is both pointing out and
correcting the contradictions he sees in traditional religious ideas71.   
The most critical consequence deriving from anthropomorphic representations of
the divine, however, is the attribution of illicit behaviour to gods, which Xenophanes
attacks in the following fragments:
πάντα θεοῖσ᾽ ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ᾽ Ἡσίοδός τε,
ὅσσα παρ᾽ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν, 
κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν. 
Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods
all sorts of things that are matters of reproach and censure among men:
theft, adultery, and mutual deceit.
                                                        DK 21 B11
68 Scholars have noted the absence of argumentation proper in the fragments: cf. Lesher 1992, p. 116. For
an overview of the issue, see Granger 2013, p. 235, n. 3.
69 DK 21 B14. Tr. in Granger 2013, p. 242.
70 Cf. DK 21 A12.
71 Cf. Granger 2013, pp. 245-246.
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 ὡς πλεῖστ᾽ ἐφθέγξαντο θεῶν ἀθεμίστια ἔργα,
κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν. 
…as they sang of numerous illicit divine deeds:
theft, adultery, and mutual deceit.
                                                         DK 21 B12 
Xenophanes  attacks  Homer  and  Hesiod  because  they  have  depicted  the  gods  as
responsible  for  immoral  deeds  which  are  blamed  and  reproached  among  men.
Significantly, as noted by Lesher, Xenophanes singles out as examples of illicit divine
conduct crimes against organized society, as they constitute a breach of the mutual trust
which ties people together72. Their essentially antisocial nature is further stressed by the
recourse to the terms  oneidos  (‘reproach’) and  psogos  (‘blame’),  which traditionally
indicated public disapproval73. The criticism contained in these fragments is thus based
on the same considerations that made Xenophanes exclude the recitation of poems about
Centaurs, Titans and Giants from the symposium74. As in the present case, even those
stories  were  fictions  of  poets  which  represented  divine  beings  involved  in  actions
dangerous for society. What remains to determine is the reason why Xenophanes firmly
states that these sorts of representation are false. Even though not directly stated in the
extant  fragments,  his  judgement  appears  to  be  grounded  in  the  belief  in  divine
perfection, which entails the god's inherent moral goodness75. An indication in this sense
is provided by the set of sympotic prescriptions presented in B1, since their call for
prayers  to  do what  is  right  and the invitation to  always respect  the gods,  including
talking  of  them  with  pure  speeches76,  presupposes  both  the  gods'  concern  for  just
behaviour and their moral excellence77. But if gods are intrinsically good, it is impious
72 Cf. Lesher 1992, pp. 84-85. 
73 Cf. Babut 1974, p. 91.
74 See DK B1.21-23.
75 On divine perfection, see Lesher 1992, pp. 83-84.
76 Cf. supra, p. 54.
77 On this point, see also Barnes 2005, pp. 93-94; Granger 2013, p. 241. For a criticism of this view, see
Mogyoródi 2002, pp. 273-274.
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and false to depict them as committing evil deeds78.  A further argument in support of
Xenophanes' belief in the god's morality might come from considering his critical and
competitive stance against the previous poetical tradition. As I will argue, Xenophanes'
conception of the divine actually serves to substantiate his moral teachings aimed at
promoting  just  behaviour  among  men.  In  particular,  he  addresses  the  problems
stemming from the ambiguous representations of divine dispensation of justice provided
by other  poets.  In  this  respect,  god's  justice  is  one  of  the  conditions  necessary  to
guarantee the certain punishment and reward of, respectively, unjust and right conduct. 
Already in Homer and Hesiod there is the idea that Zeus and, generally, the gods
are concerned with human conduct: in the Odyssey, gods are said to honour justice and
the right deeds of humans, while in the Work and Days Zeus guarantees justice among
humans by punishing unjust acts and rewarding right behaviour79. The same belief is
shared by later  poets as well:  for example,  Archilochus says  that  Zeus oversees the
wicked and lawful deeds of men and he is concerned with the right and wrong even
among animals (177 West); according to Solon, Zeus is always aware of the sins of men
and, in due time, will punish those who deserve it (13.25-32 West); and Theognis speaks
of divine punishment for unjust profit (197-208). In addition to this belief, however,
there exists another common poetic motif according to which divine dispensation of
justice and interest in human morality are mutable and unreliable. Like all the gods'
gifts, they are subject to divine capriciousness80: for instance, in the  Works and Days
passage  which  comes  right  after  the  description  of  Zeus'  detection  and  consequent
treatment of injustice, Hesiod says that the god does not let these things pass unnoticed,
78 Plato will make explicit the logical contradiction of such accounts; see, as examples, Euthphr. 6b-c and
R. II 379a-380c.
79 See, respectively, Od. 14. 83-84 and Op. 225-266. Divine concern with justice in the Iliad is a debated
issue: Dodds  excludes any interest in justice on the part of Zeus (Dodds 1951, p. 32), but see Lloyd-Jones
1971, pp. 1-27; see further Mogyoródi 2002, p. 268, n. 72. On this point, see also Granger 2013, pp. 239-
240.
80 On divine capriciousness, see also Tor 2011, pp. 32-35.
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if he wishes to do so (“The eye of Zeus, seeing all and perceiving all, beholds these
things too, if so he wishes, and fails not to mark what sort of justice is this that the city
keeps within it”)81. Theognis expresses his  wonder in  seeing that  there are  cases  in
which Zeus appears not to distinguish between wicked and righteous conduct, as he
allows unjust people to prosper, while right men face difficulties, so that humans are left
without knowing what is the way to follow in order to please the gods82. Solon himself,
in the same poem where he describes Zeus' punishment of injustice, depicts the outcome
of human actions as unpredictable, with the result that even men who act well may incur
calamities83.  Divine unpredictability is effectively described by Hesiod when he says
that Zeus'  noos,  i.e his  mind or plan,  is different at  different times and difficult  for
humans to understand84. The term noos and its cognates relate both to the understanding
of a situation and the volitional reaction to it85. When used to describe moral retribution
on the part of the gods, they indicate divine realization of human behaviour and, at the
same time, the gods' plans in response to it: in the passages quoted above, for example,
Hesiod employs the verb  noein  to describe Zeus'  perception of human conduct (Op.
267), while Theognis' wonder stems from not understanding how Zeus'  noos can treat
just and unjust acts alike (377-378)86. The uncertainty in the moral sphere deriving from
the mutability of the gods' mind/plan is an issue that Xenophanes' conception of the
divine eliminates, as one of the central features of the greatest god is unchangeability. In
B26, the god is described as always remaining in the same state and not moving to
different places at different times87. There are good reasons to infer that the attribute of
81 Hes. Op. 267-269.
82 Cf. Thgn. 373-382; 731-752.
83 Cf. Sol. 13.65-70 West. For a commentary of the elegy and a discussion of the interpretative difficulties
raised by this contrast, see Noussia 2010, pp. 127-202. 
84 Op. 483-484. 
85 On the meaning of noos and cognates, see von Fritz 1942.
86 In Thgn. 197-203, it is said that the mind/plan (noos) of the gods prevails over the man who has gained
wealth unjustly.
87 DK 21 B26. For the reading of the fragment as expressing divine unchangeability, see Lesher 1992, p.
114.
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unchangeability pertains to the god's noos as well, since a modification of his mind/plan
would  entail  an  alteration  of  state.  Moreover,  as  we  have  seen,  god  is  said  to  be
completely  different  from mortals  as  to  noēma,  and  in  poetry  the  human  mind  is
typically represented as constantly changing: as effectively described in the  Odyssey,
mortal  noos  depends on, and thus changes according to, what Zeus brings upon men
every single day88. From this point of view,  immutability would then be an additional
mark of  distinction between divine and mortal  noos.  In addition,  since Xenophanes
proposes his conception of the divine in stark contrast with the traditional view found in
other poets, especially Homer and Hesiod, the idea that his god does not change his
mind/plan  out  of  capriciousness  as  in  previous  representations  represents  a  further
criticism of such accounts.  
The dissimilarity of god's mind is further illustrated in the following fragment:
 οὖλος ὁρᾶι, οὖλος δὲ νοεῖ, οὖλος δέ τ᾽ ἀκούει. 
whole he sees, whole he thinks, and whole he hears.
                                                            DK 21 B24
The description of god as exercising sight, thought and hearing with the whole of his
body reflects the idea, expressed in B23, that his bodily frame is different from that of
mortals, since, unlike them, he does not possess specific sensory organs. In addition,
this  characterization  attributes  to  the  greatest  god  an  exceptional  awareness  which,
although not explicitly stated in the extant fragments, can be reasonably interpreted as
indicating god's omniscience. If  we again consider the competitive context in which
Xenophanes operated, it is hard to believe that he would not have credited his god with
omniscience,  since  traditionally  gods  and,  especially,  Zeus  were  said  to  know
everything89. In order actually to be the greatest among gods and men, Xenophanes' god
could not have been limited in knowledge. In fact, Xenophanes' description of god's
88 Cf. Hom. Od. 18.136-137. The image became a common motif in later poets: see, for example, Archil.
130 West; Semon. 1.1-5 West; Stesich. 222a.207-208 PMGF; Pi. N. 6.4-7.
89 For example in Hom. Od. 20.75; Hes. Op. 267 (Zeus); Il. 2.485; Od. 12.188-191 (other divinities).
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awareness addresses and corrects  a  latent inconsistency in previous poetic  accounts,
where Zeus' omniscience is at odds with the fact that he exercises his perceptual and
intellectual faculties with human-like organs, which are intrinsically limited in scope90.
Xenophanes is thus saying that  omniscience truly pertains to his god and not to those
sung  by  other  poets.  The  unlimited  extent  of  god's  cognitive  power  is  further
emphasized  by  the  repetition  of  ‘whole’  (oulos),  which  denotes  superior  quality
awareness in the form of a quantitative summary91.  God's exceptional perceptual and
intellectual abilities are combined with his active role in the events of the world, as
stated in this verse:
ἀλλ᾽ ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει. 
But completely without toil he shakes all things by 
the thought of his mind.
                                                                                 DK 21 B25
Setting aside the controversial issue about the relationship between the  noos and the
phrēn of god92, I focus on the idea of intelligent and purposeful intervention implied by
the fragment and emerging from the comparison with previous accounts of the divine. I
have already mentioned the use of the term noos to indicate Zeus' will/plan. In a similar
way, phrēn can signify Zeus' volition and, more generally, the location or instrument of
deliberation and planning93. Moreover, in a parallel passage in the first book of the Iliad,
when  Zeus  assents  to  Thetis'  request  to  honour  Achilles,  his  nod,  expressing  the
adoption  of  a  determined  plan  which  will  inevitably  be  realized,  makes  Olympus
shake94.  Thus,  Xenophanes'  image of the greatest  god shaking all  things reflects  the
90 Cf. Lesher 1992, p. 105; Granger 2013, pp. 247-248.
91 Cf. Lesher 1992, p. 106.
92 On this point, see Darcus 1978, p. 26.
93 Cf. Tor 2011, p. 70.
94 Hom.  Il. 1.523-527. On this passage and its relationship with Xenophanes' fragment, see Mogyoródi
2002, p. 283, n. 140. On the the idea that kradainein includes the notion of ʻpurposeful interventionʼ, see
Tor 2011, p. 69; Palmer 2009, p. 329; Lesher 1992, pp. 107-109. For a criticism, see Granger 2013, p.
256-257; Cornford 1952, p. 147.
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notion that the god purposefully intervenes in the world, and the further specification
that he does this completely without effort (apaneuthe ponoio) conveys the idea that his
plans are realized without hindrance or detour95. 
The above considerations indicate  that  Xenophanes'  conception of  the divine
serves both to criticize and to solve the issues deriving from the traditional accounts
about divine dispensation of justice. For the god's moral goodness, and the consequent
interest  in  justice,  combined  with  the  unchangeability  of  his  noos, eliminates  the
uncertainty  deriving  from  divine  capriciousness.  Moreover,  god's  omniscience
guarantees  that  no  evil  or  good  actions  will  pass  unnoticed,  while  the  effortless
realization of his plans assures the reliability of his judgement96. Indeed, all the criticism
which Xenophanes addresses to previous conceptions of the divine shows his moral
concerns. For the attack on anthropomorphic representations of deities, along with the
notion of the gods' moral goodness which excludes their committing illicit deeds, rules
out the possibility that men use the example of too much humanized gods as an excuse
for their own immoral behaviour97. All these elements together form a stable ethico-
religious framework in which men's actions are judged and rewarded depending on their
morality. The ultimate realization of justice is guaranteed by the immutable, omniscient
and powerful god which takes the place of the traditional divinities. As I aim to show in
the next section, besides its moral implications, Xenophanes' original conception of the
greatest god serves to undermine the premises of traditional agonism and, at the same
time, to redefine its very rules.
95 Cf. Mogyoródi 2002, p. 283, n. 141.
96 As to the certainty of god's judgment I agree with Mogyoródi, who arrives at this conclusion using
arguments  different  from  mine  (cf.  Mogyorodi  2002,  pp.  279-283).  However,  we  disagree  on
Xenophanes' attribution of moral goodness to the god, which she denies (cf. Mogyoródi 2002, pp. 273-
274).
97 The idea will be later appropriated by Euripides in the Ion, 440-451, where Ion laments Apollo's rape of
Creusa and observes that men should not be blamed for their illicit deeds, since, in committing them, they
simply imitate gods' behaviour.
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2.3 - Xenophanes and poetic competition
In  the  foregoing  discussion  of  Xenophanes'  conception  of  the  greatest  god,  I  have
pointed out how the notion of the greatest god should be interpreted in the context of
competing accounts of the divine, especially considering Xenophanes' polemical stance
against Homeric and Hesiodic depiction of the gods. Indeed, Xenophanes' theological
views  stand  in  opposition  to  the  “fabrications”  (B1.22)  of  his  predecessors,  who
wrongly attributed to the gods marked anthropomorphic characteristics. As anticipated,
however,  traditional as Xenophanes'  attitude might  appear  at  first  glance,  it  actually
entails  an innovative take on poetic competition itself.  For the characteristics which
Xenophanes attributes to the divine eliminate the very assumptions which had nurtured
the  proliferation  of  alternative  accounts.  Consider  the  case  of  different  descriptions
about the birthplace of a god, as in the  Hymn to Dionysus  mentioned above98:  even
though the poet rejects other versions as false, his own is only another possible account
among others, which can always be changed or dismissed by rivals at any moment. But
if gods are unborn, as Xenophanes affirms, the very possibility of such modifications is
eradicated. The same point holds for stories which imply gods' immorality, or derive
from their possessing anthropomorphic traits. Broadly speaking, any mythical account
about divine deeds should be discarded, since it would be based upon the idea that gods
move from place to place, a belief rejected in B26 as such a characteristic would be
inappropriate to divine status.
Significantly,  the  impact  of  Xenophanes'  innovative  theology  on  traditional
poetic agonism is not limited to a critical revision of the attributes of the gods. Actually,
Xenophanes' conception of the greatest god also entails a redefinition of the relationship
between  mortal  and  divine  which  undermines  another  key  premise  of  poetic
98 See supra, p. 62.
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competition,  namely  divine  inspiration.  In  fragment  B18,  Xenophanes  rejects  the
traditional view on divine disclosure to mortals in the following terms:
                    οὔ τοι ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖσ᾽ ὑπέδειξαν, 
                      ἀλλὰ χρόνωι ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον. 
                      Indeed not from the beginning the gods intimated all things to mortals,
                      but as they search in time they discover better99.
                                                                           DK 21 B18
                                                                                                 
The  fragment  is  famously  ambiguous  due  to  the  different  readings  of  panta  and
ap'archēs which might be adopted. On the one hand, the fact that the gods did not reveal
all things (panta) could mean either that they did not reveal anything at all or that they
revealed just some things; on the other hand, the specification “at the beginning”, could
be read as implying that, in fact, the gods have disclosed some things to mortal in the
course of time. Numerous arguments have been advanced in support of either reading,
which I cannot analyse extensively here. In what follows, I will build upon the recent
interpretation  proposed  by  Tor,  who  convincingly  argues  that  in  fragment  B18
Xenophanes  attacks  the traditional  and authoritative paradigms of  divine  disclosure,
mainly represented by mantic divination and poetic inspiration, to replace them with his
own100.  According  to  Xenophanes'  model  of  divine  disclosure,  which  Tor  calls
“universal  disclosure”,  instead  of  communicating  to  few privileged  individuals,  the
divine purposively facilitates mortal  opinion-formation by enabling human beings to
perceive  and consider  everything  that  they  encounter  in  their  experience101.  Indeed,
mortals  should  avail  themselves  of  the  everyday  experience  which  the  god  makes
accessible  to  them in  order  to  improve their  sets  of  beliefs  over  time by means of
99 Tr. Lesher. 
100 Cf. Tor 2013, p. 250 and passim.
101 Cf. Tor 2013, p. 267. Tor presents also a restricted version of his interpretation, according to which the
divine brings particular things to the consideration of mortals and only in some circumstances, but deems
the universal alternative more probable (cf. idem, pp. 270-271).
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enquiry102. In this scenario, appeals to divine inspiration cannot provide the guarantee of
poetic authority any more. Xenophanes thus eliminates one of the means by which poets
claimed the authenticity of their narrations, and, even more significantly, authorized the
continual formation of competing versions of myth103.  
It is worth noticing that, although Xenophanes' theology excises the possibility
of competing accounts, it cannot be considered as a definitive account on the divine. For
Xenophanes'  epistemological  views  excludes,  de  facto,  that  human  beings  can  ever
acquire knowledge about the gods or the cosmos. In fragment B34, Xenophanes states
that no man will ever know what is clear and certain (saphes) about the gods and natural
phenomena104.  Actually,  even  in  the  case  in  which  someone  happened  to  speak  in
conformity to what has been brought to completion (tetelesmenon), still he would not
have  knowledge  of  that,  since  human  beings  are  unavoidably  confined  to  opinion
(dokos)105. A detailed analysis of the various interpretations of the fragment is beyond
the  scope  of  the  present  work106.  In  the  following  discussion,  I  will  adopt  what  I
consider  the  most  plausible  reading  of  the  fragment,  the  so-called  “naturalistic
approach”107. According to this interpretation, Xenophanes' position must be understood
in the context of the natural restrictions on human knowledge determined by the limited
range  of  human  experience.  Since  men  cannot  have  access  to  the  complete  set  of
102 It must be noticed that Xenophanes' conception of the greatest god assures stability in the formation of
beliefs about the world. For if god's mind does not change, as a consequence one might expect regularity
and fixity in the order of things as well, because, as said in B25, it is by means of his  noos  that god
intervenes in the world. Therefore, if the order of things determined by god is stable, men can actually
improve their beliefs in the course of time. Consider the case of the honey of fragment B 38: “If god had
not made yellow honey, they would think/ that figs were much sweeter” (tr. Lesher). Even though men
cannot say that honey is the sweetest thing of all, they are however assured tin their belief that honey is
sweeter than figs (or, at least, than certain types of figs).
103 A detailed discussion of Xenophanes' rejection of traditional divine disclosure is provided by Tor, see
Tor 2013, especially p. 260 for poetic inspiration. For a commentary on the fragment, see Lesher 1992,
pp. 149-155. 
104 Cf. DK 21 B34.1-2:  “And of course the clear and certain truth no man has seen/ nor will there be
anyone who knows about the gods and what I say about all things” (tr. Lesher). On the interpretation of
“all things” as referring to natural phenomena, see Lesher 1992, pp. 167-168.
105 Cf. DK 21 B34.3-4: “For even if, in the best case, one happened to speak just of what has been brought
to pass,/ still he would not know. But opinion is wrought over all” (tr. Lesher, with modifications).
106 For an overview of the possible readings, see Lesher 1992, pp. 159-67.
107 Cf. Lesher 1992, p. 166.
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experiences  relating to the natural world due to the short  span of their  life  and the
objective impossibility of experiencing any possible aspect of nature, they cannot have
knowledge on the  subject.  Similarly,  since,  as  I  have  discussed above,  Xenophanes
denies  any sort  of  direct  interaction  between  humans  and  gods,  as  implied  by  his
criticism on the anthropomorphic belief that gods move around and communicate with
mortals, knowledge concerning divine matters is excluded108.  
However,  although debarred from knowledge,  men can improve their  beliefs
concerning the world in which they live by means of enquiry, as stated in B18. In this
context, Xenophanes' views on the divine, although potentially subject to correction as
any other opinion held by mortals, should be considered, I argue, as a set of opinions
which  represents  an  improvement  in  ethico-religious  belief.  Indeed,  Xenophanes'
competitive stance against rivals and bold claim to  sophia  in B2 indicate that he was
keen on presenting his doctrines as better than those of his rivals109. But better in which
respect?  The  answer  might  be  found  in  the  notion  of  divine  appropriateness  and
perfection which we have seen that Xenophanes uses, for example,  when he rejects
divine change and immorality. In this perspective, Xenophanes' account of the divine is
better than those offered by other poets, because more fitting to the basic assumption
that gods are morally perfect. As regards this point, one might wonder what the origin of
108 Cf.  fragments  B18,  discussed  above,  and  B26.  Noticeably,  the  limitedness  of  human life  will  be
mentioned by Protagoras as one of the reasons of his ignorance about divine nature (cf. DK 80 B4).
109 Cf. Xenophanes' invitation to consider his doctrines as plausible/verisimilar in DK 21 B35:  ταῦτα
δεδοξάσθω μὲν ἐοικότα τοῖς ἐτύμοισι,  “Let these things be accepted, certainly, as resembling realities”
(tr. Lesher, with modifications). Due to the lack of information about the context, the interpretation of the
fragment remains inevitably speculative (for a detailed discussion of the issues concerning the fragment,
see Bryan 2012, pp. 6-57; Lesher 1992, pp. 169-176).  However, given the presence of the imperative
dedoxasthō, it is highly probable that the things referred to in the fragment include Xenophanes' views
about  the  gods  and  natural  phenomena,  that  is,  the  topics  qualified  as  inevitably subject  to  opinion
(dokos) in B34 (cf. Lesher 1992, p. 175, Tor 2011, p. 76). Bryan argues that the use of eoikōs indicates
the possible speciousness of Xenophanes' doctrines, and thereby their being liable to correction like any
other opinion held by humans. The lines are reminiscent of Hesiod's Theogony 27, where the Muses say
that they are able to tell false things similar to realities (ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα).  Tor
notices that, differently from Hesiod, Xenophanes thinks that speciousness is determined by men's limited
experience, and not by divine will (on the Muses' statement, see further my discussion in Chapter 3, pp.
89-98). Sassi reads B35 as an example of Xenophanes reliance on the principle of verisimilitude, cf. Sassi
2013, p. 295.
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Xenophanes'  belief  in divine perfection is.  The evidence in our possession does not
allow us to provide a definitive answer to the question. Xenophanes' conception might
have  been  determined  by  his  personal  sense  of  piety,  which  prevented  him  from
deeming the gods capable of committing immoral deeds. Alternatively, we could also
think  that  his  theological  views had been informed by his  concern  with  ethics  and
politics. From this point of view, Xenophanes' theology is better than the traditional one
because, by encouraging people to behave justly, it is more beneficial to the welfare of
the polis than traditional ones. 
Regardless  of  the  reasons behind Xenophanes'  theological  views,  it  is  worth
noticing that Xenophanes'  challenge to traditional religious beliefs is based upon the
adoption of a criterion whereby to distinguish between better and worse accounts of the
divine. For without divine inspiration as a basis for authority, poetic accounts should be
accepted or discarded according to their conformity to the principle of divine perfection.
Similar  considerations hold for  statements  about  the natural  world,  as they must  be
based and, if necessary, corrected according to the results of enquiry on the objects of
experience which the god makes available to mortals. Thus, in entering the poetic agōn,
Xenophanes redefines its terms by both stopping the traditional way of competing and
introducing a rule to determine the outcome of successive contests110.
Conclusion
The examination of Xenophanes'  elegies B1 and B2 and of the fragments about his
theological views and the criticism against traditional beliefs has shown how deeply
110 The modification of the terms of competition is the reason why Xenophanes' criticism cannot be seen
as a manifestation of the pan-Hellenistic impulse as argued by Nagy (cf. Nagy 2008, p. 34-36). For pan-
Hellenism continues to foster traditional agonism, as it relies on the idea that absolute truth is imparted by
the  divinity,  which  pace  Nagy is  rejected  by Xenophanes.  For  a  discussion  and  criticism of Nagy's
position, see also Granger 2007, pp. 418-419. On Xenophanes' differentiation from the tradition, see also
Griffith 1990, p. 196.
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embedded he was in the competitive context which characterized Archaic Greek culture.
The surviving verses give us the portrait of a sage-poet who competed with those he
saw as rivals in order to mark his originality and superiority. The attacks on Homer and
Hesiod  are  an  eloquent  example  of  Xenophanes'  agonistic  spirit  which  led  him to
confront directly the two most important poets of Greece. But his criticism hit also at
other wisdom practitioners, like Pythagoras, and entire professional categories, as in the
case of the athletes, which he targeted in his poems111. His teachings, as emerged from
the  analysis  of  B1  and  B2,  regarded  the  moral  conduct  of  individuals  and  its
repercussions on the polis as a whole112. The exclusion of poems about divine and civic
struggle from the symposium exemplifies this preoccupation, as such stories represent
the negative effects of individual unjust behaviour on society. In particular, Centaurs are
the symbol of the socially harmful results of unrestrained conduct at banquets. In this
light, the repeated calls for morality at the symposium in B1 are, at the same time, an
invitation to civic eunomia, since not respecting the rules of communal life at the feast
is a prelude to the ruin of the city. 
Xenophanes' ethical advice is closely related to his concern with religious piety,
as shown by the fact that the guests are invited to pray to god in order to act according
to justice, and that the whole set of sympotic prescriptions of B1 is presented as a means
of  honouring  the  divinity.  This  connection  between  ethics  and  religion  is  further
strengthened  by  Xenophanes'  theology,  since  his  original  conception  of  the  divine
presupposes the gods' interest in the right behaviour of humans and their inherent moral
goodness, which exclude their committing unjust acts like those narrated in the Homeric
111 A similar criticism of poets and other wisdom practitioners can be found in Heraclitus, who attacks
Hesiod, Pythagoras, and Xenophanes himself for their polumathiē and lack of noos (DK 22 40). In other
fragments he attacks Homer and Archilochus (DK 22 42), and Hesiod (DK 22 57). But Heraclitus' critical
stance, differently from that of Xenophanes, does not involve his direct participation in the poetic game
and its internal redefinition. 
112 It is beyond the scope of this work to discuss Xenophanes' fragments on nature. For an introduction to
the topic, I refer the reader to the commentary on the fragments by Lesher, (Lesher 1992, pp. 120-148)
and to Mourelatos' reconstruction of Xenophanes' astrophysics (Mourelatos 2008b).
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and Hesiodic poems. Furthermore, Xenophanes' notion of the greatest god, omniscient
and  unchangeable,  ensures  god's  intervention  in  the  world  to  punish  injustice,  thus
avoiding the status of uncertainty about divine dispensation of justice deriving from the
traditional accounts of gods' capriciousness. It is such a conception that substantiates
Xenophanes' teachings aimed at the welfare of the polis. For, if the divinity is constantly
aware of human behaviour and will not let injustice pass unnoticed, men are effectively
urged to not commit immoral acts which eventually lead to civic strife and thus damage
the city.
In addition to its implications in ethics, the importance of Xenophanes' original
theology lies in the fact that it represents a novel means of competing with rivals: while
on the one hand it makes him directly compete with other poets, especially Homer and
Hesiod, and challenge their authority by stating that what they say is false as usual in
Archaic poetry,  on the other hand, it  actually eliminates the assumptions which had
nurtured the constant generation of alternative accounts, based on misguided opinion on
the  gods,  like  the  belief  in  their  generation.  Even  more  significantly,  Xenophanes
redefines the terms of poetic competition by introducing the criterion of appropriateness
and conformity to experience whereby to judge the value of statements about the gods
or natural phenomena. Indeed, due to their epistemic limitations, humans are destined to
remain in the process of enquiry, which involves the continuous correction of accepted
opinions  and  thereby  competition  between  new  and  old  views.  But  instead  of  an
uncontrolled proliferation of equally valid competing accounts determined by the lack
of a discriminating principle, Xenophanes provides a rule through which agonism might
be fruitfully used to improve men's set of beliefs about the world in which they live.
The above considerations show how the agonistic stances which characterized
Archaic Greek poetry informed also Xenophanes' poetical and intellectual activity, as he
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competed with possible rivals by making them the object of criticism and irony in order
to affirm his superiority. But, at the same time, the doctrines whereby he challenged his
adversaries contained the roots for the overthrow of traditional competition itself.  A
similar inclination towards eliminating competition can be found in Parmenides. In the
next chapter, I will analyse his poem in order to evaluate the way he devised to beat his
adversaries  and  stop  the  conflict  by  making  accessible  to  mortals  that  truth  which
Xenophanes deemed unattainable.
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Chapter 3
Parmenides and the redefinition of alētheia
In this chapter I will analyse Parmenides' poem in the context of poetic agonism. In
particular, I will argue that Parmenides' doctrine of Being posits a redefinition of the
notion of alētheia which responds to Hesiod's conception of truth, and eventually solves
the traditional  problem concerning the ambiguity of poetry.  However,  Hesiod is  not
Parmenides' only competitor, as he also challenges Homer's authority and the pretence
to wisdom of rival philosophers.
Differently  from  Xenophanes  and,  as  will  be  discussed  in  chapter  4,
Empedocles,  who,  like  Parmenides,  adopt  an  overtly  agonistic  stance  against  other
wisdom practitioners, we do not have indications about the performance of Parmenides'
poem,  in  particular  as  regards  public  recitations  of  his  work.  A scanty  piece  of
information is provided by Plato in the Sophist, in which the guest from Elea, a follower
of Parmenides and Zeno, says that Parmenides repeatedly warned him and his other
young pupils never to admit that What-Is-Not is, both in prose and in verse1. In the light
of Plato's testimony, Cerri has advanced the hypothesis that Parmenides made use of
verse to help students memorize the basic tenets of his doctrine, after having explained
it extensively in everyday language2. Additionally, so Cerri argues, the poem was most
probably circulated among groups of intellectuals in other cities in order to raise interest
in  Parmenides'  philosophy  and  thereby  attract  new  followers3.  Despite  the  lack  of
decisive evidence, Cerri's reconstruction is, I think, plausible. Indeed, it is undeniable
that Parmenides' poem had vast influence on later philosophers, who must have been
1 Cf. Pl. Sph. 237a: “But the great Parmenides, my boy, from the time when we were children to the end
of his life, always protested against this and constantly repeated both in prose and in verse: ʻnever let this
thought prevail, saith he, that not-being isʼ” (tr. Fowler).
2 Cf. Cerri 1999, p. 94.
3 Cf. Cerri 1999, p. 95. As implied by what Plato says in the Parmenides (Pl.  Parm. 128a-b), copies of
Parmenides' poem must have circulated in Athens during Parmenides' life. 
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well acquainted not only with his arguments, but also with his verses, as testified by
their appropriation of his “technical” terminology4. However, I also tend not to exclude
the  possibility  that  the  poem was  performed  publicly  and  thus  pitched  to  a  wider
audience than that of his  intellectual circles5.  An indication of this  fact comes from
Epicharmus' use of Parmenidean terminology in his comedies6, which, given its parodic
function, can be explained only if the public was aware, in some degree, of the content
of Parmenides' work. Moreover, the proem's marked narrative character, along with the
rich system of allusions to Homer and Hesiod therein, suggests that the poem was meant
also for the wider public, which, initially attracted by the traditional framework of the
work, would then have been introduced to a revolutionary conception of reality. 
My analysis  of Parmenides'  competitive take on his rivals  will  start  with the
examination of the proem of his work, where he alludes to his polemic targets (3.1).
Then, I  will  discuss Hesiod's  characterization of  alēthea  (“true things”) as universal
truths,  by means of which he both differentiates his poetry from that of Homer and
affirms his poetic superiority over other poets (3.2). In the next section (3.3), I will
examine Parmenides'  redefinition of  alētheia  and show how it eliminates  the issues
raised by Hesiod's poetry. Finally, I will evaluate the role of  Doxa in the poem in the
light of Parmenides' original conception of truth and his competitive stance against his
rivals (3.4).
4 Cf., for example, the echoes of Parmenides in Empedocles and Epicharmus discussed in Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5. Traces of Parmenides' linguistic influence can be found also in Aeschylus (e.g. Ag. 788-789).
5 Significantly, at Parm. 127a-c, Plato says that Parmenides and Zeno came to Athens to attend the Great
Panathenaia, where it is plausible to think that they performed their works. On the possible audience of
the the poem, see also Tulli 1993, pp. 160-162. 
6 Cf. Horky 2013, p. 136 n. 41. On Epicharmus' relation to Parmenides, see further Chapter 5, pp. 161 and
169-170.
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3.1 – The proem
Analysing Parmenides' proem in search of the literary and cultural influences which he
drew upon has led to many interesting results  in the course of decades of scholarly
debate7. These discoveries, although helpful in shedding some light on what lies in the
background of such an influential work, have had the effect of further fragmenting the
approach to and the consequent interpretation of Parmenides' thought. For each intertext
and context has been used as a sort of Rosetta stone to decipher the content of the whole
poem. One of the most eloquent examples is provided by Kingsley's interpretation of
Parmenides as a healer who put in verse the description of his mystical experiences8.
But  even  in  cases  where  the  recognition  of  literary/cultural  models  employed  by
Parmenides  has  not  led  to  such  striking  consequences,  there  remain  the  limitations
stemming from the preconceived belief that the proem was composed by drawing upon
a primary and predominant source, which should be identified in order to understand
Parmenides' work. This idea is well exemplified by Havelock's point of view on the
various and contrasting results of scholarly analysis of the proem: since they could not
be reconciled and they are not satisfactory when singularly considered, the right answer
should be sought elsewhere9. 
In what follows, my approach will address exactly these tenets, since I will start
from the assumption that Parmenides' usage of models for his poetry does not mean that
he  wholly  adopts  them  or  that  he  should  be  identified  with  them.  In  Mourelatos'
terminology, the presence of certain motifs does not allow us to draw straightforward
7 The interpretative work on the proem started in antiquity, as testified by Sextus Empiricus' reading of
the passage as an epistemological allegory (S.E. M.7.111; 114). For allegorical interpretations in modern
times, see Bowra 1937, p.  98;  Coxon 2009,  pp. 14-18. For a  discussion and criticism of allegorical
interpretations, see Palmer 2009, pp. 52-53.
8 See Kingsley 1999, pp. 101-105 and passim. Similarly, Gemelli Marciano (2008). In stark contrast with
the reading of Parmenides' proem as the description of a mystic experience, Granger sees in the goddess a
symbol of a priori reason (cf. Granger 2008, p. 16).
9 Cf. Havelock 1958, p. 135. 
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conclusions about the theme(s) of the poem10. But, rather than accepting Mourelatos'
explanation of the compresence of so many different and dissonant motifs as the results
of “archaic mentality”11, I intend to show that a more promising approach consists in
considering Parmenides as competing with the very poetic models he employs. In this
light,  the  problem  arising  from  the  impossibility  of  reconciling  all  the  different
influences traceable in  his  poem disappears:  the motifs  are  there as allusions  to his
predecessors and adversaries, who are challenged all together at the same time. In order
to analyse the parallels between Parmenides' poem and other literary/cultural models
and to show how he combines them in a multi-layered system of references, I will start
by discussing the motif of the journey, and then I will proceed to illustrate the different
ramifications and allusions contained in his narration.
As long recognized, the Odyssey is one of the models Parmenides draws upon to
describe his journey to the goddess' dwellings12. In terms of terminology and imagery,
the characteristic elements of the journey motif employed to narrate Odysseus' nostos
are  reprised  to  represent  the  quest  for  Being  in  the  poem.  The  terms  hodos  and
keleuthos, which in Homer both indicate an itinerary or route towards a specific goal or
place (specifically, Odysseus' return to Ithaka), in Parmenides are used to indicate, first,
the path he follows to meet the goddess (B1.1-2: “The mares that carry me […] were
taking me (pempon), when they brought and placed me upon the much-speaking route
(hodon)  of  the  goddess”13)  and,  then,  the  route  of  enquiry  which  the  mind/thought
should undertake (B2.2: “[I shall tell you] what routes of enquiry (hodoi dizēsios) alone
10 I follow Mourelatos' distinction between  ʻmotifʼ and ʻthemeʼ: the former indicates the conventional
forms governing the description of certain objects, persons, places and processes, while the latter consists
in the concept conveyed by that specific description (cf. Mourelatos 2008a, pp. 11-12).
11 Mourelatos 2008a, p. 29.
12 For an overview of Homeric influences on Parmenides, especially as to vocabulary, see Mourelatos
2008a, pp. 1-14; Coxon 2009, pp. 9-12. Cf. Havelock 1958 and Mourelatos 2008a, pp. 16-25. In the
following presentation of the motif of the journey, I  have drawn on both Havelock's and Mourelatos'
analyses, of which I have selected the most relevant points for my discussion. 
13 DK 28 B1.1-2.
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there are for thinking”; B2.4: “[The first route] is the path (keleuthos) of persuasion”).
The vocabulary of these last passages shows that the similarities go further, as Odysseus
is also described as seeking his return (nostos dizēmenos14) and eventually accomplishes
it with the help of escorting agents, a contribution usually expressed by the verb pempō
(ʻto sendʼ, ʻto escortʼ) and derivatives. Opposed to the idea of progression on the route
of return is the notion of wandering (planē), which can eventually coincide with a non-
return, especially if determined by human foolishness. Odysseus' comrades are deprived
of the nostos exactly because of their irresponsible behaviour, marked by recklessness
(atasthaliē)15.  In similar tones,  Parmenides describes the wandering mind of mortals
which  fails  to  recognize  the  right  path  to  follow  in  their  quest,  “for  helplessness
(amēchaniē) in their breasts directs their mind astray”16. In order to avoid losing the way
of  return  because  of  endless  wandering,  it  is  necessary  to  resort  to  the  help  of
superhuman guides. In the  Odyssey, Tiresias and Circe play such a role, as they both
provide him with advice about the route to follow and give him signs (sēmata) which
can guide him17. In Parmenides' poem as well, the goddess indicates to the kouros the
signs he can encounter on the way of Being (B8.2-3: “On this way there are very many
signs (sēmata))”18. 
Parmenides'  journey is made on a chariot driven by sagacious (poluphrastoi)
mares,  an  indirect  reference  to  Achilles'  horses  in  the  Iliad19,  and  escorted  by  the
daughters of the Sun (B1.9), who guide him on the way of divinity. The choice of the
chariot recalls a complex set of references: Telemachus' journey in the  Odyssey20; the
14 Od. 23.253; see also, Od. 11.100.
15 E.g. Od. 1.7.
16 DK 28 B6.5-6 (tr. Coxon with modifications).
17 For example, at Od. 12.25-26; Od. 11.126.
18 In addition, Havelock argues that the goddess's description of the alternatives routes of enquiry in B2 is
modelled on Circe's advice about Scylla and Carybdis at Od. 12.217-221 (cf. Havelock 1958, p. 138).
19 Il. 19.400-420. On this point, see Havelock 1958, p. 136; Coxon 2009, p. 273.
20 Od. 3. 475-4.75.
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myth of Phaethon, especially considering the presence of the daughters of the Sun21;
Herakles' apotheosis22; Hades' kidnapping of Persephone and his consequent descent to
the Underworld23. But primarily, the chariot driven by horses or other animals stands as
a metaphor for inspired poetry, as shown by coeval or slightly later poetical texts24. The
image  of  the  chariot  is  part  of  a  larger  field  of  metaphors  which  represent  poetic
discourse as a path, examples of which are attested in Homer and, more broadly, in the
Indo-European tradition25. Significantly, the chariot and the horses frequently are used
to evoke the idea of poetic competition26. 
Parmenides' chariot is driven to the gates of the paths of Day and Night (B1.11),
a topographical detail which hints at Hesiod's description of Tartarus in the Theogony.
Tartarus is the place where the dwellings of Night are located27, and Night and Day are
said  to  greet  one  another  as  they  alternatively  (ameibomenai)  pass  a  great  bronze
threshold28. The idea of alternation is echoed by Parmenides' description of the keys of
the Gate as “alternating” (klēidas amoibous) (B1.14). Furthermore, Hesiod speaks of
Tartarus as a great chasm (chasma, Th.740) beyond the Underworld gates. Similarly, the
gate opened by Dike to let the kouros pass reveals a yawning chasm (chasm' achanes,
21 Cf. Bowra 1937, pp. 103-104; Burkert 1969, pp. 6-7.
22 As testified by vase paintings datable form the middle of the 6th century BCE, see Mingazzini 1925, pp.
418-442.  Significantly,  Herakles,  like  the  kouros,  journeys  to  the  Underworld  while  still  living  (cf.
Kingsley 1999, p. 61). On Parmenides' proem as a description of a katabasis, see below.
23 Cf. h.Cer.(2).18-20. On the relationship between the hymn and Parmenides' proem, see Cerri 1999, p.
101, n. 140.
24 The image is frequent in Pindar (e.g. O. 9.81; 8.61; P. 10.65); we find it in Bacchylides (5.176) and in
Empedocles (DK 31 B3.5; see further, Chapter 4, pp. 136-140). On the image, see Durante 1976, pp. 129-
134 and Cerri 1999, pp. 97-98. Scholars have also noted a close resemblance between Parmenides' proem
and Pindar's  Olympic  6.22-27, where he describes his arrival to the gate of hymns by chariot.  For a
discussion of the possible influences of Parmenides on Pindar (or vice versa), see Durante 1976, pp. 131-
132; D'Alessio 1995 and Di Benedetto, 2003.
25 The Parmenidean image of the path leading to truth is found in Vedic texts, which also assign to the
Sun's daughter, Sūryā, a determinant role in poetic inspiration and composition. Cf. Durante 1976, pp.
132-133; on poetry as a path, see  idem, pp. 123-129. Also notice that the road is qualified as “richly
endowed in song” (poluphēmos), for a parallel, see the poluphēmos  singer at  Od.22.376. On this point,
see Lesher 1994, pp. 11-12.
26 See Durante 1976, pp. 129-130.
27 Cf. Th. 743. At B1.9, Parmenides speaks of the house of Night (dōmata Nuktos)
28 Cf.  Th.  748-750.  Instead of  bronze, Parmenides'  threshold is  made of  stone.  This variation of  the
tradition (the bronze threshold of Hades is also in Homer, at Il. 8.15) has been differently interpreted: see
Cerri 1999, pp. 176-177; Coxon 2009, p. 276-277. 
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B1.18).  This  reprise  of  Hesiod's  topography  of  Tartarus  contributes  to  characterize
Parmenides' journey as a travel to the Underworld29. A further indication in this sense is
provided by the goddess' reassurance that the kouros has not been brought to her house
by a moira kakē, which in epic language is equivalent to  ʻdeathʼ30. In other words, he
has reached while living the destination at which humans usually arrive only after their
death.
That  Parmenides  models  his  narration  on  that  of  an  afterlife  journey is  also
suggested by his designating the route the kouros  travels on as the road which carries
the man who knows (eidota phōta).  As shown by Burkert,  the phrase  eidota phōta,
when used without an object, indicates one who has been initiated to mysteries, and the
term kouros as well belongs to the terminology of initiations31. But the travelling “man
who knows” recalls again Homer's  Odyssey: during his journey Odysseus encounters
and knows the minds and the cities of many men (notice that Parmenides' road carries
the man “through all cities”32), including the land of the Lestrygonians who are said to
inhabit a region near the paths of Night and Day33, and eventually reaches Hades, where
he speaks to Tiresias and the ghosts of other people he knew during his life (the so-
called Nekuia, narrated in Book 11 of the Odyssey). Significantly, it is Circe, a daughter
29 The actual direction of the journey, that is, from darkness to light, or from light to darkness is debated:
for an overview of the possible interpretations, see Tarán 1965, pp. 23-31; Pellikaan-Engel 1974, pp. 63-
76; Tor 2011, p. 134, n. 69.
30 Cf. Burkert 1969, p. 14; Mourelatos 2008a, p. 15; Pellikaan-Engel 1974, pp. 59-60; Kingsley 1999, p.
61; Cerri 1999, p. 163.
31 Cf. Burkert 1969, p. 5. Cf. also, Kingsley 1999, p. 62; Coxon 2009, pp. 273-274; Palmer 2009, p. 58.
The idea of an Underworld journey is also corroborated by the similarities between Parmenides' poem
and the instructions for  the initiate's  journey in  the afterlife  described  in  the  Golden  Tablets  (extant
specimens dating from the late 5th century BCE to the 2nd/3rd century CE). On this point, see Tor 2011, pp.
146-148; Battezzato 2005. For the text and commentary on the Tablets, see Pugliese Carratelli 2011. On
the motif of the afterlife journey of the soul, see also Betegh 2006, pp. 29-30.
32 DK 28 B1.3. The text is uncertain here. Coxon has shown that astē is just the result of a misreading of
Sextus' text, which has pant'atē (Coxon 1968, p. 69). This has led to different emendations of the reading
kata pant'astē: see, for example, Coxon 2009, p. 271; Cerri 1999, pp. 169-170; Gallop 2000, p. 49. For a
detailed discussion of the problem, see Lesher 1994. I think that Lesher's analysis of poetic tradition
convincingly supports the reading pant'astē (see esp. idem, pp. 8-16). 
33 Od. 10.86.
87
of  the  Sun34,  that  instructs  Odysseus  on  how to  get  to  Hades  in  order  to  speak to
Tiresias.
The details  characterizing the  Nekuia serve to introduce a  further element of
parallelism between the  Odyssey  and Parmenides'  poem, namely the  role  played by
mind (noos) during the journey. As argued by Frame, noos and nostos derive from the
same Indo-European root  *nes-, meaning “to return to light and life”, and Odysseus
accomplishes his return (which is also a return from Hades) exactly in virtue of his
mind, in respect of which he is superior to mortals35. In Parmenides as well, the noos
plays  a  central  role  in  the  quest  for  being:  as  previously  mentioned,  the  routes  of
enquiry are paths of thinking (eisi noēsai B2.2), and an incorrect use of noos results in
being  led  into  error  (B6.6).  Furthermore,  mind/thought  possesses  a  privileged
connection with Being, as implied, for example, by fragments B3 and B8.34-3836.
The analysis so far has shown that in his poem Parmenides appropriates different
elements drawn from various poetic sources, by which he constructs the narration of an
afterlife journey culminating in the apprehension of a truth ignored by other mortals37.
Prior to Parmenides, stories about Underworldly experiences or, more generally, psychic
journeys outside the body, which granted superior knowledge to the traveller thanks to
the contact with gods or spirits, already circulated in relation to semi-legendary figures
like Aristeas,  Abaris,  Hermotimus,  and Epimenides of Crete38.  Even Pythagoras was
credited with such extraordinary abilities, and he was also thought to have returned from
34 Od.10.138. On this point, see Frame 1978, p. 147; Tor 2011, p. 141.
35 Cf. Frame 1978, pp. 6-80 and passim.
36 These lines are notoriously difficult to interpret, and especially in the case of B3, the problems start
with their syntax. Different solutions have been proposed. However, there seems to be a consensus about
their  conveying  the  idea  that  Being is,  at  the  same time,  an  object  of  thinking/understanding and  a
condition for understanding. On this point, see von Fritz 1945, pp. 236-242; Zeller 1963, p. 687, n. 1;
Tarán 1965, pp. 41-44; Crystal 2002; Coxon 2003 and 2009, pp. 296-297; Mourelatos 2008a, pp. 164-
193; Palmer 2009, pp. 118-122; Tor 2011, pp. 164-166.
37 As implied by the goddess' description of the road travelled by Parmenides as a path “far from the
beaten track of men” (DK 28 B1.27, tr. Gallop).
38 On these wonder-workers, see Dodds 1951, pp. 135-178; Burkert 1972, pp. 165-164.
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a katabasis39. Since such traditions thrived in the cultural milieu of South Italy, it should
not  be a surprise that  Parmenides came in contact  with them40.  Furthermore,  Sotion
reports  that  Parmenides'  teacher  was  the  Pythagorean  Ameinias,  thus  implying  that
Parmenides  should  have  been  well  acquainted  with  Pythagorean  doctrines41.  If  we
consider  Parmenides  as  involved  in  competition  with  other  sages  and  wisdom
practitioners, including Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans42, his depiction of the kouros'
journey as a katabasis, in addition to its Homeric and Hesiodic parallels, could be seen
as a way of challenging the wisdom of those who claimed to have had such other-
worldy experiences. In adopting the same narrative framework, he apparently enters the
same game of his adversaries, but, as I will argue, only to put a stop to it from the
inside. The move he makes to achieve such a result consists in the articulation of a new
notion  of  truth  which  aims  to  eradicate  competition  once  and  for  all.  But  the
introduction of a truth conveyed by poetry entails a direct confrontation with Hesiod, as
demonstrated  by the  goddess'  distinction  between  alētheia  and  doxa,  which  closely
resembles that of the Muses between  alēthea  and pseudea in the  Theogony. To fully
evaluate Parmenides' challenge to Hesiod, I will now examine the implications deriving
from the Muses' address to Hesiod.
39  See Burkert 1969, pp. 22-29 and 1972, pp. 158-159.
40 On this point, see Burkert 1969, p. 5 and 25; Kingsley 1999, pp. 61-71 and passim. Even Xenophanes
appears to be acquainted with the wonders of Pythagoras (see Chapter 2, p. 49) and Epimenides (cf. DK
21 B20).
41 DK 28 A1=D.L.9.21. 
42 Parmenides' engagement with Pythagoreans doctrines has been strongly argued for by Raven, who saw
in the poem a criticism of Pythagorean theories, in particular that about void (cf. Raven 1948, pp. 21-42
and  passim;  for  a  convincing  refutation  of  Raven's  interpretation,  see  Vlastos  1953).  Although  it  is
objectively difficult to determine with certainty the details of Parmenides' criticism of Pythagoreans, the
idea  that  the two schools  critically interacted  cannot  be  easily dismissed:  see,  for  example,  Horky's
reading of the so-called mathematical Pythagoreans as responding to Parmenides' philosophy (cf. Horky
2013, pp. 136-149). In what follows, I will propose an interpretation according to which Parmenides'
criticism is directed toward the Pythagorean idea of wisdom (see infra, pp. 112-116).
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3.2 – Truth in the Hesiodic poems
The interpretation of the notion of truth in the Hesiodic poems is one of the main issues
in  the  understanding  of  these  works,  especially  regarding  the  truth  status  of  their
content. In this respect, the Theogony is emblematic, as represented by the words which
the Muses address to Hesiod during his poetic investiture: 
ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
ἴδμεν δ’ εὖτ’ ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι
We know how to say false things similar to concrete/genuine ones,
and we know, when we wish, how to proclaim true things43.
                                                                     Th. 27-28
Before  evaluating  the  import  of  such  a  statement,  it  will  be  useful  to  present
schematically the Homeric usage of the terms etumos and alēthēs. The term etumos (and
its reduplicate variant etētumos) usually refers to what actually exists as true, that is the
actual state-of-affairs44. In addition, it also indicates a communication whose content is,
or will prove to be, conform to the facts45, in opposition to a statement which can be
disproved by events, and thus turns out to be false (pseudos)46. Alēthēs is used to qualify
the informational content of communication as devoid of any kind of forgetfulness or
inattentiveness  (lēthē)  which  may prevent  the  complete  and  precise  transmission  of
information47. The term is opposed to pseudos when the latter indicates deliberate lies,
as in the passage of the  Odyssey, where Eumaeus says that the beggars who arrive at
Ithaca  do  not  want  to  tell  Penelope  the  truth,  and  thus  say  false  things  to  gain
advantages48. 
43 Tr. Most, with modifications. 
44 Cf. Pucci 1977, p. 9.
45 Cf. Cole 1983, p. 13.
46 Cf. Krischer 1965, p. 166.
47 On this point, see Cole 1983, p. 12; Palmer 2009, p. 89, n. 107. 
48 Od.  14.125.  On  the  opposition  between  pseudos  and  alēthēs  as  distinguished  from that  between
pseudos and etumos, see Germani 1988, pp. 183-184.
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In what follows, I intend to show that the Muses' claim of being able to tell false
things resembling (homoia)49 concrete/genuine ones and, according to their wish, true
things, hints at a distinction between two different types of poetic narration. To do that, I
will start by considering the reference to Odyssey 19.203 contained in line 2750. At Od.
19.203, the phrase  iske pseudea polla etumoisin homoia is used to describe the lies
Odysseus tells Penelope, while still disguised as the Cretan guest. This episode about
the  encounter  between  Odysseus  and his  wife  is  only one  among  the  many which
characterize, throughout the poem, the hero's ability to enchant and persuade with his
words.  The  most  indicative  instances  of  his  eloquence  are  in  the  part  in  which  he
narrates  his  peregrinations  to  the  Pheacians,  who,  enchanted  by  his  tale,  remain
completely speechless51. In this respect, he is similar to a singer, as declared by Alcinous
during a pause in his narration52:
                              ὦ Ὀδυσεῦ, τὸ μὲν οὔ τί σ᾽ ἐΐσκομεν εἰσορόωντες 
                                 ἠπεροπῆά τ᾽ ἔμεν καὶ ἐπίκλοπον, οἷά τε πολλοὺς
                                 βόσκει γαῖα μέλαινα πολυσπερέας ἀνθρώπους
                                 ψεύδεά τ᾽ ἀρτύνοντας, ὅθεν κέ τις οὐδὲ ἴδοιτο· 
σοὶ δ’ ἔπι μὲν μορφὴ ἐπέων, ἔνι δὲ φρένες ἐσθλαί,
μῦθον δ’ ὡς ὅτ’ ἀοιδὸς ἐπισταμένως κατέλεξας,
πάντων Ἀργείων σέο τ’ αὐτοῦ κήδεα λυγρά. 
Odysseus, in the first place we do not at all suppose, as we look at you,
that you are the kind of dissembler and cheat which the dark earth
breeds in such numbers among far-flung humankind,
men that fashion lies out of what no man could ever see.
49 On the meaning of homoios, see Bryan 2012, pp. 28-36 and Tor 2011, pp. 25-26. 
50 The reference to Homer is subject to debate. Broadly speaking, the identification of a polemic target in
line 27 relates to the problem concerning the truth-status of Hesiod's poetry. The possible interpretations
can be divided in three main groups (I follow, with modifications, Pucci's classification, cf. Pucci 2007,
pp. 60-63): 1) Line 27 contains a criticism of Homeric poetry as false, in contrast to the truth of Hesiod's
poems expressed in the following verse: e.g. Verdenius 1972, pp. 234-235; Buongiovanni 2011; Arrighetti
2006, p. 4 and passim. 2) Lines 27-28 qualify all the poetic production before Hesiod as a mixture of truth
and falsehood, without specifically targeting Homer: e.g. Lanata 1963, p. 25; West 1966, p. 162.). 3) In
these lines Hesiod recognizes that  all poetry,  including his own, is essentially a mixture of truth and
falsity: e.g. Pucci 1977; Thalmann 1984, pp. 143-149; Clay 2003, p. 57-63; Ledbetter 2003, pp. 40-61.
51 Od. 11.333-334; 13.1-2. 
52 This is the first explicit assimilation of Odysseus to a poet, a similarity which is constantly stressed
throughout the poem, due to the hero's  ability in speech. Another example is  provided by the words
Eumaeus uses to describe to Penelope the enchanting ability of the stranger: “Just as when a man gazes
upon a minstrel who sings to mortals songs of longing that the gods have taught him, and their desire to
hear him has no end, whenever he sings, even so he charmed me when he sat in my hall”(Od. 17.518-521;
tr. Murray-Dimock). For an analysis of the representation of Odysseus as poet, see Thalmann 1984, pp.
166-184.
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But upon you is comeliness of words, and within you is a noble spirit, 
and your tale you have told with skill, as a minstrel does,
the grievous woes of all the Argives and of your own self53.                       
                                                                                      Od. 11.367-369
Alcinous' trust in Odysseus' tale is determined by the fact that it  is characterized by
beauty, as his words possess comeliness (morphē epeōn), and exhaustiveness of details,
indicated by the verb katalegein54. Similar considerations are adduced by Odyssesus in
his  praise  of  Demodocus'  song  about  the  events  of  the  Trojan  war:  the  old  singer
certainly has been taught by the divinity, since he is capable of narrating in the right
order  (kata kosmon)  the fate  of  the  Acheans,  like one who has  been present  at  the
events55.  Moreover,  Odysseus  invites  him  to  tell  with  accuracy  (katalegein)  the
construction  of  the  wooden horse,  stating  that,  if  the  account  corresponds  to  (kata
moiran)  what  happened, he  will  readily declare  without  reserve  that  the  singer  has
received the gift of song by the gods56. As argued by Arrighetti, both passages are based
upon the idea that there exists a correlation between telling with accuracy an abundance
of details, the beauty of song and the truth of narration57. More precisely, the capacity of
narrating detailed events in their proper order is the necessary condition for a song to be
beautiful and true58. Focusing on the latter aspect, I would like to draw the attention to
the possibility of actually testing the veracity of the speaker's account. In the case of
Demodocus,  for  example,  Odysseus  is  capable  of  judging  about  the  exactness  and
53 Tr. Murray-Dimock, with modifications.
54 On katalegein, see Krischer 1965, pp. 168-171; Perceau 2002.
55 Cf. Od. 8.487-491: “Demodocus, truly above all mortal men do I praise you, whether it was the Muse,
daughter of Zeus, that taught you, or Apollo; for well and truly do you sing of the fate of the Achaeans, all
that they did and suffered, and all the toils they endured, as perhaps one who had yourself been present, or
had heard the tale from another” (tr. Murray-Dimock). Noticeably, given that the scene at Alcinous' court
is set at a time in which it was possible for people to hear of the Trojan war from those who fought in it,
Odysseus speaks also of the hypothetical possibility that Demodocus has been told the story by someone
who was present at the events.
56 Cf. Od. 8. 492-498. 
57 Cf. Arrighetti 2006, pp. 9-10. On this characteristic of Homeric poetry, see also Accame 1963, p. 264.
Generally speaking, the richness of details relates to the vividness of Homer's narration: see Bakker 2005,
pp. 157-160; Elmer 2010, p. 290, with references.
58 The expressions  kata kosmon  and  kata moiran generally indicate an accordance with the order  of
things.  In  certain  specialized  metrical  forms,  kata  moiran  implies  the  idea  of  a  “steady progression
through an orderly sequence of details” (Elmer 2010, p. 293).
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reliability of the bard's song since he took part of the events. What is narrated in such
accounts  is  thus  etumos,  since  it  is  liable  to  be  proven  by the  facts.  However,  as
demonstrated by Odysseus' speech to Penelope, things are not as simple as they might
appear, because there remains the possibility that stories presenting a series of well-
arranged details, similar to actual facts, could be false. In this case,  the same factor
necessary to judge about the truthfulness of narration, namely the actual presence at the
events reported in speech, is the key for the production of persuasive lies. For when
Odysseus tells Penelope false things about himself, she starts questioning him about
particulars which, besides Odysseus, only someone who had really met him, could have
known59.  The  presence  or  not  of  details,  therefore,  is  not  a  decisive  element  for
distinguishing between false and true accounts, since it is always possible to create lies
having  the  appearance  of  truth  provided  that  the  audience  has  not  the  relevant
experience necessary to discriminate between truth and falsity. 
Still, false accounts resembling genuine events have nonetheless the property of
beauty,  as  demonstrated  by  their  enchanting  effect  on  the  audience60.  But  since  a
beautiful  song  cannot  but  be  inspired  by  the  Muses61,  the  goddesses  have  to  be
responsible also for false accounts of events62. As I have anticipated, the content of such
revelations hints at a type of narration different from that consisting of truths. Actually,
as I intend to show, Hesiod employs this distinction in order to stress the diversity of his
poetry from that of Homer,  as they are based on a different conception of the truth
poetry  should  convey.  For,  instead  of  focusing  on  the  narration  of  factual  events,
59 Cf. Od. 19.215-219: “Now above all, stranger, I feel I must test you as to whether or not you did in very
truth (ὀίω πειρήσεσθαι, εἰ ἐτεὸν) entertain my husband with his godlike comrades there in your halls,
even as you say. Tell me what sort of clothing he wore about his body, and what sort of man he was
himself; and tell me of the comrades who followed him” (tr. Murray-Dimock).
60 On the enchanting effect of poetry and its ambivalence between truth and deceit, see Thalmann 1984,
pp. 172-173. This aspect is also related to the persuasive power of poetry, see infra, pp. 15-16.
61 Indeed, skilfulness in speaking and beauty of song are the most notable gift of the goddesses: in the
proem, Hesiod repeatedly qualifies the song and the voice of the Muses as “beautiful” (e.g.  Th.10; 22;
68), “sweet” (e.g. Th. 40; 83; 97), “delicate” (e.g. Th. 41).
62 Cf. Arrighetti 2006, pp. 9-10.
93
Hesiod's poetry aims at the transmission of universal truths, ultimately related to the
stable order of the world established by Zeus63. While the Theogony narrates the origins
of the world and the events which eventually led to Zeus' reign over the cosmos, the
Works and Days, despite its focus on human activities, shows an interest in the universal
dimension in which these very activities are inserted. An example might help to clarify
this aspect. In the part of the poem devoted to navigation, the so-called Nautilia, Hesiod
states that he will show to Perses the rules (metra) of seafaring, despite his not being
expert in ships, since his experience of navigation is limited to the short voyage he did
in order to take part in the funeral games in honour of Amphidamas64. Notwithstanding
this lack of skill, he declares that he will tell the mind/plan (noos) of Zeus, thanks to the
Muses  who  taught  him to  sing  a  marvellous  song.  The  passage  implies  that  Zeus'
mind/plan encompasses the notions that constitute the rules (metra) of seafaring, which
consist in the injunctions about the proper seasons for navigation expounded by Hesiod
in the following lines. But, rather than amounting to a mere list of technical details,
these notions are presented as having an ethical import as well. For the term  metron
refers also to the right measure men should not overpass in order to not incur in the loss
of  their  possessions,  or,  worse,  of  their  life,  as  illustrated  in  the  final  lines  of  the
Nautilia, which is closed, and summed up, by a last precept inviting to observe the right
measure (metra phulassesthai) in all  circumstances65.  In this light,  the connection to
Zeus' noos is further strengthened, since it is in the mind/plan of the god that the ethical
structure  of  the  world  has  its  foundation.  Thus,  Hesiod's  treatment  of  navigation  is
characterized by the attention given to the way this human activity is inserted in the
context  of  the  cosmic  order  established by Zeus,  and  the  same holds  for  the  other
63 On the difference of content between Homeric and Hesiodic poetry, see also Vernant 1983, p. 353.
64 Cf. Op. 648-662.
65 Cf. Op. 684-694.
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occupations  described in  the  poem66.  The  invocation  contained in  the  proem of  the
Works and Days well exemplifies this aspect: while Hesiod prays to Zeus to deal with
justice, he himself will expound to Perses genuine/concrete things (etētuma) regarding
mortal life, thus implying that the realities of the world find their significance only if
placed in the wider ethical order of the universe, which transcends the concreteness of
human experience67. 
These considerations clarify why I take the Muses'  statement as a distinction
between two types of narration: while, on the one hand, alēthea indicates true things in
their  universal  validity,  on  the  other  hand,  etuma comes  to  specifically  signify the
concrete realities and events of human life. But a poetry grounded on etuma, like the
Homeric poems, can be false. Truth belongs to another type of narration, which does not
reproduce the multiformity of experience, but which rather expounds the universal and
stable character of the world, as Hesiod aims to do in his poems. It is important to notice
that what the Muses say is not equivalent to equating a poetry dealing with etuma with
falsehood, or stating that heroic poetry is false, as demonstrated by the reference to the
events of the Trojan war present in the Hesiodic poems68. Rather, the phrase  pseudea
polla etumoisin homoia stands as a reminder of the possibility that what is narrated,
despite  its  apparent  adherence  to  real  events,  could  be  completely false.  Moreover,
Odysseus'  example  demonstrates  that  such accounts  could  be  fabricated  by anyone,
provided he has the relevant experience necessary to make his tale credible and not
subject to confutation. By contrast, the fact that Hesiod provides an account of the order
66 Cf. Arrighetti 1987, pp. 49-50. On the “universal” value of Zeus' noos, see also Nannini 2010, pp. 44-
45.
67 It is important to notice that at Op. 10, Hesiod employs the form mythēsaimēn, which, combined with
the particle ke, expresses potentiality, so that it should be translated as ʻI would tellʼ or ʻI should like to
tellʼ (cf. Krischer 1965, p. 173 and Tor 2011, p. 41). In other words, Hesiod wish to tell Perses things that
will prove conform to events, a difficult task because of the inscrutability of divine will (on this point, see
below). 
68 Cf. Op. 651-653.
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of the universe and of Zeus' dominion over it marks the diversity and the superiority of
his poetry, since it deals with contents which no mortal could know.
However, while on the one hand, the fact that the content of the Hesiodic poems
relates  to  events  beyond human experience  reveals  their  divine origin,  on the other
hand, it represents a serious problem for the truth status of the poems. For the total
dependence on the Muses leaves open the possibility that they are telling lies to Hesiod
as well. The audience, like the poet himself, is totally deprived of any criterion to judge
about the truth or falsity of the content of the poems. But despite this, I would say that
Hesiod's  faith  in  the authenticity of  what  the  Muses  tell  him cannot  be questioned,
especially considering his claim to authority, which he substantiates by narrating the
particulars of his investiture in the Theogony. The scene is described at lines 22-34 by
means of a ring composition whose central element consists in the Muses' address to
Hesiod (ll. 26-28). The lines can be schematised as follows69:
                                                                            
                   A1      One time they [i.e. the Muses] taught Hesiod a beautiful song
                                While he was pasturing lambs under holy Helicon (Th. 22-23).
                     B       The Muses' address (Th. 24-28).
                     A2      So spoke great Zeus' ready-speaking daughters, and they 
                                plucked a staff, a branch of luxuriant laurel, a marvel, and
                                gave it to me70; and they breathed a divine voice into me, so
                              so that I might glorify what will be and what was before, and
                                they commanded me to sing of the race of the blessed ones
                                who always are, but always to sing of themselves first and last (Th. 28-34).
The external elements of the ring (A1 and A2) are related through the couple of terms
song/voice, so that A2 constitutes both an explanation and an expansion of Hesiod's
statement about the song which the Muses taught him. Actually, the scene described in
A2 acquires  its  significance  in  the  light  of  what  the  Muses  say in  B71.  Considered
69 I adopt Most's translation of the passage.
70 The translation is based on the variant drepsasai. According to another textual tradition, instead of the
participle, drepō is in the infinitive (drepsasthai). For a discussion of the implications of either readings,
see Pucci 2007, p. 71.
71 On ring composition, see Thalmann 1984, pp. 8-21.
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together,  the  three  elements  configure  a  framework  which  emphasizes  Hesiod's
authoritative role. The first mark of authority is represented by the name  ʻHesiodʼ (l.
22), a striking innovation if compared with the traditional singers' anonymity we find in
the Homeric poems. For the function of the name is to sanction the content of the poem.
In fact, the name serves to stress the privileged relationship between the Muses and one
single poet, Hesiod, which they chose in order to reveal to him the origins of the world
and the birth of the gods72. The importance of divine choice is further highlighted by the
fact that the Muses, descend from the Helikon to teach Hesiod a divine song, while in
the Homeric  poems the poet had to  invoke them in order to obtain the information
necessary for singing. In B, the goddesses themselves emphasize this aspect by saying
that they tell the truth when they wish73, and Hesiod wants the audience to believe that
they  have  chosen  him as  the  authorized  spokesman  of  this  truth.  In  a  competitive
context like that characterizing Archaic poetry, I would say, the acknowledgement that
the Muses can tell false things makes sense only if the poet reporting it is sure of his
own authority74. Finally, in A2, Hesiod receives a sceptre from the Muses as the tangible
proof of his investiture. For traditionally the skēptron was regarded as an instrument of
divine origin which allowed its  owner to  speak authoritatively words conveying the
gods' will75. The sceptre in itself, however, does not guarantee the truth of the song. As
noted by Tor,  in  the  Iliad Agamemnon is  deceived by Zeus while  holding the very
sceptre he received by favour of the god76. But, I argue, even though the sceptre alone is
not  sufficient  to  support  Hesiod's  claim  to  authority,  when  granted  alongside  the
72 Cf. Nannini 2010, pp. 45-46.
73 Th. 28.
74 In this respect, it is important to notice that, as stressed by Verdenius, in the Theogony, Hesiod provides
a negative representation of pseudea, cf. Verdenius 1972, p. 235.
75 For an overview of the figures traditionally associated with the sceptre, see Calabrese De Feo 2004, pp.
45-52. On the sceptre as a mark of authority, see also Nagy 1996, pp. 44-45.
76 Cf.  Tor  2011,  p.  29. Contra  Calabrese  De  Feo,  who  argues  that,  since  the  sceptre  traditionally
symbolizes a special connection to Zeus, it stands per se as a guarantee of the truth of Hesiod's song (cf.
Calabrese De Feo 2004, pp. 45-46). 
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inspiration  of  divine  voice,  as  described  immediately  after,  it  actually  proves  the
authoritative status  of Hesiod's  poetry.  Indeed,  Hesiod's  superiority over  other  poets
derives exactly from the fact that, differently from them, he both received the sceptre
and  the Muses inspired him a divine voice, so that he could sing the truth about the
gods' birth and the cosmic order established by Zeus77.
However,  notwithstanding  Hesiod's  commitment  to  prove  his  authority,  it  is
undeniable that the dependence on the gods' will, which as he himself admits, is difficult
for mortals to understand78, does not guarantee the validity of what he says. Moreover,
despite  the  particularity  of  his  poetic  investiture,  which  should  serve  to  sanction
Hesiod's authority, and thus the contemporary exclusion of other rival versions, there
remains the possibility of other poets claiming the same prerogative. Hesiod's universal
truth, then, turns out to be built on potentially shaky foundations. It is now time to show
how Parmenides address this question left unsolved by Hesiod's poetry and evaluate his
solution in order to provide a universal truth with more solid foundations.
3.3 – Parmenides' alētheia
Parmenides'  engagement  with  Hesiod's  conception  of  truth  and,  broadly  speaking,
similar poetical programmatic claims, is indicated by the echoes of the Muses' statement
of  Theogony  27-28  contained  in  the  goddess's  announcement  to  the  kouros  of  the
77 Noticeably,  Hesiod tells us that the Muses inspired him to sing the past, the future and the immortal
gods (l. 32), thus hinting at the permanent arrangement of the universe brought about by Zeus' dominion.
On this point, cf. Rudhardt 1996, pp. 35-39; Pucci 2007, p. 74. It is worth noticing that Hesiod employs
the term  audē,  which indicates  human voice specifically,  but  he qualifies  it  as  divine (thespis),  thus
stressing the divine origin of his poetry and thereby his role as spokesman of the Muses. On Hesiod's use
of audē, see further Tor 2011, pp. 30-31, with references.
78 Cf. Op. 483-484.
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content of her revelation79. These lines, however, present significant differences which, I
argue, respond to the issues raised by the Muses' words. The text runs as follows:
              χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι 
                                         ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος80 ἀτρεμὲς81 ἦτορ
                                         ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής. 
   
         You must be informed of everything,
                                         both of the unmoved heart of persuasive truth
                                         and of the beliefs/opinions of mortals which comprise
                                                                                    no genuine trustworthiness82. 
                                                                DK 28 B1.28-30
The  distance  from Hesiod  is  marked  both  by  the  content  and  the  structure  of  the
passage. First, instead of truths (alēthea) and falsehoods (pseudea) resembling genuine
realities (etuma), the goddess speaks, respectively, of the heart of truth (alētheiēs ētor)
and  of  the  opinions/beliefs  of  mortals  (brotōn doxai)  which  lack  in  genuine
trustworthiness/conviction (pistis alēthēs). Secondly, the goddess is clear about what she
will  reveal  to  Parmenides  and  does  not  leave  room for  ambiguity:  the  kouros  will
apprehend both truth and mortal opinions, emphatically kept distinct by the particles
ēmen...ēde83. The same clarity will be maintained later in the poem, when the goddess
will announce the exact point where her account of truth ceases and that of opinion
begins84. Differently from Hesiod, then, the kouros is constantly aware of the truth-value
79 As long recognized by scholars, see Dolin 1962, pp. 94-96; Pellikaan-Engel 1974, pp. 79-80; Arrighetti
1983, p. 12;  Germani 1988, p. 185;  Cerri 1999, pp. 184-185; Tulli 2000, pp. 75-77; Mourelatos 2008a, p.
33; Tor 2011, pp. 169-170. 
80 Besides εὐπειθέος, there are two other variants in the text, namely εὐκυκλέος (accepted in the Diels-
Kranz edition) and εὐφεγγέος (reported by Proclus, but generally dismissed by commentators). εὐκυκλέος
is accepted because is a lectio difficilior, but εὐπειθέος fits more in the context, as it marks a contrast with
mortals' belief mentioned in the following line, deprived of true trustworthiness. In addition, even though
in fragment B8 Being is described as spherical, at this point of the poem such an anticipation would have
been missed by the audience (cf.  Coxon 2009, pp. 283-284). For a different interpretation, see Tarán
1965, pp. 16-17.
81 The variant  ἀτρεκές  (ʻstrictʼ,ʻsureʼ,ʻcertainʼ) could work here, but  ἀτρεμὲς is more appropriate as a
qualifier  of  ētor,  especially  because  it  stresses  the  property of  being  unmoved  by contrast  with  the
inherent movement of the heart. On this point, cf. Tarán 1965, loc. cit.; Mourelatos 2008a, pp. 155-156;
Coxon 2009, p. 284.
82 Tr. Coxon, with modification.
83 On this point, see also Pellikaan-Engel 1974, p. 80. On ēmen...ēde, see Smyth 1920, p. 650 (2867).
84 DK B8.50-51.
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of what he is learning from the divinity85. However, as shown by the precedent of the
Theogony, without a further guarantee of the truth of revelation, there still remains the
possibility of divine deception. The solution to this problem lies in the phrase “unmoved
heart  of  persuasive  truth”  (B1.29),  which,  I  argue,  hints  at  Parmenides'  original
redefinition of the notion of alētheia.
In the previous section (3.2), I have argued that, in the Hesiodic poems, the term
alēthea  indicates truths universally valid, in contrast with  etuma, which signifies the
concrete realities of human experience86. Before entering the discussion of Parmenides'
notion of alētheia, it will be useful to consider Palmer's recent interpretation of the term.
Palmer argues that in Parmenides alētheia and alēthēs signify, respectively, ʻrealityʼ and
ʻrealʼ/ʻgenuineʼ,  thus excluding that they relate to truth as a property of speech and
thought87. In particular, he stresses that the goddess never qualifies her speech as true,
but rather describes it as a “speech about  alētheiē” (B8.51). Such an expression could
not,  in his view, but indicate that  alētheiē refers to Being, whose characteristics are
discussed in the preceding lines88. Such an interpretation, however, tells only a part of
the  story.  As  I  will  try  to  demonstrate,  it  actually  misses  an  essential  point  of
Parmenides' construction of the poem. For while it is correct to say that the goddess'
speech is about Being, that is,  what “genuinely and really is”89, at the same time, it
configures a new notion of alētheia in terms of rational deduction. This means that the
truth expounded in the poem is both about reality and the nature of truth itself. Indeed,
85 Noticeably, the fact that the kouros is told that he will learn both truth and opinions is a novelty in itself,
since traditionally, in didactic poems the persona loquens expounds to the addressee gnōmai presented as
reliable, as in the case of Hesiod and Perses in the  Works and Days, or Theognis' elegies addressed to
Cyrnus.
86 Cf. supra, p. 95.
87 Cf. Palmer 2010, p. 89ff. Similarly, Coxon 2009, p. 282-283; Cole 1983, p. 25.
88 Cf. Palmer, loc. cit. 
89 Tor 2011, p. 162.
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as it will emerge from the following discussion, the two aspects conflate, since What-Is
and truth come to assume the same characteristics90. 
As mentioned above, the goddess speaks of her account of Being as a “speech
and thought about truth” (B8.51), which actually consists in a long deductive argument
meant to provide the justification for the attributes of Being listed at the beginning of
the fragment. The goddess introduces her deduction by stating that on the path of Being
there are many signs (sēmata) that What-Is is ungenerated, unperishable, whole, unique,
immobile, and complete91. As argued by McKirahan, the term sēmata should be taken as
indicating the very arguments which prove that What-Is possesses such attributes92. In
fact,  the  justification  of  each  attribute  is  provided  by a  deduction  based  upon  the
Principle of Non-Contradiction, since their negation would entail speaking or thinking
of What-Is-Not, a possibility whose refutation in B2 led to the dismissal of the path of
Not-Being93. That each attribute is true in virtue of its being validly deduced is further
reinforced when mortals are said to be (wrongly) persuaded that the names they give to
What-Is are true (B8.39). Indeed, these names are verbs which denote actions/states
contradicting  the  essential  attributes  of  Being,  such  as  “to  come into  being  and to
perish” (gignesthai te kai ollusthai), and “to change place” (topon allassein) (B8.40-41).
The importance of deduction further emerges from another passage of B8, where the
goddess speaks again of the choice between the road of Being and that of Not-Being.
While  the  latter,  being  not  true  (ouk  alēthēs),  has  been  discarded  by  necessity  as
“unconceivable  and  nameless”,  the  former  is  said  to  be  “genuine”  (etētumos)94.
90 On this point, see Cole, loc. cit.; Mourelatos 2008a, p. 67.
91 On the textual problems regarding ateleston (ʻunaccomplishedʼ, ʻendlessʼ), see Tarán 1965, pp. 93-95;
Coxon 2009, p. 315; Cerri 1999, pp. 222-223. 
92 Cf. McKirahan 2008, p. 221, n. 9.
93 The correlation of asserting with thinking and knowing is stated in fragments B2.7-8; B3; B6.1-2; B8.7-
9, 15-18, 50  (on this point, see Coxon 2009, p. 294). In Wedin's reconstruction of Parmenides' arguments,
B2 and B3 together contain the “Governing Deduction”, upon which all the other deductions are based
(cf. Wedin 2014, pp. 9-33). It is beyond the scope of the present work to enter the details of Parmenides'
arguments in B2 and B8, but, for an analysis of the arguments, I refer the reader to Wedin 2014, loc. cit.
and pp. 83-192; McKirahan 2008; Palmer 2009, 137-159; Barnes 2005, pp. 122-136 (discussion of B2). 
94 Cf. B8.15-18. On the role of necessity, see below.
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Considering that the decision about the right path of enquiry rests upon the refutation
contained  in  B2,  the  qualification  of  the  two roads  as  “not  true”  and “genuine”  is
determined by the fact that there are valid arguments indicating which is the road to
follow. It is worth noticing that, in this perspective, Parmenides'  modification of the
concept of truth effects a change in the semantics of  etumos/etētumos  as well. For, if
previously etumos designated a communication conforming to the actual state-of-affairs,
and, consequently, not disprovable by events, in Parmenides the term comes to qualify a
statement which is genuine because it has not been refuted by argument. 
Since  the  truth  expounded  by  the  goddess  consists  in  the  conclusions  of  a
deduction, the  kouros can actually put to the test and verify the correctness of divine
revelation,  as  the  goddess  herself  encourages  him  to  do  at  B7.5-6:  “judge  by
discourse/reason  the  much-contested  test  (elenchos)  which  has  been  said  by me”95.
Parmenides' characterization of  alētheia as rational deduction thus provides the poet,
and consequently the audience, with that independent criterion of truth whose absence
condemned  Hesiod's  poetry  to  unsolvable  ambiguity.  Parmenides'  decisive  move  to
solve  the  issue  of  poetical  truth  consists  in  the  shift  from  narration  to  logical
argumentation. As long as poetry was conceived as a means of reporting events distant
in place and time, as in Homer, there always remained the possibility that what the poet
sang actually did not correspond to actual state-of-affairs. The same consideration holds
in the case of Hesiod's Theogony, as the alēthea to which the Muses inspired him still
related to events of which humans could not have knowledge, and thus were devoid of
any guarantee. Similarly, when Hesiod deals with everyday human experiences, as he
does  in  the  Works and Days,  the dependence on divine will  prevents  him from the
95 Compare with the unreliability of the test employed in the Odyssey discussed above. My observation
holds regardless of whether we interpret elenchos as referring to the argument developed in B8 or to the
decision about the right path of enquiry (on this point, see Mourelatos 2008a, p. 91; Tarán 1965, p. 81).
On elenchos as a test for truth, see Furley 1989; for a detailed discussion of these lines, see Lesher 1984.
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possibility of stating assuredly true things. By contrast, if poetry is used to illustrate a
truth  which  is  the  result  of  a  logical  argument,  there  is  no  room for  uncertainty96.
Indeed, being the conclusion of an  a priori  deduction based on internal consistency
only,  such a truth is universal,  and thus absolute and eternal.  As I have anticipated,
Parmenides'  poetry  has  the  same  claim  to  universality  as  Hesiod's,  but  with  the
fundamental difference that the truth it expounds is unequivocal and, as a result, humans
can place confidence in it. Parmenides emphasizes this aspect by constantly making use
of terms indicating trust/trustworthiness (pistis) and persuasion (peithō), which serve to
emphasize the opposition between  alētheia  and  doxa from the very beginning of the
poem: while truth is persuasive and trustworthy (eupeitheos), mortals opinions are never
to be trusted, as there is no true pistis in them. 
It is important to stress that, without grounding truth on deduction, Parmenides'
appeal  to  trust  and  persuasion  would  not  have  been  sufficient  to  guarantee  the
genuineness of his poetry97. In fact, by means of his original conception of  alētheia,
Parmenides addresses the issue stemming from the traditional ambiguity regarding the
persuasiveness  of  poetic  compositions.  Broadly  speaking,  in  Archaic  Greek  poetry
peithō represents the seductive power of speech, which plays a determinant role both in
deception  (apatē)  and  in  the  communication  of  truth,  while  pistis  designates  the
relationship which is established between persuader and persuaded98. There, the divine
personification of persuasion, the goddess Peithō, is an all-powerful deity who bestows
enchanting sweetness on words, with both beneficial and harmful effects99. In virtue of
her abilities, she is often associated with Aphrodite, the goddess capable of deceiving
both gods and men with her charms. Eloquent in this respect is the Iliadic episode of the
96 Significantly, ambiguity and deceit are proper of the narrative Doxa, see section 3.4.
97 This was the problem which Hesiod did not resolve, despite his attempt to support his claim to truth by
means of the scene of his investiture (cf. above).
98 In presenting the basic features of  peithō  in Archaic poetry, I follow  Detienne 1996, pp. 76-81 and
Mourelatos 2008a, pp. 136-144.
99 Cf. Detienne 1996, p. 77.
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deception of Zeus: when Hera asks Aphrodite to grant the love and desire by means of
which she subdues mortals and immortals, she explains that these powers serve to effect
persuasion100. As suggested by the passage, inducement is primarily effected by physical
appearance, as in the case of the Zeus' deception of men, which is effected by Pandora,
who  receives  her  grace  directly  from  Aphrodite101.  But  beauty  is  crucial  to  the
persuasion effected by means of speech and poetry as well, regardless of the truth of
falsity of their content. This fact is vividly illustrated in the Odyssey, where, as shown
above,  the  enchantment  produced  by  a  beautiful  song/speech  reporting  a  genuine
account of events is  the same as that  attained through lies.  Similarly,  in  the second
Hymn to Aphrodite, the poet asks Aphrodite to inspire him in order to win the contest he
is competing in, thus implying that a song must be beautiful at the cost of everything
else102. 
That persuasion is one of the most notable properties of poetic composition, and,
at the same time, a power inevitably equivocal is eloquently illustrated by Hesiod, who,
in  the  Theogony,  establishes  a  kinship between poetry and political  discourse.  Both
types of speech benefit from the Muses' gift of sweetness in speaking, which enables the
kings to put a stop to quarrels by persuading the litigants, and the poets to soothe their
audience103. But, since the Muses are capable of inspiring both falsehoods and truths,
which  are,  in  fact,  indistinguishable  by  mortals,  one  cannot,  a  priori,  rule  out  the
possibility that what he is listening to is actually deceptive. 
By contrast, Parmenides' conception of truth eliminates the ambiguity of  pistis
and  peithō.  The trust  in the goddess'  account can be confidently qualified as “true”
(alēthēs), since it depends on the correctness of argumentation, and thus it is subject to
100 Cf. Il. 14.160.
101 Cf. Hes. Op. 65-66.
102 Cf. h.Ven. (6).19-21. On this point, see Accame 1964, p. 131.
103 These  are  examples  of  the  good  effects  of  persuasion.  On  the  soothing  capacity  of  poetry,  see
Thalmann 1984, pp. 129-133; Ledbetter 2003, pp. 48-51.
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verification. The close connection between trust and valid inference is further stressed
by  the  occurrences  of  pistis in  B8,  to  the  extent  that  the  meaning  of  the  term
approximates  that  of  ʻdeductive  proofʼ104.  At  lines  26-27,  for  example,  the  goddess
explains that What-Is has no beginning nor end, because pistis alēthēs has “thrust away”
(apōse) becoming and perishing (B8.26-27), that is, the argument against generation and
death presented earlier (B8.5-16). Similarly, the “strength of pistis” at B8.12 denotes the
force  of  logical  proof  against  the  possibility  that  something  alongside  What-Is  is
generated out of What-Is-Not. The same considerations hold for the adjective  pistos,
which  designates  what  is  trustworthy because  it  derives  from a valid  deduction,  as
implied by its being used by the goddess to qualify her logos on the attributes of What-
Is at B8.50105. 
The unambiguous character of persuasion effected by truth is further emphasized
by Parmenides' description of the path of persuasion in B2, which contains an allusion
to  a  passage  of  Hesiod's  Theogony  about  the  Muse  Calliope.  The  passages  run  as
follows:
                      
                       Πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος (Ἀληθείηι γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ) 
                       […] It is the path of Persuasion (for she attends Truth)106.
                                                                                                           DK 28 B2.4
                     Καλλιόπη θ᾽· ἡ δὲ προφερεστάτη ἐστὶν ἁπασέων.
                        ἡ γὰρ καὶ βασιλεῦσιν ἅμ᾽ αἰδοίοισιν ὀπηδεῖ. 
                 
104 While  Heidel  maintains  that  the  phrase  pistis  alēthēs  must  be  understood in forensic  terms,  thus
meaning ʻevidenceʼ or ʻproofʼ (cf. Heidel 1913, pp. 717-719), Mourelatos persuasively argues against this
reading and translates it as ʻtrue fidelityʼ (cf. Mourelatos 2008a, p. 150). Recently, Bryan has argued that,
indeed, we should interpret pistis and, broadly speaking, the vocabulary of Parmenides' fragment B8, in
the  light  of  forensic  terminology,  and  opts  for  the  meaning  of  ʻgenuine  cogencyʼ,  emphasizing  the
“objective  persuasive  force”  of  the  goddess'  arguments  (cf.  Bryan  2012,  pp.  90-93).  I  agree  with
Mourelatos  in  not  pressing  the  forensic  image,  and  thus  I  prefer  to  take  pistis  as  indicating
trustworthiness/confidence, as it better fits the poetic context in which Parmenides operates. However, I
add the specification that true pistis is indeed based on the result of logic argumentation. Similarly, Coxon
interprets  pistis  alēthēs  as  indicating  ʻgenuine  convictionʼ,  that  is,  the  certainty  “resulting  from  the
persuasion which reality exercises on the mind by causing it to reason deductively” (Coxon 2009, p. 284).
105 DK 28 B8.50: “Here I stop my trustworthy speech to you and thought about truth” (tr. Gallop).
106 Tr. Mourelatos, slightly modified.
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             […] And Calliope: she is the greatest of them all,
                        for she attends upon venerated kings too107.
                                                             Hes. Th. 79-80
These lines have a common structure which can be thus schematized: divine agent – gar
– thing attended –  opēdei. In Parmenides' poem,  Peithō, who is said to attend Truth,
significantly replaces Calliope, who, according to Hesiod, attends kings as well as poets.
The substitution of Calliope, with Peithō is, I argue, an effective image which serves to
illustrate the unequivocal nature of Parmenides' poetry. For, since  Peithō is associated
with truth, the ambiguity which inevitably characterized persuasion as effected by kings
and  poets  thanks  to  Calliope's  gift,  namely  beauty  and  sweetness  of  words,  is
immediately ruled out. Indeed, the patroness of Parmenides' poetry is not Calliope, the
“beautiful voiced” Muse, but Peithō, the attendant of truth.
The close relationship between Peithō and Alētheia indicated by the verb opēdeō
acquires  further  significance  considering  that,  as  shown by Mourelatos,  one  of  the
meanings of the verb  is  ‘to  attach oneself  to’,  ‘to  be attached to’,  rightly,  justly or
properly108.  How  are  we  to  interpret  the  normative  nature  of  this  relation?  While
Mourelatos is certainly right in emphasizing the favour which Persuasion bestows on
truth, I think that there is another important aspect to consider. In the poem, persuasion
and pistis are not only used in reference to truth, but also to mortals' doxai: at B8.38-39,
cited above, for example, human beings are said to be persuaded of the truth of the
names they give to What-Is, while the fact that pistis is qualified as true implies that it
could be false as well. In fact, the very existence of doxa is determined by the mortals'
trust  in their  senses and the persuasive power they exercise on their mind, which is
consequently led to error109. Persuasion is thus responsible for deception as well. In this
scenario,  the  goddess'  specification  that  Persuasion  rightly/justly  attends  alētheia,  I
107 Tr. Most.
108 Cf. Mourelatos 2008a, pp. 158-160.
109 As implied in fragment B7. On this point, see below.
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argue,  serves  exactly  to  distinguish  between  persuasion  effected  by  truth  and  that
resulting from deceit. To illustrate how the distinction is made, it is useful to consider a
passage  of  the  Works  and  Days  where  Hesiod  states  that  wealth  unjustly  acquired
attends (opēdei) those who have seized it only for a short time110. Similarly, the beliefs
of which humans are persuaded are far from stable, and, in fact, continually change, as
vividly  described  by  Parmenides  in  fragment  B6  where  mortals  are  described  as
wandering  on  a  “backward-turning  (palintropos)  path”111.  By  contrast,  persuasion
produced by truth is stable, since alētheia itself is absolute and eternal.
The foregoing analysis allows us to clarify the meaning of the phrase “unmoved
heart of persuasive truth” (B1.28), which the goddess employs at the beginning of her
revelation to indicate the part of her speech devoted to truth. First, it must be noticed
that the locution “heart of truth” is a Parmenidean innovation, since in epic and lyric
poetry, ētor is always used in reference to gods or humans to indicate their inner self as
the  seat  of  emotion  and life112.  The  ētor  of  truth thus  may be  reasonably taken  as
signifying the vital principle of  alētheia, or in other words, its very foundation. This
consists in the conception of truth as rational deduction, which, as shown above, also
explains truth's persuasiveness. At the same time, “heart” as inner being refers to What-
Is, that is, reality as it is in itself. Reality and the principle of truth actually have the
same  characteristics,  as  indicated  by  the  adjective  “unmoved”  (atremes113),  which
appears also at B8.28 as one of the attributes of What-Is. In fact, truth and its principle
are not subject to change, and thus hold regardless of any external factor. Truth is thus
absolute,  and  then  complete  and  eternal.  In  this  respect,  it  is  important  to  notice
Parmenides'  use  of  the  vocabulary  of  necessity  (anankē,  moira)  and  justice (dikē,
110 Cf. Hes. Op. 320-326.
111 I adopt Taran's translation of palintropos (Tarán 1965, p. 54). On the context of this line, see below.
112 Cf. Coxon 2009, p. 283.
113 Also at DK B8.4.
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themis), which, on the one hand, represents the bonds that hold fast What-Is, on the
other hand, emphasizes the inalterable and everlasting validity of truth. In particular,
since  traditionally  even  the  gods  cannot  subvert  the  decrees  of  Necessity/Fate,  the
recourse to necessity marks again the distance from Hesiod, where the truth and validity
of the account ultimately rested upon divine will.
As  argued  so  far,  Parmenides'  redefinition  of  alētheia  in  terms  of  rational
deduction responds to the problem of poetic ambiguity found in the Homeric and the
Hesiodic poems.  But  the poem has also other  polemic targets,  represented by other
kinds of philosophical speculation. In order to show how Parmenides challenged these
other rivals, I will now turn to the second part of his work: the Doxa.
3.4 – The Doxa
The second part of the goddess' speech to the kouros is about mortals' doxai, which, as
previously illustrated, are distinguished and opposed to alētheia, since they lack in true
trustworthiness. As anticipated above, the opinions/beliefs of mortals take the place of
the  Hesiodic  false  things  resembling  concrete  realities  (etuma).  As  in  the  case  of
aletheia, this modification has important consequences. Actually, I argue that mortals'
doxai do not only replace falsehoods, but all  etuma as a whole. For the content of the
Doxa consists in a description of the world of experience, but due to the redefinition of
truth and the real in terms of rational deduction, the etuma of experience cannot count as
a type of truth,  but rather,  they contribute to the formation of a false conception of
reality114. The rejection of doxa is strengthened by Parmenides' condemnation of sense
experience,  which  leads  mortals  to  believe  that  reality  is  subject  to  generation,
destruction and change and thus to include What-Is-Not in their speculations. In fact, in
fragment B7, the habit of relying on sensory experience (ethos polupeiron) is indicated
114 Cf. the meaning of etētumos in B8, discussed above.
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as the cause of humans' belief that things that are not, i.e. everyday phenomena115, really
are. The same position is pointedly criticized in B6, where mortals are described as a
“race without judgement” (akrita phula, l.7), which, at the same time, considers Being
and  Not-Being  as  identical  and  different,  and  thus  follows  a  path  which  is  back-
turning116.
The misleading effects of sense experience and the consequent mistakes inherent
to  mortals'  doxai are  eloquently  illustrated  by  the  goddess'  characterization  of  her
doxastic account at the end of fragment B8: 
                                         δόξας δ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας
   μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων. 
From here onwards learn human beliefs/opinions
listening to the deceitful order of my words117.
                                                               DK 28 B8.51-52
 τόν σοι ἐγὼ διάκοσμον ἐοικότα πάντα φατίζω,
 ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσηι. 
 
This arrangement I declare to you to be plausible in its entirety
 in such a way that never shall any mortal judgement outstrip you118.
                                                                DK 28 B8.60-61
The  account  of  mortal  doxai  (the  Doxa)  is  characterized  as  a  “deceitful
order/arrangement of words” (kosmon epeōn apatēlon). While the adjective  apatēlos
(ʻdeceitfulʼ) emphasizes the deceiving aspect of doxa, that is, its description of a reality,
which, in fact, is not reality at all, since only Being genuinely is, the phrase  kosmon
epeōn is significant as it hints at poetic tradition. The expression is used by Solon (fr. 1
West) to indicate poetic composition as opposed to prose speech, and, broadly speaking,
kosmos is associated with the idea of composition and ordering typical of poetry, and in
particular, as shown above, with the narration of details about a specific event119. In this
115 Cf. Tarán 1965, p. 75.
116 See supra, p. 18. Scholars have seen a polemic reference to Heraclitus in these lines, but the question is
debated: see Tarán 1965, pp. 69-72; Cerri 1999, pp. 205-213; Graham 2002; Nehamas 2002.
117 Tr. Gallop.
118 Tr. Coxon, with modifications.
119 Cf. Cerri 1999, pp. 243-244; Coxon 2009, p. 342; and supra, p. 92. In this perspective, the phrase kata
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light, Parmenides' use of kosmon epeōn to indicate the doxastic account of the cosmos
should be interpreted as a critical reference to traditional poetry, which, as shown above,
by focusing on events narration was inevitably condemned to ambiguity120. In particular,
Parmenides'  poetic cosmogony critically alludes to Hesiod's  Theogony,  in  which the
order of the song actually reproduces the development of the cosmos. Since, as I argued,
Hesiod's choice of narrating the origin of the gods and the world served as a mark of his
superiority and, consequently, of the truth of his poetry, Parmenides' critical reference is
meant to stress the fact that, in fact, his poetry, not Hesiod's, is true. Indeed, the kosmos
of words is eloquently contrasted with  logos  at line 50, which refers to the clear and
trustworthy deduction of the attributes of Being conducted in the previous lines121. 
The  interrelation  between  the  order  of  words  and  that  of  cosmos  is  further
emphasized by the use of the term diakosmos to indicate the content of mortal doxai. In
fact, since lines 51-52 and 61-62 are in ring composition, the term diakosmos must be
read as the full explication of the idea contained in the phrase kosmon epeōn, in the light
of what is said in the central section (ll. 53-59). There the goddess describes the starting
point of mortal doxai, which consists in the distinction and naming of two forms, then
employed  to  explain  cosmic  phenomena122.  Indeed,  in  Homer,  the  term  diakosmos
mainly refers to the ordering of the army, and thus to an arrangement effected by means
of division/separation, as conveyed by the prefix dia-123. Thus, the diakosmos actually is
the  kosmos  epeōn  as  essentially  characterized  by  the  original  division  operated  by
mortals. In this perspective, the terms kosmos and diakosmos come to indicate both the
kosmon  in  fragment  B4  should  be  interpreted  as  indicating  an  ordered  disposition,  rather  than  the
distribution of things in the universe (on this line, see Cerri 1999, pp. 199-200; Coxon 2009, p. 308;
contra Palmer 2009, p. 184).
120 See supra, pp. 92-93.
121 Interestingly, the only occurrence of  apatēlon  in Homer is used to express the idea that the word to
which Zeus nods is not deceptive, as it is neither revocable (palinagretos) nor unfulfilled (ateleutētos) (Il.
523-527). Mortals' opinion are qualified by opposite attributes, cf. especially the palintropos path which
conflates Being and Not-Being (DK 28 B6.9).
122 Cf. DK 28 B8.53-59.
123 Cf. Mourelatos 2008a, pp. 231-232.
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account and the content of mortals' doxai.  Although deceptive, this kosmos/diakosmos
is qualified as plausible in its entirety (eoikōs pas)124 by the goddess. The plausibility of
doxastic  cosmology is  determined by the  fact  that,  by offering  a  description of  the
development  of  the  world  in  terms  of  change  and  generation,  it  fits  humans'
(mis)conception  of  reality125.  In  other  words,  the  Doxa  resembles  what  mortals  are
falsely persuaded to be the truth.  It  is thus an account which mortals can trust,  and
probably the best possible one, as implied by the use of  pas, which stresses its being
completely plausible. This idea is further emphasized by the fact that the goddess tells
the  kouros  that,  by  listening  to  her  exposition  of  humans'  doxai,  he  will  not  be
outstripped by mortals'  judgements/opinions (gnōmai) on the world126.  For, since  the
kouros has learned the nature of Being, he is perfectly aware of the falsity of what the
goddess tells him. Thus, by realizing that even the best possible cosmology is false, he
could not be persuaded of the authenticity of any other inferior account of the world.     
Still,  what remains is to determine why Parmenides includes the  Doxa in his
poem, despite declaring it completely deceitful. The fact that it prevents the kouros to be
outstripped by mortal opinions is not a satisfactory answer, since the proofs provided in
the section about Being would have been sufficient to reject any doxastic account of the
world as false, without having to expound a detailed cosmology. In fact, this issue is a
debated  one,  and  scholars  have  advanced  many  different  interpretations,  but  no
consensus has been achieved127. A solution to the problem might come, I argue, from
124 On eoikōs in Parmenides, see Bryan 2012, pp. 58-113.
125 Cf. Bryan 2012, pp. 106-108. On this point, see also Tor's discussion of  B1.31-32, which configures
Doxa as an account which mortals, ignorant of truth, deem as acceptable (cf. Tor 2011, pp. 111-112).
126 The interrelation between judgement and opinion is explained by considering that, by contrast with the
correct  krisis  about being and not-being in the account of truth (see B7.5; B8.15-16),  mortals'  wrong
judgement led them to distinguish two basic forms is the origin of opinions. On the importance of krisis,
see Tor 2011, pp. 151-153.
127 Proposed  interpretations  of  doxa  include:  dialectical  exercise  (Owen  1960,  p.  89);  study in  self-
deception (Mourelatos 2008a, pp. 221-263); model of reference to refute any account of phenomena and
preserve the kouros from the temptations of cosmology (Tarán 1965, pp. 226-228; Barnes 2005, p. 123;
Gallop 2000, p. 23; Warren 2007, pp. 100-101); collection of the provisional results of scientific enquiry
(Cerri 1999, pp. 69-77); didactic account about the wrong way of constructing a cosmology (Curd 1998,
pp. 11-116). 
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considering Parmenides as in competition with other poets and other philosophers or
wisdom practitioners. I have already shown that the presence of a cosmology hints at
other poetic works, especially that of Hesiod, which Parmenides takes as critical target
also for his conception of truth. But the attack on accounts of the world which consider
generation,  destruction  and  change  as  inherent  to  reality,  alongside  the  rejection  of
senses as reliable means of knowledge, can be also seen as a criticism against the Ionian
investigation  on  nature  and,  broadly  speaking,  any  pretence  to  wisdom  and  truth
ultimately based on direct observation128. In fact, the coupling of wisdom with personal
enquiry and/or observation was one of the most common traits of Archaic approaches to
sophia,  and  characterized  also  the  original  speculations  of  6th-5th centuries  BCE,  as
attested by Heraclitus' criticism of rivals in his fragments, in particular B40 and B129129.
In fragment  B40, besides  Hesiod,  Heraclitus  attacks  Pythagoras,  Xenophanes
and Hecataeus saying that they do not possess intelligence/understanding (noos), but
only polumathiē, the much learning acquired by means of enquiry130. Personal enquiry
appears to have had a central role in Xenophanes' and Hecataeus' claims to wisdom, as
reflected by the broad scope of their  enquiries. Although, according to Xenophanes,
relying on investigation and observation inevitably barred humans from the acquisition
of knowledge and confined them to opinion, the recourse to experience could, at the
128 Not  necessarily  made  directly  by the  author  (cf.  Huffman  2008,  pp.  28-29).  According  to  some
interpretations, fragments B1.31-32, B6 and B7 contain the description of a third way of enquiry which
accommodates natural speculations like those of the Ionian tradition (cf. Palmer 2009, p. 163; Curd 1998,
pp. 98-126), but see Wedin's criticism of this position (Wedin 2014, pp. 53-71). 
129 As argued by Montiglio, the prominent role assigned to enquiry by early philosophers can be seen as a
legacy of the correlation between wandering and acquisition of knowledge already present in the Odyssey,
cf. Montiglio 2000, pp. 87-90.
130 Cf. B40: “Learning of many things does not teach intelligence; otherwise it would have taught Hesiod
and  Pythagoras,  and  again  Xenophanes  and  Hecataeus”  (tr.  Marcovich).  polumathiē can  also  be
considered as characterizing the wisdom attributed to the Seven Sages, who represented the standard of
sophia already in the Archaic period. As argued by Martin, the Sages should be seen as in competition
with each other (cf. Martin 1993, p.120), and Pythagoras, whose name sometimes is included or added to
the list of Sages,  probably sought to outdo their fame. Significantly,  Iamblichus says that Pythagoras
followed the example of the Sages by including in his  akousmata  responses to questions of the type  ti
malista (Iamb. VP. 83; on this point, see Burkert 1972, p. 169). 
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same time, represent an effective means of improving men's beliefs on the world131.
Indeed, both Xenophanes and Hecataeus could criticise their rivals and claim to have
made better discoveries than their predecessors. As regards Pythagoras, his possession
of a vast knowledge resulting from enquiry and experience must have been one of his
most distinctive marks of wisdom, probably the most renowned, especially due to his
alleged multiple reincarnations and superhuman powers, as emerging from his praises
by Empedocles  and  Ion  of  Chios.  Empedocles  emphasizes  Pythagoras'  capacity  of
easily  seeing  “each of  all  the  things  that  are,  even in  ten  or  twenty generations  of
men”132, while Ion characterizes his wisdom in terms of knowledge and learning of the
opinions  of  men (gnōmai)133.  According to  Heraclitus,  however,  Pythagoras'  alleged
wisdom is not the result  of his extraordinary capacities,  but rather of his  fraudulent
appropriation of others' opinions, as stated in B129:
Πυθαγόρης Μνησάρχου ἱστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων καὶ
ἐκλεξάμενος  ταύτας  τὰς  συγγραφὰς  ἐποιήσατο  ἑαυτοῦ  σοφίην,
πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην.
Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, practised enquiry most of all men and, by
making a selection of these writings, he contrived a wisdom of his own,
much learning, base trickery134. 
 
           DK 22B129
The fragment's critical force is effected by the fact that enquiry (historiē), which is what
makes one acquire  polumathiē, in the case of Pythagoras consists in his investigation
into others' teachings with the aim of appropriating them. Thus, in addition to not being
131 Cf. Chapter 2, pp. 73-76.
132 Cf. DK 31 B129. There are, in fact, doubts about the identity of the man praised by Empedocles in
B129. According to Diogenes Laertius (D.L. 8.54), some thought that the man was Parmenides. For the
sake of my argument, it is important to notice that, even if Empedocles did not praise Pythagoras, the fact
that later interpreters read the fragment in this way still provides an important indication of the kind of
wisdom that was ascribed to him in antiquity. For an analysis of the issues raised by the fragment, see
further, Chapter 4, pp. 150-152.
133 Cf. DK 36 B4. Compare with the mortals' gnōmai in Parmenides' poem at DK 28 B8.61.
134 Tr. after Horky.
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other  than  mere  polumathiē  and,  then,  not  real  sōphiē  (as  already  said  in  B40),
Pythagoras' professed wisdom is actually a forgery and a base artifice (kakotechniē)135.
Heraclitus'  criticism  of  Pythagoras  as  expressed  in  fragment  B129  reveals
another important aspect of his view on  polumathiē and the wisdom claimed by his
polemic targets.  As argued by Mansfeld,  the structure of  B129 is  modelled,  for the
purpose of parody,  on the  incipit  of the treatises of the period,  whose usual pattern
includes: the name of the author (sphragis); the contrast between the author's truth and
the untruths expounded by others; the presentation of the subject of the work136. The
motif is already present in Hesiod's Theogony137, and was later adopted by prose writers.
At the beginning of his Histories, for example, Hecataeus mentions his name and states
that he is writing what seems true to him, because the  logoi  of the Greeks are, in his
opinion, many and ridiculous138. Other examples of sphragis are provided by Alcmaeon
of Croton, and later in the 5th century by Ion of Chios and Antiochus of Syracuse139.
Considering  this  traditional  pattern,  the  parodic  effect  of  Heraclitus'  fragment  is
achieved  by the  substitution  of  the  expected  claim to  truth  with  the  declaration  of
Pythagoras' theft of others' ideas. But Pythagoras, I would argue, is not the only victim
of Heraclitus' parody. In fact, the fragment can be seen as an attack to the tradition of
self-declared  sophia on  the  part  of  poets  or  other  wisdom practitioners  who,  from
Heraclitus' point of view, were in possession of polumathiē only. For the imposition of a
sphragis  on  their  works  served  both  to  indicate  their  authority  and  to  mark  the
differentiation of their version of truth against that of  rivals140. But in Heraclitus' eyes,
135 In  DK 22 B81, Heraclitus calls  Pythagoras “the chief of swindlers” (archēgos kopidōn).  Huffman
translates  kakotechniē as  ʻevil  conspiracyʼ,  interpreting  the  passage  as  referring  to  a  Pythagorean
conspiracy based on false testimony about Pythagoras' doctrine of metempsychosis (cf. Huffman 2008,
pp. 44-45).
136 Cf. Mansfeld 1989, p. 232.
137 Cf. supra, pp. 96-97.
138 Cf. Hecat. F1 Jacoby: “Hecataeus of Miletus speaks in this way: I write these things as they seem true
to me. For the accounts of the Greeks, as they appear to me, are many and ridiculous”.
139 On the use of sphragis in prose works, see also Kranz 1961, pp. 44-45.
140 Cf. Kranz loc. cit.
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the  truth  which  they were  trying  to  impose  could  only be,  at  most,  a  partial  truth,
deriving from their limited view of reality141. By contrast, Heraclitus expounds a truth
which he presents as the content of the universal logos according to which the events of
the cosmos take place. In fact, in fragment B50, Heraclitus eloquently presents himself
as the spokesman of the logos: “Not listening to me, but to the logos, it is wise to agree
that all things are one”142. In this perspective, the absence of Heraclitus' name from his
fragments,  in  particular  in  B1,  which  seems  to  have  opened  his  work,  should  be
considered as determined by the desire to emphasize that the truth presented in the work
is not Heraclitus' own private truth, but the universal truth of the logos143. 
Parmenides'  view  on  any  pretension  to  wisdom  based  on  the  collection  of
experiences  is,  in  some  respects,  similar  to  Heraclitus'.  For  even  according  to
Parmenides  the  results  of  observation  cannot  be  equated  with  understanding  and,
ultimately, truth. In addition, as in Heraclitus, Parmenides does not appear to include a
sphragis in the poem, thus emphasizing the universal character of the truth expounded
in  his  work.  With  his  criticism,  however,  Parmenides  takes  a  step  further  than
Heraclitus.  In fact,  at  a closer inspection,  the fault  which Heraclitus  ascribed to  his
rivals did not consist in enquiry qua enquiry, which he indicates as one of the necessary
requisites for those who aspire to wisdom144, but rather in the incapacity of identifying
the principle common to all phenomena. Indeed, Heraclitus appears not to reject in toto
the testimony of the senses, as implied, for example, by fragments B101a (“The eyes are
witnesses  more accurate  than the ears”)  and B107 (“The eyes  and the ears  are  bad
witnesses  for  men  who  have  barbarous  souls”)145.  By  contrast,  in  the  light  of
141 On the limitedness of common human understanding, see, for example, fragments B1, B2, B17, B34,
B89, B108.
142 Cf. DK 22 B50.
143 Contra Mansfeld (cf. loc. cit.), who thinks that Heraclitus' sphragis was probably lost. 
144 Cf. DK 22 B35: “Men who love wisdom must be inquirers (histores) into many things indeed” (tr.
Kahn).
145 See also DK 22 B55.
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Parmenides's ontology, any form of wisdom relying on empirical enquiry can only be an
example of doxa. In this perspective, even Heraclitus' doctrine is just another example
of mortals' self-deception and of their confusing What-Is and What-Is-Not.
Despite  his  rejection  of  these  rival  forms  of  wisdom,  however,  Parmenides
included  in  his  poem  an  elaborate  cosmology  along  the  lines  of  those  of  his
predecessors. As I have anticipated, the reason why he expounded a doxastic account of
the world, although deceitful, should be ascribed to his being in competition with other
wisdom-practitioners. In fact, by proposing a plausible cosmology which enables the
kouros  to be outstripped by mortals' opinions, Parmenides demonstrates that he could
outperform  them  in  their  own  game146.  Indeed,  by  entering  the  game,  Parmenides
strengthens his offensive strategy against his rivals, as he attacks them on two different
levels. For he not only defies his competitors' accounts of the world by presenting the
best possible cosmology, but he also proves their inherent deceitfulness by deducing the
attributes of What-Is, which reject the very premises upon which such accounts were
based,  like  the  reality  of  change  and  motion.  Parmenides'  superiority  over  his
adversaries thus stems from his capacity of both providing the best possible cosmology
and,  at  the same time, of recognizing its  falsity,  because he learned the truth about
reality itself. 
  
146 In  this  perspective,  Mourelatos'  observation that  the  verb  parelaunō  (ʻto  outstripʼ)  belongs  to  the
terminology of chariot races acquires new significance. Actually,  Mourelatos argues that,  since in the
poem men are not represented as charioteers in a race towards truth, Parmenides used the form parelassēi
instead of parelthēi for metrical reasons (cf. Mourelatos 2008a, pp. 226-227, n. 15). But considering the
competitive connotation of the chariot, especially in poetic context (cf.  supra, p. 86), I would say that
parelaunō  well  illustrate  the idea that  Parmenides'  account  will  not  be defeated by rival  ones.  For a
defence of the reading  parelassei and an alternative explanation of its meaning in the context of the
chariot metaphor, see Lesher 1984, pp. 24-30.
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Conclusion
The  study  of  Parmenides'  work  proposed  in  this  chapter  has  been  conducted  by
considering the competitive context which characterized Archaic poetic production. As I
argued, Parmenides' poem is informed by a critical stance which targets different rivals
at  the  same  time,  and  the  proem of  his  work,  by  means  of  more  or  less  indirect
references and allusions to his competitors, represents a challenge to all of them. In
particular,  I  have  argued  that  Parmenides'  doctrine  of  Being,  besides  illustrating  a
conception  of  reality  which,  by  excluding  change,  generation,  and  destruction,  is
directly  opposed  to  common  human  beliefs  about  the  world,  actually  configures  a
redefinition of the notion of truth (alētheia) in terms of rational deduction by which he
challenges  the  authority  of  other  poets,  especially  Hesiod.  By  operating  this
modification, Parmenides addresses and solves the problem concerning the ambiguous
nature of poetry. 
The same issue had already been tackled by Hesiod, who, I argued, operated a
distinction  between  two  types  of  poetic  narration,  corresponding  to  two  different
conceptions  of  the  truth  which  poetry  should  convey.  The  first  type  of  narration,
represented by Homeric and heroic poetry, was based on the equation of beauty and
truth with the exhaustive account of a multitude of details pertaining to the concrete
realities of experience (etuma). But such narration did not guarantee the truth of poetry,
as exemplified by Odysseus' lies in the  Odyssey, which by resembling actual events,
deceived his audience without being detected. In contrast, Hesiod's poetry, by focusing
on the narration of universal and eternal truths regarding the cosmic order established
by Zeus (alēthea), testified both the truth of its content and Hesiod's superiority over
other poets. For only a poet who received the investiture from the Muses, like Hesiod,
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could sing truths which no mortal could have accessed. Indeed, the particulars of the
scene of Hesiod's investiture served to strengthen his claim to truth and present his song
as authorized by the divinity. However, Hesiod's total dependence on the Muses did not
eliminate the possibility that the goddesses told him falsehoods. Actually, without an
independent criterion by which to judge the authenticity of the goddesses' revelation, the
poet and the audience could not be assured of what they apprehended from the divinity. 
Parmenides appropriates Hesiod's conception of poetry as conveyor of universal
and  eternal  truth,  but,  by  redefining  alētheia  as  the  result  of  logical  deduction,  he
manages  to  eliminate  the  uncertainty  which  still  affected  the  Hesiodic  poems.  His
decisive move consists in the shift from the idea that truth is determined by the content
of  poetic  narration  to  the  conception  that  it  is  effected  by  the  formal  validity  of
argumentation. Since the truth about Being consists in an a priori  deduction based on
internal consistency only, humans could test the content of the goddess' revelation and
be  assured  of  its  truth,  which  being  absolute,  is  also  universal  and  eternal.  The
persuasiveness  of  divine  account,  and,  consequently,  of  Parmenides'  poetry,  is  then
deprived  of  the  ambiguity traditionally  characterizing  poetic  persuasion,  which  was
inextricably associated with deception.
The sure apprehension of a universal and eternal truth thus testifies Parmenides'
superiority  over  Hesiod,  who,  despite  his  commitment  to  truth,  did  not  manage  to
eliminate  the  ambiguity  inherent  to  poetic  narration.  The  distance  from  Hesiod  is
stressed by the  different  role  which Parmenides  assigns  to  divine  inspiration:  while
Hesiod  needs  to  elaborate  a  scene  of  investiture  to  justify  his  claim  to  truth,  in
Parmenides'  poem,  alētheia,  although presented  in  the  form of  divine  revelation,  is
grounded and justified on independent logical principles which men can access. Thus,
the divinity is not seen, as in the previous poetic tradition, as the exclusive owner of
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truth. In fact, Parmenides' rejection of such a model is illustrated by the diversity of the
goddess' reception of the kouros from the Muses' attitude towards Hesiod: the goddess
is benevolent, while the Muses open their speech to Hesiod with insults (Th. 26); the
kouros is not a passive recipient as Hesiod, but is urged to learn and judge on his own
about the goddess' account; finally, the kouros remains anonymous. There is no need to
include his name as a mark of authority, as Hesiod does, since the truth he is going to
learn,  because  of  its  nature,  is  universally  valid  and  independent  of  external
authorization. 
Parmenides poetic ability, however, is shown not only by his superiority over
Hesiod, but also over Homer. In fact, Parmenides demonstrates that he is capable of
skilfully reproducing the Homeric type of narration, especially in the proem, where he
vividly describes his voyage to the goddess' dwelling with abundance and vividness of
details. In addition, by the systematic allusions to the Odyssey, Parmenides emphasizes
that  he is  narrating a journey superior  to  that  of Homer's  poem, since it  makes the
kouros a genuine “man who knows”, whose noos, having deduced the sēmata of reality,
is  better  even than Odysseus',  which,  until  then,  represented the poetic  paradigm of
mind's excellence. 
As I argued, Parmenides' conception of truth and reality expounded in the first
part  of  his  poem serves  not  only  to  challenge  his  poetic  predecessors,  but  also  to
undermine the pretence to authority of rival wisdom practitioners and philosophers. For
the denial of generation, destruction and change, alongside the condemnation of sense
perception and experience as reliable means of enquiry, constitutes a powerful attack on
Ionian natural philosophy, and, broadly speaking, on any claim to wisdom based on
empirical observation and investigation.  Furthermore,  the rejection of phenomena as
non-reality marks as deceptive and illusory traditional poetic cosmogonies, like that of
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Hesiod, or the one attributed to Epimenides. In this light, Parmenides' Doxa, described
in  terms  of  poetic  discourse  (kosmon epeōn)  and qualified  as  deceptive,  beyond
attacking a certain type of philosophical enquiry, also represents a criticism of previous
poetic  narrations.  Parmenides'  superiority  over  poetic  cosmogonies  and  competing
philosophical speculations about the universe is further emphasized by his capacity to
elaborate the best possible cosmology, which, nonetheless, he recognizes as deceitful in
the light of the truth about reality expounded in the first part of the poem. 
Significantly, both Parmenides' doctrine of Being and redefinition of truth, by
which he conquers his adversaries, appear to be aimed at stopping competition itself,
since they excise the possibility that rival speculations might outdo that of Parmenides.
Consider  the  case  of  cosmological  speculation:  even  if  someone  proposed  a  better
explanation of  natural  phenomena,  at  any rate  such an account  could  not  have  any
pretence  to  describing  reality,  since  reality  coincides  with  Being  as  described  by
Parmenides. Similarly, since alētheia  does not pertain to the narration of events, any
form of poetry other than Parmenides' cannot have any realistic pretence to truth. 
Despite  Parmenides'  intention,  however,  the  philosophical-poetic  competition
did not end, and his doctrines were modified, discussed and challenged by those who
came after him. There can be little doubt that he irrevocably changed the rules of the
game, and his successors could not ignore them. In this perspective, I will now turn to
evaluate the poetic responses to Parmenides provided by Empedocles and Epicharmus.
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 Chapter 4
Empedocles, the divine poet
In this chapter, I will analyse Empedocles' competitive stance towards his philosophical
and  poetic  adversaries.  In  particular,  I  will  focus  on  some  passages  which  reveal
Empedocles' confidence in his poetic authority and superiority over competitors. Before
turning to the fragments, however, I will  consider some aspects related to Empedocles'
poetic  production  and  performance,  which  serve  as  a  general  introduction  to  my
analysis. 
Any study of Empedocles must take into account the problems regarding: 1) the
unity of  Empedocles'  thought;  2)  the  existence  of  two separate  poems,  namely  On
Nature and the Katharmoi. The roots of the first issue are to be traced to the late 19th and
early 20th century tendency to separate rigidly scientific and religious topics, which led
scholars to see Empedocles' physics as in contradiction with his quasi-mythical account
of  transmigration.  As  a  consequence,  Empedocles'  extant  fragments  were  assigned,
depending  on  their  content  and  context  (as  reconstructed  through  later  testimonia),
either to the purely scientific On Nature or to the “theological” Katharmoi1. This view
has been challenged starting  from the  1980s by a  minority of  scholars  who argued
against the idea of incompatibility between natural and religious material, and thereby
advanced the hypothesis that Empedocles wrote a single poem, in which he described
both the destiny of the cosmos and that of the soul2. In 1999, the publication of the
Strasbourg Papyrus provided decisive evidence for the unity of Empedocles' thought, as
1 Most notably Diels, then followed by the majority of scholars (on this point, see Inwood 2001, p. 9;
Trépanier 2004, p. 1).
2 The first to make a case for the existence of a single poem was Osborne (1987). More recently, the
single poem hypothesis has been proposed by Inwood (2001, pp. 8-19) and Trépanier (2004, pp. 1-30 and
passim). Regardless of the issue concerning the number of poems, the unity of Empedocles' thought has
been defended by Barnes 2005, pp. 391-396, Kahn 1960, Sassi 2009, pp. 190-191, Curd 2001, pp. 38-44,
Gallavotti 1975, pp. xii-xvi.
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it contains sections which display a close interrelation between physical and religious
themes3. Important as the evidence of the Papyrus is, however, it does not help to decide
either  against  nor  in  favour  of  the  single-poem  hypothesis.  In  the  light  of  these
considerations, I will conduct my analysis of Empedocles' fragments on the premise of
doctrinal unity, but I will refer to On Nature and the Katharmoi as two separate poems.
It is worth noting, however, that the existence of one or two poems does not directly
affect my argumentation.
The  second  aspect  to  consider  regarding  Empedocles'  poetic  production  is
related  to  the  information  about  the  public  performance of  his  poetry preserved by
Athenaeus. In a passage containing a long list of famous rhapsodes, Athenaeus quotes
Dicearchus of Messana, a pupil of Aristotle who, in a work titled the Olympic4, says that
the rhapsode Cleomenes recited the  Katharmoi  at Olympia5.  Leaving aside the issue
concerning the  import  of  Dicaearchus'  testimony on the  question  of  the  number  of
poems, the fact that Empedocles' poetry was publicly recited constitutes an important
piece of information, especially from the point of view of poetic agonism. For, even
though  rhapsodic  contests  were  not  part  of  the  Olympic  program6,  the  Panhellenic
gathering  represented  a  major  opportunity  for  wisdom  practitioners  to  display  and
“advertise” their expertise7. This inevitably involved a competitive confrontation among
intellectuals, who aimed to gain the favour of the public, to the detriment of their rivals8.
3 In particular, Ensemble d. On the significance of the Papyrus, see further Curd 2001, pp. and passim,
Trepanier 2004, pp. 3-6, Inwood 2001, pp. 19-24 and 75-79.
4 The work was probably in the form of a dialogue, as implied by Cicero's testimony in Att. 13.30.2.
5 Cf.  Ath.14 12.620d.  The information is  preserved  also  by Diogenes  Laertius,  who derives  it  from
Favorinus (cf. D.L. 8.63). 
6 See Chapter 1, p. 32 n. 61.
7 Obbink (1993, pp. 77-80) argues that  Cleomenes performed an abridged version of the  Katharmoi.
Sedley  (1989,  p.  273)  advances  the  hypothesis  that  the  Katharmoi  contained  a  set  of  oracles  and
purifications, rather than doctrinal exposition. For a discussion of the issue, see further Inwood 2001, p.
15 n. 35; Trépanier 2004, pp. 23-24.
8 An  interesting  testimony  by  Galen  reports  that  Empedocles  was  involved  in  a  “good”  kind  of
competition among medical schools (Gal. Method of Healing 1.1, 10.5-6 K): “In past times, too, there was
no little contention as those in Cos and Cnidus strove to prevail over each other in the number of their
discoveries. There were still two groups of Asclepiads in Asia, even when the one on Rhodes had failed.
And the Italian doctors Philistion, Empedocles, Pausanias and their colleagues contended with them also in
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In  this  scenario,  Empedocles'  polemic  allusions  to  his  poetic  and  philosophical
predecessors acquire special significance, since, as I will argue, they were intended to
increase and spread Empedocles' fame as a sage.
I  will  start  my  analysis  of  Empedocles'  agonistic  stance  towards  rivals  by
examining the polemic connotation of the term stolos at B17.26 (section 4.1), and next I
will move to Empedocles' invocations to the Muse in fragments B3 and B131 (section
4.2).  Finally,  I  will  consider  Empedocles'  self-presentation  as  a  divine  being  and
evaluate how it serves to ground his claim to poetic primacy (section 4.3).
4.1 – The meaning of stolos at B17.26
The first instance that Empedocles takes a competitive stance towards his poetical and
philosophical predecessors is contained in B17, the longest fragment in our possession
and, actually, one of the most important of the collection, as it contains the description
of the basic interactions between the four roots whereby living beings are generated. At
B17.26,  Empedocles  invites  Pausanias  to  listen  attentively  to  his  account  with  the
following words:
                       […] σὺ δ᾽ ἄκουε λόγου στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν 
                     […] but you hear the non-deceptive stolos of the account.
                                                                                                      DK 31 B17.26
The phrase λόγου στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν has proven hard to translate and understand
properly, due to the difficulty posed by the phrase  stolos logou, as the term  stolos  is
absent  in  Homeric  epic  and  attested  only  since  the  5th century  BCE.  Proposed
translations  include:  “the  progression  of  my  argument”  (Wright),  “array  of  words”
(Trépanier),  “il  seguito del mio discorso” (Gallavotti),  “l'ordine non ingannevole del
mio messaggio” (Bignone),  “cursum sermonis” (Karsten),  “l'équipée de ces paroles”
that noble kind of rivalry which Hesiod praised. So there were these three admirable troupes of doctors
vying with each other” (tr. Johnston and Horsley).
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(Bollack), “the expedition of [my] account” (Inwood), “the ordering of my discourse”
(Kirk-Raven-Schofield). Despite the lack of agreement concerning the translation, the
majority  of  scholars  recognizes  in  this  phrase  a  polemic  reference  to  Parmenides'
rejection of doxastic cosmology, which the goddess presents as a “deceptive order of
words” (kosmos epeōn apatēlos)9. This mainstream view has been criticized by Bollack,
who contends that the phrase  ouk apatēlon  is not critical of Parmenides, but rather of
the wrong opinions of men in general10. More recently,  Palmer has argued that, since
Empedocles appears to qualify as not deceptive only his account of the action of Love
on the four roots, the line cannot be interpreted as a criticism of Parmenides' rejection of
cosmology11. However, Palmer's argument loses its force when one considers that, being
responsible for the mixing of the four roots whereby plurality and change are generated,
Love is, in fact, a cosmogonic agent. Indeed, Parmenides could not have accepted the
description  of  Love's  function,  as  it  is  based  upon  the  admission  of  plurality  and
change12.  Moreover,  both Palmer and Bollack have failed to notice that the polemic
force of the passage lies in the use of the term stolos as a metaphor for poetry. Such an
image, employed in a line which clearly echoes Parmenides, as Bollack and Palmer
themselves acknowledge, cannot but indicate, I argue, Empedocles' highly competitive
stance towards his predecessor. As I now turn to show, a detailed analysis of stolos as
poetological image13 reveals that Empedocles is not only targeting Parmenides, but also
affirming his poetic authority by putting his work on the same level of Homeric and
Hesiodic epic14.
9 Cf. DK 28B8.52: “μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων”. 
10 Cf. Bollack 1969, pp. 71-72.
11 Cf. Palmer 2009, pp. 273-274 and 2013, pp. 326-327.
12 Cf. Chapter 3, pp. 110-111.
13 I am using the term after Nünlist (1998, pp. 1-10).
14 Even Nünlist, who analyses the implications of the poetological images stolos logou and kosmos epeōn,
still claims that there are no decisive elements to decide whether Empedocles' verse is actually polemic
(cf. Nünlist 2005, especially pp. 81-83).
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The term stolos derives from the verb stellō, whose basic meanings in the active
are ʻto arrangeʼ, ʻto prepareʼ, ʻto equip with weaponsʼ, ʻto prepare for departureʼ, ʻto
sendʼ; in the middle-passive, the verb signifies: ʻto get preparedʼ, ʻto get for oneselfʼ, ʻto
set on a journeyʼ15. In Homer, the verb is most frequently used in (a) military and (b)
nautical contexts. As to group (a), the verb indicates the action of preparing and sending
troops or single individuals to battle. For example, in the Iliad, at 4.294 Nestor is said to
marshal and urge his comrades to fight (ἑτάρους στέλλοντα καὶ ὀτρύνοντα μάχεσθαι),
while, at 12.325, Sarpedon tells Glaucon that he would not send him to fame-giving
battle (οὔτέ κε σὲ στέλλοιμι μάχην ἐς κυδιάνειραν), if death did not await them outside
war anyway. The idea of preparation for hostile activities is present also in non-warlike
contexts:  for  example,  at  23.285,  stellō  is  employed to  indicate  the  preparation  for
competing at the funeral games held in honour of Patroklos. Group (b) counts the major
number of instances. In such contexts, phrases like nēa/nēas stellein (Od. 2.287; 14.247-
248)  and  istia  stellein  (Il.  1.433;  Od.  3.11  and  16.353) refer,  respectively,  to  the
equipment of ships and the rigging of sails. 
In  later  texts  by  tragedians  and  historians,  stellō  is  used  to  describe  the
deployment of armies both by land and sea, and to indicate the action of getting ready
for  terrestrial  or  maritime  journeys16. Furthermore,  given  the  basic  meaning  ‘to
prepare’/‘to arrange’, stellō sometimes signifies ‘to adorn with garments’ or ‘to dress’17.
In  accordance  with  the  meanings  of  stellō, the  derivative  stolos  generally  signifies
ʻequipmentʼ (with the stress put on the activity involved in the process)18, ʻexpeditionʼ,
15 Cf. Chantraine 1990, s.v. στέλλω.
16 See,  for  example,  Aeschylus (Pers.  177;  Ag.  799),  Sophocles  (Aj.  1045;  Ph.  911,  1077,  1416),
Herodotus (1.165; 3.52; 5.64; 4.153) and Thucydides (2.69; 3.86, 3.91,7.20).
17 See, for example, Herodotus (3.14): “He [sc. Cambyses] dressed his [sc. the king] daughter as a slave
(στείλας αὐτοῦ τὴν θυγατέρα ἐσθῆτι δουληίῃ), and sent her out [...] together with other girls from the
families of the leading men, dressed like the daughter of the king (ὁμοίως ἐσταλμένας τῇ τοῦ βασιλέος)”;
Sophocles (Tr. 610-612): “If I ever saw or heard that he was coming safe at home, I would dress him
properly with this tunic” (εἴ  ποτ᾽  αὐτὸν ἐς δόμους/ἴδοιμι σωθέντ᾽  ἢ κλύοιμι πανδίκως/στελεῖν χιτῶνι
τῷδε). From this particular meaning of stellō derives the noun stolē which generally signifies ‘garment’,
‘robe’.
18 On this point, cf. Chantraine, loc. cit. and Nünlist 2005, p. 77.
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ʻvoyageʼ19. As in the case of its cognate verb,  stolos  is mostly used in contexts which
relate to bellicose activities, to the extent that it can also mean ʻarmyʼ or ʻfleetʼ 20. In this
respect,  in  Aeschylus'  Persians,  stolos  indicates  the  ship's  prow plated  with  bronze
(chalchērēs stolos) used to attack and destroy the enemy's ships21. 
As  emerges  from the  above  analysis,  stolos  is  usually  employed  to  refer  to
processes involving the arrangement of things, in most cases for hostile purposes. In this
light, I think that Inwood's translation of the term as “expedition” appears to be the most
appropriate choice, since, differently from the other alternatives, it  includes both the
ideas  of  ordering  and  progression  towards  a  specific  target.  At  any rate,  given  the
competitive connotation of  stolon  and cognates, it is reasonable to think that even in
Empedocles'  passage the term possesses agonistic implications. This reading appears
even more plausible when one considers the following passage from Pindar's second
Pythian Ode, in which stolos is used as a metaphor for his poetic composition:
    εὐανθέα δ᾽ ἀναβάσομαι στόλον ἀμφ᾽ ἀρετᾷ
      κελαδέων. 
      But to proclaim your prowess I shall board a flower-garlanded ship22.
                                                                                                  Pi. P. 2.62-63  
At lines 67-68, Pindar further develops the image by comparing his song to a cargo sent
over the sea to reach Hieron of Syracuse, to whom the ode is dedicated (“This song is
sent to you over the grey sea like Phoenician merchandise”23). The depiction of poetic
activity as a voyage by ship is part of a broader field of nautical metaphors extensively
exploited in Archaic Greek poetry24. Indeed, navigation offers a wide range of images
19 For example: S. Ph. 499, 781; Hdt. 3.26, 5.64, 4.145. In connection with this meaning, the term can also
indicate groups of people, usually set out to a particular purpose, as in A. Supp. 2, 28; Eu. 1027; S. OT
170.
20 For example: A. Ag. 45, 577; Pers. 400, 795. S. Ph. 73, 247, 916; OC 1305. Hdt. 3.25, 3.138, 4.145;
Thuc. 1.9, 1.10, 6.31.
21 See A. Pers. 408, 416.
22 Tr. Verity, with modifications.
23  Pi. P. 2. 67-68.
24 For  an  overview,  see  Durante  1976,  pp.  128-129.  Nünlist  provides  a  useful  collections  of  poetic
passages where nautical metaphors are employed (see Nünlist 1998, pp. 255-276). 
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which includes:  poetic  activity as the rigging of  sails25;  the Muse as steersman and
provider of fair wind26; and the sheering to another route of song27. It is worth noticing,
moreover,  that  Pindar  uses  stolon  in  a  competitive  context,  as  his  poetic  task  is
contrasted  with  potential  slanderers  of  Hiero,  who might  question  the  extent  of  his
possessions and reputation28.  A similar agonistic stance is present in other poems in
which Pindar employs nautical  images with reference to his  activity as poet.  In the
seventh  Olympian, for example, he declares that he made a voyage by ship to praise
Diagoras and his father Damagetus with a song in which he provides the correct account
about their ancestors29, while in the thirteenth Olympian, he compares his poetic task to
a maritime trip and declares that he will not tell a false tale about Corinth (thus implying
that such stories had been told by others) to celebrate Xenophon and his forefathers30.
The use of nautical images within the context of poetic competition is part of a
tradition which dates back at least to Hesiod, as emerging from the polemic allusion to
Homeric epic contained in the part of the Works and Days known as Nautilia (Op. 618-
694). There, in narrating the brief voyage to Calchis which he made to participate in the
25  Cf. Pi. N. 5.50-51: “give voice, unfurl your sails at the highest yard” (tr. Verity).
26 Cf.  B. 12.1-3: “Like a skilled helmsman, Clio, queen of song, steer my thoughts straight now” (tr.
Campbell). The metaphor of the steersman is employed also by Alcman, but to refer to the chorus leader
Hagesichora (Alcm. 1. 94-95 Page). As regards the other type of image, cf. Pi. N. 6.28-30: “Come, Muse,
guide a glorious wind of poetry onto this house, for when men die it is songs and stories that recall their
fine deeds” (tr. Verity). See also Pi.  P. 4.1-3: “Today, my Muse, you must stand at the side of a friend,
Arcesilas [...] so that with him in his victory revel you may swell the winds of song” (tr. Verity).
27 Cf. Pi. N. 4.69-72: “But it is not permitted to pass to the west of Gadeira; set your ship's sails back to
Europe's mainland, for I cannot run through the whole tale of Aeacus' offspring” (tr. Verity). The idea of
poetry as  a  nautical  route can be found also in Anacreon's poetry:  “I'm borne over unmarked reefs”
(Anacr. 403 Page, tr. West).
28  Cf. Pi. P. 2.58-61: “If anyone today says that another man of former times in Greece was superior to
you in possessions and reputation, he is empty-minded, and wrestles to no purpose” (tr.  Verity).  It  is
noteworthy that the other occurrence of stolos in Pindar is in a competitive context as well, as it is used to
refer to the pankration (cf. N. 3.17).
29 Cf. Pi.  O. 7.20-21: “I have come ashore with Diagoras, singing of Rhodes, his island home, child of
Aphrodite and bride of Helios, to praise this giant of a man, a straight fighter, who has won a crown for
boxing by Alpheus' river and at Castalia,and also to celebrate his father Damagetus, friend of justice […]
My hope is to make known the correct account (ἀγγέλλων διορθῶσαι λόγον), starting from Tlepolemus”
(tr. Campbell, with modifications). On the phrase diorthōsai logon as implying the correction of previous
versions of the myth, see Verdenius 1987, 56-57 contra Young, who interprets as “to tell the tale aright or
exalt” (cf. Young 1968, p. 78 n. 2).
30 Cf. Pi. O. 13.49-52: “I am a private passenger on a public voyage, and when I speak of the talents of
their forefathers and their heroic deeds in war I shall give no false account of the people of Corinth” (tr.
Campbell, with modifications)”. On the nautical metaphor of the passage, see Nünlist 1998, p. 269.
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funeral games for Amphidamas, Hesiod explicitly refers to the Trojan war by saying
that he departed from Aulis, the same place from which the Achaean fleet sailed to Troy:
οὐ γάρ πώ ποτε νηὶ [γ᾽] ἐπέπλων εὐρέα πόντον, 
εἰ μὴ ἐς Εὔβοιαν ἐξ Αὐλίδος, ᾗ ποτ᾽ Ἀχαιοὶ
μείναντες χειμῶνα πολὺν σὺν λαὸν ἄγειραν
Ἑλλάδος ἐξ ἱερῆς Τροίην ἐς καλλιγύναικα. 
For never yet did I sail the broad sea in a boat, 
except to Euboea from Aulis, where once the Achaeans,
waiting through the winter, gathered together a great host to sail
from holy Greece to Troy with its beautiful women.
                                                                                           Hes. Op. 650-653
Hesiod's  agonistic  stance  towards  Homeric  poetry  is  revealed  by  his  skilful
appropriation and manipulation of Homeric diction. First, the typical epithets of Troy
and Greece employed in the Iliad, respectively “holy” (hierē) and “of beautiful women”
(kalligunaix),  are  reversed.  Then,  in  order  to  describe  his  extremely short  voyage31,
Hesiod employs the phrase “broad sea” (eurea ponton) which in Homer is used to evoke
heroic enterprises32. Such a skilled employment of typical Homeric expressions serves
to demonstrate Hesiod's poetic calibre, which, in fact, surpasses Homer's, as implied by
the narration of his victory in the poetic contest dedicated to Amphidamas contained in
the following lines. Indeed, Hesiod's success in Chalcis represents a victory over Homer
himself33,  which  he  emphasizes  by  contrasting  the  grandiosity  of  Homeric  epic,
symbolized by the great Achaean fleet, with his brief voyage to Euboea. Noticeably,
Hesiod's declaration of superiority over Homer acquires deeper significance when we
consider his claim to be able to sing the mind (noos) of Zeus at line 661. Since, as I
have previously argued, the mention of Zeus'  noos  hints at the universal character of
Hesiod's  poetry,  the passage as a  whole implies that Hesiod's  poetic  primacy is  not
31 About 65 metres long, according to West (cf. West 1978, ad loc.).
32 On these points, cf. Graziosi 2002, p. 170.
33 That may be why, although Hesiod does not mention his rival, later in antiquity these lines were used as
a basis for the legend of the contest between Homer and Hesiod as narrated in the Certamen (see Chapter
1, pp. 38-39).
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simply due to his being able to perform a poetry as beautiful as Homeric epic, if not
more, but also to the fact that his poetry deals with universal topics which only he, the
poet chosen by the Muses, can narrate34. 
The agonistic implications of the Nautilia are later appropriated by Ibycus in his
Encomium  to  Polycrates,  which  contains  allusions  both  to  Homer  and  Hesiod,  as
emerges by the following lines: 
     καὶ τὰ μὲ[ν ἂν] Μοίσαι σεσοφι[σ]μέναι
      εὖ Ἑλικωνίδ[ες] ἐμβαίεν λόγω[ι·
     †θνατ[ὸ]ς δ᾽ οὔ κ[ε]ν ἀνὴρ 
      διερὸς […...]† τὰ ἕκαστα εἴποι,
      ναῶν ὃ[σσος ἀρι]θμὸς ἀπ᾽ Αὐλίδος
      Αἰγαῖον διὰ [πό]ντον ἀπ᾽ Ἄργεος ἠλύθο[ν ἐς Τροία]ν
      ἱπποτρόφο[ν,  ἐν δ]ὲ φώτες
      χ]αλκάσπ[ιδες, υἷ]ες Ἀχα[ι]ῶν35 
    
     On these themes the skilled Muses
      of Helicon might embark in story,
      but no mortal man (untaught?) 
      could tell each detail,
      the great number of ships that came from Aulis
      across the Aegean sea from Argos to the horse-rearing
      Troy, with bronze-shielded warriors on board sons of the Achaeans36.
                                                                            Ibyc. 282.23-31 Page
                                                                                       
The passage recalls the invocation preceding the Catalogue of the Ships (Il. 2.484-494),
as the Muses' ability to tell all the details and the number of the Achaeans' ships is
contrasted with mortals' incapacity to do the same. The allusion to Hesiod is conveyed
through  the  use  of  the  epithet  ʻHeliconianʼ  to  refer  to  the  Muses37 and  their  being
described as ʻskilfulʼ (sesophismenai), the same term employed by Hesiod to describe
his lack of expertise in navigation38. In addition, Ibycus explicitly mentions Aulis as the
place  of  departure  of  the  Greek  expedition,  and,  at  line  18,  he  uses  the  adjective
34 Cf. Chapter 3, pp. 93-96.
35 The text is as reconstructed by Barron (see Barron 1969, pp. 119-124). For the reading  ἐς Τροία]ν,
Barron follows Hunt (cf. ibidem, p. 129).
36 Tr. Campbell. The hypothesis about ʻuntaughtʼ is due to Barron's suggested restoration for the corrupted
lines 25-26 (see Barron 1969, pp. 128-129).
37 In  the  invocation  which  opens  the  Catalogue,  the Muses  are  referred  to  as  ʻhaving dwellings  on
Olympusʼ (l. 484) and ʻOlympianʼ (l. 491).
38 Cf. Hes. Op. 649.
129
polugomphos  (ʻwith  many  nailsʼ,  ʻwell-rivetedʼ),  a  rare  term which  appears  in  the
Works  and  Days39.  Noticeably,  such  indirect  references  to  Homer  and  Hesiod  are
inserted in a context in which navigation is used as a metaphor for poetic activity, as
indicated by the use of the verb embainō (ʻto embarkʼ) to describe the Muses' narrative
capacities. As I have previously illustrated, Ibycus' allusions to his predecessors need
not to be considered as a rejection of epic qua epic, but rather as a rhetorical device to
extol  the  qualities  of  Polycrates40.  However,  I  argue,  considering  the  competitive
implication of the nautical images for poetry, Ibycus' allusions to Homer and Hesiod
serve also to exalt his poetic skilfulness and to emphasize the fact that, although he is
not  going to compose the same type of poetry as theirs,  Polycrates will  still  obtain
undying fame (kleos aphthiton) thanks to Ibycus' own fame and song41. In other words,
even though Ibycus will not embark an epic story, his poetry will nonetheless achieve
immortal results.
To sum up, the foregoing analysis shows that the term stolos  and its cognates
have strong agonistic  connotations,  as  they are usually employed in contexts  which
involve competitive confrontation. In particular, stolos is related to the broader field of
nautical metaphors traditionally employed by poets to refer to their art, whereby they
frequently expressed their polemic stance towards rivals. As anticipated above, then,
Empedocles'  use  of  stolos  at  B17.26,  which  closely  resembles  Parmenides'  B8.52,
should be  taken to  indicate  a  critical  allusion  to  his  predecessor.  Indeed,  the  stolos
logou, which Empedocles invites Pausanias to heed, functions as a metaphorical poetic
expedition aimed to prove that Parmenides' rejection of cosmology was misguided. But
the image of nautical enterprise hints also at the epic production of Homer and Hesiod,
39 Cf. Hes. Op. 660. 
40 Cf. Chapter 2, p. 56.
41 Cf. Ibyc. 281.46-48: “These have a share in  beauty always: you too, Polycrates, will have undying
fame, as song and my fame can give it” or, accepting a different punctuation of the Greek text, “Among
them, for beauty always you too, Polycrates, will have undying fame [...]” (tr. Campbell). On the function
of Ibycus' allusions, see also Barron 1969, p. 134; Nünlist 1998, pp. 274-276.
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whom Empedocles wants to emulate, but only to demonstrate ultimately his superiority
as  a  poet.  For  even  Empedocles  sets  out  on  a  poetic  journey  of  epic  dimensions,
whereby he wants to provide a comprehensive and complete account of the origin and
development of the cosmos which outshines those of his competitors. As I will show in
the next section, Empedocles' invocations to the Muse are marked by the same self-
confidence in his supremacy over rivals and further contribute to his self-presentation as
a poetic authority.       
4.2 – Empedocles and the Muse
In the extant fragments,  Empedocles directly invokes the Muse twice,  in B3 and in
B131.  Both  invocations  feature  important  aspects  which  help  to  characterize
Empedocles' relationship with the goddess, and thereby to indicate his poetic authority. I
will start by considering fragment B3, in which Empedocles appeals to the divinity to
grant purity to his poetry:
   ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τῶν μὲν μανίην ἀποτρέψατε γλώσσης,  
   ἐκ δ᾽ ὁσίων στομάτων καθαρὴν ὀχετεύσατε πηγήν 
  καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα, 
   ἄντομαι, ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,
   πέμπε παρ᾽ Εὐσεβίης ἐλάουσ᾽εὐήνιον ἅρμα. 
   But gods, turn aside their madness from [my] tongue,
   and channel a pure stream from pious mouths.
   And you, much-wooed maiden Muse of the white arms, 
   I beseech you: of what is right for ephemeral creatures to hear,
   escort the well-reined chariot, driving from the [halls] of piety
                                                                                         DK 31 B3.1-542
42 I  follow,  with  modifications,  Inwood's  translation.  The  structure  and  meaning  of  the  passage  are
debated, especially as regards the last two lines. Below I offer a detailed analysis of the main issues and
the justification for the translation here proposed. Lines 6-13 of B3 contain further injunctions addressed
to an unspecified se: lines 9-13 are undoubtedly addressed to Pausanias, who is invited to keep his senses
and understanding attentive to Empedocles' teachings. As regards lines 6-8, it is debated whether they are
addressed to Pausanias or the Muse: Pausanias is opted for by Karsten, Wright and Inwood, who treat
B3.6-13 as a separate fragment (for a commentary, see Wright 1981, pp. 157 and 160-163). Proponents of
the Muse include: Diels-Kranz, Bignone, Bollack (cf. Bollack 1969, pp. 31-32), Gallavotti, Calzolari and,
more recently, Trépanier, who, however, admits that the question cannot be settled once and for all (cf.
Trépanier 2004, pp. 59-65). Given the lack of decisive evidence, and considering that either solution does
not affect the following discussion, I prefer to suspend judgement.
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The first line is irremediably ambiguous, since we know neither the people to whom
Empedocles' refers nor what their madness consists in43. However, given Empedocles'
insistent use of terms relating to purity and piety, it is plausible to think that the maniē
refers to some sort of transgression disrespectful of the gods. Regardless of the identity
of his targets, Empedocles' request to the gods serves to emphasize that what he is about
to  say  in  his  poem  will  be  informed  by  piety,  an  idea  further  reinforced  by  the
qualification of his song as a “pure stream”, which alludes to the language of libations
and purificatory rituals44. 
The  appeal  to  the  gods  is  followed  by  an  invocation  to  the  Muse,  who  is
addressed  with  three  epithets,  namely  λευκώλενος (ʻwhite-armedʼ),  παρθένος
(ʻmaidenʼ)  and  πολυμνήστη.  The  translation  of  the  adjective  πολυμνήστη  is
controversial,  as its meaning varies depending on whether one considers the term as
deriving from μιμνήσκω (ʻto rememberʼ) or from μνάομαι (ʻto be mindfulʼ, ʻto woo for
one's  brideʼ).  As  to  the  first  possibility,  πολυμνήστη  would  be  a  rare  form of  the
adjective with two endings πολύμνηστος, which can signify ʻmuch-rememberingʼ or, in
a passive sense, ʻmuch-rememberedʼ, as attested in Aeschylus45. According to the other
alternative,  πολυμνήστη would mean  ʻmuch-wooedʼ, as in the few occurrences of the
term in Homer46. In fact, πολυμνήστη appears in the Odyssey only three times, twice as
43 Sextus (M. 7.24) says that Empedocles is criticizing those who claim to know more. Diels thinks that
the reference is to Parmenides (and so do Bignone 1916, p. 391 and Burnet,  ad loc.) but it is hard to
believe that, although in competition with him, Empedocles accuses of madness the philosopher who had
such an important influence on him (on this point cf. Bollack 1969, pp. 26-27, Wright 1981, pp. 157-158,
Trépanier 2005, p. 58; but see Calzolari 1984, pp. 78-81). Trépanier argues that Empedocles attacks those
who perform blood sacrifice (cf. Trépanier loc. cit.). For a discussion of the possible interpretations, see
further Sassi 2009, p. 233 n. 62.
44 Cf.,  for  example,  Xenophanes'  elegy on the  ideal  symposium marked by the respect  for  the gods
discussed in Chapter 2, pp. 52-54.
45 Cf. A.  Ag. 821 and 1459 (in the form  πολύμναστος). Whether to take the adjective in the active or
passive sense is subject to debate (see Wright 1981, p. 158). For the meaning ʻmuch-rememberingʼ, cf.
also the form πολυμνήστωρ, in A. Supp. 535. The active sense is adopted by Karsten (“memor”), Bollack
(“mémoire  nombreuse”),  Wright  (“of  long memory”),  while  the  passive  by Diels,  who translates  as
“much-celebrated”  (“vielgefeierte”),  and recently by Bordigoni,  who argues  that  πολυμνήστη is  here
equivalent to πολύφατος, used in choral lyric (cf. Bordigoni 2004, pp. 215-216). 
46 “Much-wooed”  is  the  translation  adopted  by  Burnet,  Guthrie,  Bignone  (“molto  contesa”),  and
Gallavotti (“molto agognata”).
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an epithet of Penelope (Od. 4.770 and 23.149), and once to describe the wife whom
Eumeus hopes that Odysseus will  give to him in return for his  loyalty (Od.  14.64).
Despite  the  numerous  attempts  to  identify  the  exact  meaning  of  πολυμνήστη  in
Empedocles, no shared consensus has been attained. By contrast to the hypothesis of a
single  specific  meaning,  Cerri  has  argued  that  Empedocles'  use  of  the  term  is
intentionally ambiguous, and that it actually accommodates a plurality of meanings47.
Given the lack of decisive reasons to prefer one meaning over the others, the hypothesis
of a polysemic usage of πολυμνήστη cannot be excluded. Indeed, the qualification of
the Muse as “much-remembering” refers to the traditional role of the Muses, daughters
of  Mnemosyne48,  as  preservers  of  memory,  and  the  Muse  is  certainly  “much-
remembered/celebrated” by poets. Finally, the Muse is also “much-wooed”, since poets
seek her to obtain her favours. However, as Cerri himself notices, the meaning “much-
wooed” appears to possess special prominence in Empedocles' description of the Muse,
as implied by the fact that the goddess is referred to as “maiden”. Indeed, as I now turn
to show, πολυμνήστη, in the sense of “much-wooed”, possesses a connotation which
further emphasizes Empedocles' agonistic stance towards his poetic rivals.
In  order  to  illustrate  the  agonistic  implications  of  πολυμνήστη,  we  should
consider again the use of the term in the Odyssey, in particular as an epithet of Penelope.
As mentioned above,  Penelope is  called πολυμνήστη in two scenes which feature a
similar pattern: in the first passage, on hearing Penelope screaming in her apartment,
some of the suitors think that the “much-wooed queen” has finally decided to marry one
of them49. However, they are unaware that Penelope' cry is caused by her discovery of
47 Cf. Cerri 2004, p. 89.
48 I cannot see how the the fact that the Muse's knowledge is unlimited could pose a problem to the
adoption of the meaning “much-remembering”, as argued by De Sanctis (cf. De Sanctis 2007, pp. 17-18,
n. 19). Indeed, unlimited knowledge entails the capacity of remembering many things, which, in turn,
might become subjects of poetry: compare the Muse who loves to remember great contests in Pindar's
first Nemean (N. 1.11).
49 Cf. Od. 4.770.
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the suitors' plan to kill Telemachus. Later in the poem, on hearing sounds of music and
dance  coming  from  Odysseus'  palace,  the  people  of  Ithaca  are  led  to  think  that
Penelope, the much-wooed queen”, has finally chosen a husband, and thus criticize the
woman for  not  having  waited  Odysseus'  return50.  But  even in  this  case,  Penelope's
intentions are misunderstood, since, in fact, the festive sounds are a trick of Odysseus
aimed to keep the massacre of the suitors secret. In both cases, Penelope's fidelity is
emphasized by the fact that her supposed betrayal of Odysseus does not correspond to
the truth51. In the light of these passages, De Sanctis has recently argued that, by calling
the Muse πολυμνήστη, Empedocles wants to establish analogies between, on the one
hand, Penelope and the Muse, and, on the other hand, the suitors and other poets. In this
scenario, Empedocles would figure as Odysseus himself, thus implying that the Muse
has chosen him as the only recipient of her favour52. While De Sanctis' interpretation
appears to be correct in its basic formulation, in order to provide a deeper understanding
of the passage and its implications, we must take stock of further aspects. In particular,
as I now turn to show, the system of parallels effected by the term πολυμνήστη serves to
characterize not only Empedocles'  relation with the Muse, but also that between the
goddess and his rivals. 
As narrated in  the  Odyssey,  in  order  to  resist  the suitors'  insistent  proposals,
Penelope adopts different stratagems whereby she fools them and thereby manages to
await Odysseus' return. Indeed, Penelope's faithfulness is inextricably connected to her
ability in deceiving the suitors. It is reasonable to think that the same holds for the
Muses' relation to Empedocles and his competitors. For Penelope's most famous trick is
that of the loom, by which she succeeds in delaying the choice of a new husband for
50 Cf. Od. 23.149-152.
51 Homer stresses the ignorance of the suitors and the people of Ithaca by employing the same phrase on
both occasions:  ὣς ἄρα τις εἴπεσκε, τὰ δ᾽ οὐκ ἴσαν ὡς ἐτέτυκτο, “so they would say, but did not know
how these things were” (tr. Murray-Dimock).
52 Cf. De Sanctis 2007, especially pp. 19-20.
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three years53.  Noticeably,  in Archaic Greek poetry,  weaving is a metaphor for poetic
activity54.  In  a  renowned  scene  of  the  Iliad,  Helen  embroiders  a  purple  web  with
representations  of  the  battles  between  Achaeans  and  Trojans,  thus  offering  an
illustration of the ongoing process of composition of the  Iliad  itself55.  ʻWeavingʼ and
ʻembroideringʼ as images for poetry were then appropriated by later poets, for example
Pindar and Bacchylides who frequently speak of the weaving of hymns or words, or
musical  embroidering56.  Empedocles  himself  appears  to  resort  to  the  metaphor with
reference to his poetry, when, in fragment B17, he speaks of the “threads of the tales”
(πείρατα  μύθων)57 which  he  announced  previously  in  the  poem58. The  connection
between textile activities and poetry is also behind the belief that rhapsodes were called
in this way because they stitched songs together  (from rhaptein, ʻto stitchʼ and aoidē,
ʻsongʼ)59. It is worth noting that the capacity of colourfully embroidering a fabric is also
presented as an efficacious means of deception, as eloquently described by Pindar in the
first Olympian: “stories are embroidered beyond the truth, and so deceive us with their
elaborate lies”60. As I have illustrated in the previous chapter, this idea is related to the
conception according to which beautiful poetry might be deceptive, as it can simply
imitate the multiform variety of human experience, without corresponding to reality61. 
53 Cf. Od. 2.93-110; 19.138-156. 
54 On weaving as an image for poetry, see Bergren (2008), in particular pp. 215-141 on Penelope. On
weaving in Greek and Roman culture, see further Scheid and Svenbro (2001).
55 Cf. the scholiast's remark (bT): “ The poet fashioned a noteworthy model of his own poetry”.
56 E.g.  Pindar:  O.  6.85-86:  πλέκων ποικίλον ὕμνον (“weaving a many coloured hymn”),  N.  4.93-94:
ῥήματα  πλέκων  (“weaving  words”),  N.  8.14-15:  φέρων  Λυδίαν  μίτραν  καναχηδὰ  πεποικιλμέναν
(“bringing a Lydian headband embroidered with resonant music”. Bacchylides: 5.9-10: ὑφάνας ὕμνον (“a
woven hymn”), 19.8-10: ὕφαινέ νυν τι καινὸν (“now weave something new”). For an overview and other
examples, see Nünlist 1998, pp. 110-118. 
57 DK 31 B17.15.
58 On the translation of peirata as ʻthreadsʼ, cf. Graham 1988, pp. 300-301. Similarly, in the first Pythian,
Pindar speaks of the importance of “plaiting the threads of many matters into a brief whole”,  πολλῶν
πείρατα συντανύσαις ἐν βραχεῖ (Pi. P. 1.81-82, tr. Verity). The verb suntanuō is an hapax glossed as ʻto
stretch togetherʼ and taken as a synonym of sumplekō ʻto twine/ plait togetherʼ. On this line, see further
Onians'  discussion  included  in  his  analysis  of  the  meaning  of  peirar  (Onians  1954,  pp.  310-342,
especially 338-340). For a discussion of the issues related to the line and an alternative interpretation, see
further Bergren 1975, pp. 148-162. 
59 Cf. Chapter 1, pp. 34-35. 
60 Pi. O. 1.28-29, tr. Verity. 
61 Cf. Chapter 3, pp. 92-93.  
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In the light of these considerations, the parallel between Penelope and the Muse
established by means of πολυμνήστη acquires its full import. For we can see how the
three-member relation Muse-Empedocles-poets exactly mirrors the Penelope-Odysseus-
suitors  one:  while,  on  the  one  hand,  the  Muse/Penelope  is  faithful  to
Empedocles/Odysseus, on the other hand, she preserves her fidelity by deceiving rival
poets/suitors. As regards the latter point, Penelope's treacherous weaving is paralleled
by  the  Muse's  fabrication  of  false  accounts  which  she  inspires  to  other  poets.
Empedocles then seems to appropriate Hesiod's idea that the Muses are equally able to
inspire truth and falsehoods, as stated in the  Theogony62. Indeed, similarly to Hesiod,
even Empedocles emphasizes that he is the chosen one by the Muses. However, I argue,
Empedocles' status as a poet is, in fact, very different from that of Hesiod, as emerges
from  the  analysis  of  the  passages  in  which  the  Muse  is  invoked.  I  will  start  by
considering the rest of fragment B3, which contains Empedocles' request to the Muse.
For the sake of clarity, I quote again the Greek text:
   καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα,
   ἄντομαι, ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,
   πέμπε παρ᾽ Εὐσεβίης ἐλάουσ᾽εὐήνιον ἅρμα.
                                                          DK 31 B3.3-5
Lines 4 and 5 are notoriously difficult to translate and interpret, as their very structure is
subject to debate. In what follows I will briefly sketch the main issues arising from the
passage and then propose what I consider the most plausible reading. As to the lines'
syntax, some scholars put a stop at the end of line 4, after ἀκούειν, and thus make the
verb depend on ἄντομαι. The line would then mean that Empedocles is asking the Muse
to hear from her the things which are lawful for mortals to apprehend63. Alternatively, as
proposed  by  Bollack,  ἄντομαι  can  be  construed  with  two  objects,  namely  the  se
62 Cf. Chapter 3, pp. 90-91.
63 Cf. Karsten: “precor, quantum fas sit mortalibus, ex te audire”; Burnet: “And thee, much-wooed, white-
armed Virgin Muse, do I beseech that I may hear what is lawful for the children of a day!” 
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indicating the Muse (line 3), and an omitted demonstrative tauta generically referring to
“things” whose characteristics are then specified by the relative clause introduced by
hōn. Bollack's reading is based on a parallel construction of the verb lissomai, which, in
tragedy, is a synonym of ἄντομαι. As Bollack figures it, the line would thus translate as:
“I come to you for the words that the Law allows men to hear”64. In both cases, line 5
would be an independent sentence in which harma is the object of the verb pempe. As a
consequence, Bollack, following Karsten, reads para elaousa as a tmesis, and thus takes
the genitive Εὐσεβίης as indicating the owner of the chariot which the Muse is asked to
conduct  to  Empedocles65.  By  contrast,  Burnet  considers  the  phrase  par'eusebiē  as
indicating the starting point of the Muse's journey by chariot and takes Empedocles as
the object of pempe. He thus translates the line as follows: “Speed me on my way from
the abode of Holiness and drive my willing car!”. 
Although possible, the above readings of lines 4-5 demand further additions and
integrations on the part of interpreters which, in fact, are not necessary. Actually, the
lines can be plausibly construed even by keeping the punctuation adopted by Diels-
Kranz. To start  with line  4,  it  must  be noticed that,  although  antomai  can take the
infinitive66,  the  dependent  verb indicates  the  action  which  the  person  to  whom the
prayer is addressed is asked to do. But, of course, it is hard to believe that the Muse is
entreated to hear what is lawful for mortals67. As regards Bollack's reading, there is no
need, I argue, to consider antomai as a synonym of lissomai, as happens in tragedy. For,
besides  the  fact  that  Empedocles  could  have  used  lissomai,  which is  metrically
64 Cf.  Bollack's  French  translation:  “je  viens  à toi  pour  les  mots  que  la  Loi  permet  aux  hommes
d'entendre”.
65 Cf. Karsten: “Age, vehe mihi agilem religionis currum!”; Bollack: “Mène le char d'Eusébie, guide-le,
docile aux rênes”; Gallavotti: “[...] guidando avanti il carro ben governato dell'amore devoto”.
66 Pace Wright: cf.  Aristophanes  Th. 977-980:  Ἑρμῆν τε νόμιον ἄντομαι/ καὶ Πᾶνα καὶ Νύμφας φίλας/
ἐπιγελάσαι προθύμως /ταῖς ἡμετέραισι/χαρέντα χορείαις.
67 This explains why Karsten has to supply a “ex te” which, in fact, is not in the Greek text. Burnet's
rendering “I beseech that I may hear” would require a verb in the subjunctive or optative, not infinitive
(cf. E. Heracl. 226). 
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equivalent to ἄντομαι, a rapid overview of the occurrences of antomai in dramatic texts
is sufficient to notice that the verb is most frequently accompanied by a verbal form in
the imperative68. Thus, given the presence of the imperative pempe at line 5, it is more
natural to consider lines 4 and 5 as not independent, and to take the verb as specifying
the action which the Muse is asked to perform. 
On the basis of this construal, the lines can be read in two ways, depending on
which object one assigns to pempe. On the one hand, (a) the object of pempe can be the
omitted tauta before the relative clause. In this case,  harma would depend on elaousa
and the lines would read as follows: “I pray you, escort the things which it is lawful for
mortal to hear, driving the well-reined chariot from the halls of Piety”. On the other
hand, (b) the phrase can be construed by taking  harma  as the object of  pempe.  The
relative clause would then depend on harma69, and the lines would translate as: “I pray
you, escort the well-reined chariot of the things which it is lawful for mortals to hear,
driving  from  the  halls  of  Piety”.  Before  continuing  with  the  discussion  of  these
alternative readings,  I  want  to  draw the attention on two aspects  of  the translations
which I have proposed. First, I have taken the genitive Eusebiēs as depending on para.
The construction para + genitive is frequent in Homer and, indeed, there is no need to
introduce another female divinity to make sense of the passage, as in Archaic poetry the
poetic chariot traditionally belongs to the Muse70. Empedocles' request to the Muse to
drive the chariot from the halls of Piety then should be read as a way of further stressing
the pious character of his work, after the prayer to the gods to grant purity to his song.
Indeed, both phrases ek hosiōn stomatōn and par'Eusebiēs metaphorically indicate the
religious framework of Empedocles' teachings71. The second point regards the meaning
68 E.g.: S. OC. 250; E. Med. 709, Andr. 921, Supp. 278; A.Th.1155.
69 Cf. Cerri 2004, p. 89. For the image of the chariot of song, cf. Pindar Fr. 124a*-b.1.
70 Against the idea of Piety's chariot, see further Wright 1981, p. 158; Calzolari 1984, p. 79 n. 25; Obbink
1993, pp. 62-63.
71 On this point, see also Nünlist 1998, p. 259. 
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of  pempe, which I have translated as ʻescortʼ (or  ʻconductʼ), while most of scholars,
interpreting  the  lines  along  (a),  translate  ʻsendʼ and  thus  render  the  passage  in  the
following way: “I pray you, send [to me] the things which is lawful for mortals to hear,
driving the well-reined chariot from the halls of Piety”72. By contrast, I argue, ʻescortʼ
appears to be more appropriate in this context. First, if we consider the usage of pempō
in epic poetry, while the verb is frequently used to indicate the action of sending, when
divine  agents  are  involved  it  often  refers  to  the  action  of  escorting/conducting,  in
particular, mortals to some destination73. Furthermore, it would be otiose if the Muse
were to be asked to send to Empedocles the things which can be heard by mortals, an
action which implies separation between the thing sent and the sender, but at the same
time  to  drive  her  chariot  in  the  same  direction.  Surely,  she  could  more  easily
bring/escort them with her.
In the  light  of  these  considerations,  I  tend to  prefer  option (b)  and interpret
Empedocles'  prayer  as  a  request  to  the  Muse to  escort  the  poetic  chariot  which  he
metaphorically mounts to expound his teachings. As I have illustrated in the chapter on
Parmenides, the image of the chariot was traditionally employed by poets as a metaphor
of their art74. Indeed, my reading of the passage is even more plausible if we notice that
it actually contains an allusion to Parmenides' proem: there, Parmenides employs twice
the verb pempō to indicate the escorting of his chariot by the mares and the daughters of
the Sun75. In addition, when the goddess welcomes Parmenides, she tells him that he has
come there under the aegis of  themis. Significantly, as in the case of Parmenides, the
fact that the Muse is asked to escort Empedocles' on his poetic chariot-journey implies
the poet's active role in the poetic performance. Thus, Empedocles is not just a passive
72 E.g. Trépanier 2004, Inwood 2001, Wright 1981.
73 E.g. Od. 4.586; 5.25; 11.626.
74 Cf. Chapter 3, p. 86.
75 Cf. DK 28 B1.1-2 and 8.
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recipient  of  the  Muse's  inspiration,  as  involved by translating  pempō  as  ʻsendʼ,  but
rather possesses a certain degree of autonomy76.
Such interpretation is further supported by another passage in which Empedocles
invokes the Muse for assistance. The text runs as follows:
   εἰ γὰρ ἐφημερίων ἕνεκέν τινος, ἄμβροτε Μοῦσα, 
   ἡμετέρας μελέτας <ἅδε τοι> διὰ φροντίδος ἐλθεῖν,
   εὐχομένωι νῦν αὖτε παρίστασο, Καλλιόπεια,
   ἀμφὶ θεῶν μακάρων ἀγαθὸν λόγον ἐμφαίνοντι77.
   
   For if, immortal Muse, for the sake of any ephemeral creature,
   <it has pleased you> to let our concerns pass through your thought,
   then stand now once again beside one who prays to you, Calliope,
   as he reveals a good discourse about the blessed gods78.
                                                                                  DK 31 B13179   
In the passage, Empedocles appeals again to his Muse, here named as Calliope80, to aid
him in his poetic task. The way in which the invocation is formulated emphasizes, I
argue, Empedocles' active role in poetic composition: Calliope is asked to stand beside
him (paristaso) as he reveals (emphainonti) his discourse about the gods81. In Archaic
poetry, when the verb paristēmi is employed with reference to divine agents, it indicates
76 It  is worth noticing that the same considerations hold even if one construes lines 4-5 according to
alternative (a). In that case, Empedocles would be asking the Muse to escort his poem (about the things
which mortals can hear) towards the audience (for an eloquent poetic parallel, cf. Od. 6.251-322, where
Nausicaa escorts Odysseus to Scheria on board of her chariot), thus implying that he is not just a passive
spokesman of the Muse. Interestingly, the symbolism associated to a female figure escorting a chariot was
exploited by Peisistratus, who, in order to legitimate his power, entered Athens on a chariot escorted by a
woman dressed as Athena (cf. Hdt. 1.60).
77 The text is the result of various scholarly emendations. For an analysis of the major issues, see Wright
1981, p. 159, Gallavotti 1975, pp. 161-164.
78 Tr. after Inwood with modification (see Most 2007, p. 291).
79 Diels assigned the fragment to the Katharmoi, because he identified the tis of line 1 with Pausanias and
thereby interpreted the passage as a reference to On Nature. However, as persuasively argued by Wright
and Obbink, the appeal to the Muse's past assistance should be read as an hypothetical event, deprived of
any historical dimension specification, as traditionally happens in the hymnoi klētikoi, on which fragment
B131 is modelled (cf. Wright 1981, p. 159; Obbink 1993, p. 59-61; on the  hymnoi klētikoi, see further
Page 1975 and Lloyd-Jones 1963, pp. 83-84). The attribution to On Nature is further supported by the fact
that Hippolytus cites the fragment amid the discussion of the role of Love and Strife as cosmological
principles (on this point, cf. Palmer 2013, p. 312, n. 4).
80 The identification of Calliope with the Muse mentioned in B3 is corroborated by a passage from
Bacchylides' fifth epinician which presents striking parallels with Empedocles' fragment. To mark the
transition between two parts of the ode, Bacchylides metaphorically invites Calliope, the “white-armed”,
to  stop  her  well-made  chariot: λευκώλενε  Καλλιόπα,  στᾶσον  εὐποίητον  ἅρμα  αὐτοῦ,  “white-armed
Calliope, stop the well-made chariot right here” (B. 5.176-178).
81 The gods in question are most probably the basic constituent of the cosmos, namely the four roots and
Love and Strife, to which Empedocles attributes divine features, cf. Gallavotti 1975, pp. 163-164; Wright
loc. cit.; Obbink 1993, p. 59, n.19, Palmer loc. cit. On the divinity of the elements, see further below.
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the gods' standing beside mortals so as to offer them help by action or speech82. The
god's/goddess's  assistance  usually  configures  as  a  sort  of  alliance,  in  which  human
beings actively contribute to the development of events83. The same consideration holds
in  the  case  of  poetic  activity,  as  emerging  from Pindar's  third  Olympian,  in  which
paristēmi  is  employed  to  describe  the  Muse's  intervention,  in  a  way which  closely
resembles that of B131:
       Μοῖσα δ᾽ οὕτω ποι παρέ-
       στα μοι νεοσίγαλον εὑρόντι τρόπον 
       Δωρίῳ φωνὰν ἐναρμόξαι πεδίλῳ 
       ἀγλαόκωμον.
      The Muse thus stood beside me
       as I discovered a brilliant new way
       to fit my voice of glorious celebration to the Dorian measure84.           
                                                                             Pi. O. 3.4-6
Pindar stresses his active role in the composition of the ode in honour of Theron of
Acragas,  as  his  poetic  achievement  is  presented  as  the  product  of  a  collaboration
between him and the Muse85. In other words, by standing beside him, the Muse grants to
Pindar her favour and help, so that he can find a new way of celebrating Theron through
his song. Similarly, Empedocles invokes the Muse to receive her assistance while  he
expounds his account about the gods. Even in this case, then, Empedocles stresses that
he  is  not  just  a  passive  intermediary  between  the  divinity  and  human  beings,  but
actively participates in the poetic process86.
82 E.g.: Il. 10.279, 10.291, 18.70, 23.783; Od. 2.284, 3.222, 8.10, 13.301.
83 The most eloquent examples are provided by Athena's frequent interventions to help Odysseus: e.g. Od.
16.455, 18.70, 24.368.
84 Tr. Verity, with modifications.
85 On this point, cf. De Sanctis 2007, p. 15.
86 Empedocles  is  thus  part  of  that  gradual  process  of  increasing  autonomy from  the  Muse  which
characterized the poetic production at the end of the Archaic age, as emerging, for example, from the
works by Pindar and Simonides. On the modifications to the relationship between poet and the Muse, see
further:  Accame 1964;  Arrighetti  1983;  Ledbetter  2003,  pp.  62-77  (on  Pindar).  Another  instance  of
Empedocles' active poetic role is provided by his use of the verb exocheteuō (ʻdraw offʼ) to indicate his
transition from a part of his account to another (B35.2: λόγου λόγον ἐξοχετεύων). The image implies that
Empedocles can direct as he wishes the stream of song which the gods had channelled through his mouth.
On the pouring and channelling of water as conveying the idea of poetic autonomy, see further Nünlist
1998, p. 180.
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It is worth noticing that, besides emphasizing Empedocles' active role as poet,
fragment B131 contains allusions to his poetic and philosophical predecessors. First of
all, the prominent role of Calliope could not but remind the audience of Hesiod, who, in
the  Theogony, describes the goddess as the greatest of all Muses, as she attends both
poets and kings87. Indeed, exactly like Hesiod, even Empedocles declares his intention
to provide an account concerning the gods88. But in addition to Hesiod, Empedocles'
characterization of his  poem (or part  of it)  as a  logos amphi theōn entails  a further
allusion to Xenophanes and Parmenides, who both employ the preposition amphi with
reference to the topics of their poetry. In fact, Xenophanes' fragment B34 contains the
only other  extant occurrence in Archaic poetry of the phrase  amphi theōn,  while in
Parmenides' poem the deduction of the attributes of Being is described by the goddess
as a logos and thought amphis alētheiēs89. Once again, then, through a stratified system
of allusions, Empedocles indicates his poetic predecessors and rivals, with whom he
competes to ultimately demonstrate his superiority. 
As emerges  from the the foregoing analysis,  the invocations  to  the  Muse in
fragments B3 and B131 reveal Empedocles' self-confidence in his status as a poet, both
by stressing his primacy over competitors and his special relationship with the Muse,
which configures as an alliance to which he actively contributes. Still, what remains to
determine is why Empedocles can be so sure about his outstanding abilities and the
reliability of the Muse's assistance. In fact, since Hesiod, divine inspiration had been
marked by unsolvable ambiguity, and, as shown above, even Empedocles appears to
admit that the Muse can deceive. As I will argue in the next section, Empedocles' unique
response to this question lies in his self-presentation as a god.
87 See Chapter 2, pp. 105-106.
88 On the allusions to Hesiod contained in the passage, see further Most, who points out the unusual
concentration of Hesiodic language in the lines (cf. Most 2007, pp. 291-292). Most also argues that the
unnamed tis is, in fact, Hesiod, but see my considerations above. Gallavotti thinks that the allusion is not
only to Hesiod, but also to Xenophanes and Parmenides (cf. 1975, p. 162-163).
89  Cf. De Sanctis 14, n. 13; Wright 1981, p. 159.
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4.3 – Empedocles' divine knowledge
Empedocles' alleged divine status has been the object of intense scholarly debate. The
issue  is  further  complicated  by  its  being  connected  to  the  question  regarding  the
existence of one or two poems. The main problem stems from Empedocles' apparently
contradictory description as a god and a daimōn in fragments B112 and B115, usually
attributed to the Katharmoi:
   ὦ φίλοι, οἳ μέγα ἄστυ κατὰ ξανθοῦ Ἀκράγαντος 
   ναίετ᾽ ἀν᾽ ἄκρα πόλεος, ἀγαθῶν μελεδήμονες ἔργων,
   <ξείνων αἰδοῖοι λιμένες, κακότητος ἄπειροι,>
   χαίρετ᾽· ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός
   πωλεῦμαι μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος, ὥσπερ ἔοικα,  
   ταινίαις τε περίστεπτος στέφεσίν τε θαλείοις. 
   O friends, who dwell in the great city of the yellow Acragas,
    up in the high parts of the city, concerned with good deeds,
   <respectful harbours for strangers, untried by evil,>90
   hail! I, in your eyes a deathless god, no longer mortal,
   go among all, honoured, just as I seem:
   wreathed with ribbons and festive garlands91.
                                                            DK 31 B112.1-5
   τῶν92 καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης,
   νείκεϊ μαινομένωι πίσυνος.   
   I too am now one of these [i.e. daimones], an exile from the gods and a wanderer,
   trusting in mad strife93.
                                      DK 31 B115.13-14
According to ancient testimonies, both fragments have a proemial character: Diogenes
Laertius tells us that B112 was the very opening of the  Katharmoi94,  while Plutarch
90 The line is reported separately by Diodorus (13.38.2) as a description of the Acragantines, but inserted
here by Sturz and later editors. In his reconstruction of the Katharmoi, Zuntz places the line later in the
poem (cf. Zuntz 1971, pp. 187-189). For a discussion of the issue, see Wright 1981, pp. 265-266.
91 Tr. Inwood.
92 Zuntz argues in favour of Plutarch's reading (On Exile, 607c) τὴν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἶμι φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ
ἀλήτης and translates “this way I am myself now going” (cf. Zuntz 1971, pp. 198-199). For a criticism of
this construal, see Wright 1981, p. 275. Gallavotti reads τῇ instead of τῶν and translates: “in this way/for
this reason I am an exile [etc.]”.
93 Tr. Inwood.
94 Cf. D. L. 8.54: Ὅτι δ᾽ ἦν Ἀκραγαντῖνος ἐκ Σικελίας, αὐτὸς ἐναρχόμενος τῶν Καθαρμῶν φησιν, “That
he  [sc.  Empedocles]  was  a  citizen  of  Acragas  in  Sicily  he  himself  says  at  the  beginning  of  the
Purifications” (tr. Inwood).
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ascribes B115 to the prefatory part of Empedocles' philosophy95. While in Diels' edition,
the  attribution of  B115 to  the  Katharmoi  and his  position  after  B112 were deemed
necessary to  explain  Empedocles'  bold  claim to  divinity,  such assumption  has  been
revised and criticized by later scholars96. In 1975, van der Ben proposed a reconstruction
of the proem of On Nature and considered B115 as the opening of the poem. Van der
Ben's  argument  in  support  of  his  hypothesis  is  mainly  based  on  the  following
considerations: a) according to ancient evidence, Diels' thematic division between On
Nature  and the  Katharmoi  (i.e. natural philosophy versus religion) is unwarranted; b)
Simplicius and Hippolytus quote the passage in the course of their discussion of  On
Nature; c) in B112, Empedocles is not claiming to be actually a god, but rather he is
describing, with a tinge of irony, the way in which people see and honour him 97. Some
years later,  Sedley pointed out the contradiction between Empedocles'  description of
himself as an “immortal god, no longer mortal” (θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός) in B112
and as  a  daimōn, banned from the gods because guilty of a blood crime perpetrated
under the influence of Strife98. In order to solve this apparent clash, Sedley resorted to
what might be called a “biographical/developmental” hypothesis, according to which
the fragments relate to two different moments of Empedocles'  cycle of incarnations.
Thus, fragment B115, in which he claims to be a daimōn, would belong to On Nature,
chronologically anterior to the Katharmoi composed when he had already completed his
apotheosis99.  An  important  contribution  to  the  debate  came from the  discovery  and
95 Cf.  Plut.  On Exile, 607c.6:  Ἐμπεδοκλῆς  ἐν  ἀρχῇ  τῆς  φιλοσοφίας  προαναφωνήσας,  “Empedocles,
making a proclamation as a prelude at the beginning of his philosophy [quotation of B115 follows]” (tr.
Inwood with modification).  On the meaning of  προαναφωνέω in Plutarch's passage, see van der Ben
1975, pp. 16-20; Wright 1981, pp. 270-272; Trépanier 2004, pp. 11-12.
96 Of course, I am here referring to scholars who argue for the existence of two poems. Noticeably, the
proemial position and the relative order of the fragments (i.e. B115 after B112) has been maintained even
by the proponents of the single-work hypothesis (cf. Inwood 2001 and Trépanier 2004).
97 Cf. van der Ben 1975, pp. 16-26. For a criticism of van der Ben, see Panagiotou 1983, pp. 278-285. The
attribution of B115 to the opening of  On Nature had been already proposed by Karsten in his edition of
the fragments.
98 Cf. B115.3. On the textual problems of the line and the daimōn's crime, see further Wright 1981, pp.
270-271; van der Ben 1975, pp. 130-131; Zuntz 1971, p. 196. 
99  Cf. Sedley 1989, pp. 275-276. For a criticism of Sedley's position, see Palmer 2013, pp. 310-311.
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publication  of  the  Strasbourg  Papyrus,  which  provided  evidence  of  how  religious
themes connected to Empedocles' demonology were mingled with cosmological themes
and thus buttressed the idea that B115 could belong to On Nature100. 
By contrast, proponents of the single poem hypothesis do not consider B112 and
B115 as presenting two contradictory claims. Inwood and Trépanier, for example, while
acknowledging  the  ambiguity of  Empedocles'  self-declaration  of  divinity,  take  it  as
genuine and reconcile the apparent incompatibility by arguing that Empedocles asserts
his divinity because he is confident about his next reincarnation as a divine being101.
Indeed,  even  those  who  believe  in  the  existence  of  two  poems  and  assign  both
fragments to the Katharmoi, like Zuntz and Wright, explain Empedocles' claim to be a
god  as  a  manifestation  of  his  certainty  in  his  imminent  (or  already  complete)
apotheosis102.  According to  a  more  deflationary view,  the  contradiction  between the
fragments can be easily solved by interpreting B112 as not containing a claim to actual
divinity. As mentioned above, van der Ben was among the first to advance doubts about
Empedocles'  self-proclaimed  divinity,  although  he  argued  that  only  to  support  his
attribution of B115 to On Nature. Similarly, in his edition of the fragments, Gallavotti
reads  B112 as  simply asserting that  Empedocles  looks like a  god103.  More recently,
Palmer has  argued against  the  idea that  Empedocles  is  actually claiming his  divine
status by stressing how it would have been impossible for him to become a god while
still in his current incarnation104.
100 On this point, see Sassi 2009, pp. 234-235; Gemelli Marciano 2002, pp. 106-107; Curd 2001, p. 31;
Martin and Primavesi 1999, pp. 113-114. Contra Bollack 2001, p. 175 and O'Brien 2001.
101 Cf. Inwood 2001, pp. 57-58 and 61; Trepanier 2004, p. 73-74 and 79-86. Stehle does not take position
as regards the number of poems, but argues for actual divinity (cf. Stehle 2005, pp. 267-280).  
102 Cf. Zuntz 1971, pp. 189-191; Wright 1981, p. 266.
103 Cf. Gallavotti 1975, pp. 266-267.
104 Cf. Palmer 2013, pp. 311-312 and passim. As a consequence, Palmer argues that the god mentioned in
fragment DK 31 B23.9-11 (“But know these things clearly, as you have heard the tale from a god (para
theou)”) is not Empedocles, but Calliope. That Empedocles is referring to the Muse had already been
maintained, for example, by Wright (1981, p. 181) and Obbink (1994, pp. 63-64), but Palmer goes a step
further, as he argues that in this and other fragments the speaker is Calliope herself (Palmer 2013, p. 312
and passim). Even though I cannot address extensively all the issues related to this point, I cannot agree
with  Palmer's  interpretation  for  the  following  reasons:  1)  as  shown  above,  Empedocles  repeatedly
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As a matter of fact, it is difficult to solve definitively all the issues related to
Empedocles' statements in B112 and B115. Indeed, the evidence in our possession is
hardly decisive and any proposed solution must be inevitably based on some degree of
speculation. In what follows, I will advance some considerations about the fragments
which hold regardless of the solution adopted. In particular, I will focus on the role
which Empedocles' declarations play in his strategy against his poetic and philosophical
rivals. For, I argue, B112 and B115 were both conceived for providing an authoritative
framework to Empedocles' poetry and thereby to convince the audience of its reliability,
in a way similar to Hesiod's or Parmenides' self-presentations in the proems to their
works.  To  start  with  B115,  the  fact  of  being  a  daimōn who  underwent  a  cycle  of
incarnations  renders  Empedocles  a  direct  witness  of  the  continuous  interchange  of
living  beings  generated  by  the  mixing  and  separation  of  the  elements  which  he
illustrates in his poem105. In this regard, it is worth noticing that the description of the
daimōn's  wandering  in  B115  alludes  to  the  interactions  between  the  four  roots106.
Physical doctrine and religious concerns are thus combined in an account about the
functioning and ordering of the cosmos which Empedocles, as a daimōn, experienced in
person.
emphasizes his active poetic role, and he explicitly tells us that he is going to reveal a discourse about the
gods (cf. section 3.2); 2) even if we accept Palmer's idea that Empedocles is a daimōn and not a god, he
still might have referred to himself as a theos, that is, a divine being. Indeed, Empedocles does not appear
to draw a rigid distinction between daimones and theoi, as emerges from fragment B59, where he calls the
divine roots daimones (on this point, see Rangos 2012, p. 327); 3) as I am going to argue, Empedocles'
claims to divinity should be taken as genuine, especially considering their “advertising” function (see
below). For the reading of theos as a reference to Empedocles himself, see Inwood (2001, p. 57 n. 127),
Trépanier (2004, pp. 37-38, 49 and passim), and Edwards 1991, p. 288 n. 20.
105 In fragment B117 Empedocles provides instances of his previous lives: “For I have already become a
boy and a girl/ and a bush and a bird and a fish from the sea” (tr. Inwood). The nature of the daimōn's
knowledge of past lives is subject to debate. Wright argues that Empedocles does not actually remember
his previous lives, but that he only inferred them (cf. Wright 1981, p. 276). However, as Inwood notices,
it  is  more  plausible  to  think  that  Empedocles  remembered  his  previous  incarnations,  especially
considering that  the  daimōn's  continuous awareness of his condition would render more effective his
punishment and thus urge him on the path of expiation (cf. Inwood 2001, p. 59). On this point, see also
Sassi 2009, p. 197, n. 66.
106 Cf. B115.9-12: “For the strength of aither pursues them [i.e. daimones] into the sea,/and the sea spits
[them] onto the surface of the earth and earth into the beams/of the blazing sun, and it throws [them] into
the eddies of the air;/ and one after another receives [them], but all hate [them].” (tr. Inwood, modified).
On this point, see Wright 1981, pp. 274-275; Trépanier 2004, pp. 32-33.
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As regards Empedocles' claim to be a god, contrary to the deflationary reading
of B112 proposed by some scholars (i.e. Empedocles is only describing how he is seen
by people), I tend to take his profession of divinity as genuine.  First,  as noticed by
Zuntz, if people had already considered Empedocles as a god, to tell them what they
already believed would have been trivial and practically useless107. In fact, it is crucial to
notice that Empedocles does not simply affirm that he is an immortal god, but specifies
that he is “no longer mortal” (οὐκέτι θνητός)108.  Since such a qualification could be
properly  understood  only  within  the  context  of  Empedocles'  doctrine  of  the  fallen
daimōn and his redemption through a cycle of incarnations and purifications, it is hard
to believe that Empedocles was just reporting the opinion of common men who, before
listening to his teachings, could not have an idea of such a truth. Rather,  I suggest,
Empedocles'  claim  served  precisely  as  a  powerful  introduction  to  his  purificatory
precepts and his doctrine of salvation. Indeed, the fact that Empedocles is a god, “no
longer  mortal”  means that  he has  already completed the purificatory path owing to
which  he  will  not  incarnate  again  in  mortal  forms109.  Thus,  in  his  own  person,
Empedocles  provides  his  audience  with  a  living  example  of  how a  pious  and pure
conduct can eventually lead to divinity. 
As part of his advertising strategy, Empedocles is keen to present his teachings
as important to the process of approximation to divinity. For, as eloquently illustrated by
Empedocles'  repeated addresses to Pausanias, the development of cognitive faculties
and  the  consequent  increase  of  knowledge  attainable  by  means  of  his  doctrine  are
closely related to the process of personal improvement. In fragment B110, for example,
Empedocles  invites  Pausanias  to  thrust  his  teachings  into  his  thinking  organs
107 Cf. Zuntz 1971, p. 190.
108 DK 31 B112.4.
109Cf. fragment DK 31 B113, in which Empedocles stresses his difference from other human beings, who
are bound to incarnate multiple times: “But why do I press on these points, as though doing some great
thing, if I am better than men who are destroyed many times (πολυφθερέων ἀνθρώπων)? (tr. Inwood)”.
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(prapides)110 and to gaze on them with pure meditations (katharai melētai), so that they
will continually grow and improve over time. At the same time, Pausanias is warned
against the negative influence of common men's blunt mediations which may hinder his
progression  towards  wisdom111.  Significantly,  the  fact  that  the  attitude  which
Empedocles urges Pausanias to have towards his doctrine should be informed by the
same purity which he ascribes to his poetic account serves to emphasize the importance
of Empedocles'  logos  to the process of personal purification. The connection between
increase of knowledge and improvement  of personal condition is  further  stressed in
fragment B132:
     ὄλβιος, ὃς θείων πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον,
     δειλὸς δ᾽, ὧι σκοτόεσσα θεῶν πέρι δόξα μέμηλεν. 
 
     Blessed is he who has gained the wealth of divine understanding,
     wretched he who cherishes a dark opinion about the gods112. 
                                                                                DK 31 B132
The  couplet  presents  men's  blessedness  and  wretchedness  as  related  to  knowledge.
While  the man who possesses  divine understanding is  blessed,  the one who has  an
obscure opinion about the gods is bound to be wretched. Given the parallel structure of
the  verses,  the  phrase  “divine  understanding”  acquires  deeper  significance  when
compared with the second line. Actually, the contrast between the two different states
makes sense only if to have divine understanding implies the possession of knowledge
110 The term prapides  indicates an organ whose functions include intellectual, emotional and volitional
aspects. In Empedocles, it indicates a cognitive act whereby we can mentally embrace and visualize the
object  of  apprehension  (cf.  fragment  B129  discussed  below).  On  prapides,  see  further  Macris  and
Skarsouli 2012, pp. 363-368.
111 Cf. DK 31 B110: “For if, thrusting them deep in your crowded thinking organs,/ you gaze on them in
kindly fashion, with pure meditations,/ absolutely all these things will be with you throughout your life,/
and from these you will  acquire many others; for these things themselves/  will expand to form each
character, according to the growth of each./ But if you reach out for different things, such as/ the ten
thousand wretched things which are among men and blunt their meditations,/ truly they will abandon you
quickly, as time circles round,/ desiring to arrive at their own dear kind. For know that all have thought
and a share of understanding” (tr. Inwood).
112 Tr. Wright with modifications.
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about the gods113. In the light of the divine status of the four roots and Love and Strife114,
knowledge about the gods encompasses the correct apprehension of the interactions of
the  constitutive  elements  of  reality  which  generate  the  cosmos.  Significantly,  this
understanding  grants  to  the  person  who  possesses  it  a  kind  of  knowledge  which
traditionally was deemed to belong exclusively to the gods or to divine men, such as
seers and prophets,  as eloquently shown by the so-called “zoogonic formula” which
Empedocles repeatedly employs to indicate the generation of living beings from the
mixing and separation of the elements caused by Love and Strife: ἐκ τούτων γὰρ πάνθ᾽
ὅσα τ᾽ ἦν ὅσα τ᾽ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται […] ἐβλάστησε (“for out of these all that was, that is,
and will be has blossomed”)115. The formula is fashioned along the lines of traditional
descriptions of divine knowledge, such as that of the Muses in the  Theogony and of
Chalcas in the  Iliad116. Noticeably, knowledge of the past, present and future does not
simply relate  to  events,  as in the case of prophets,  but rather to the generation and
destruction  of  living  beings  according  to  the  cosmic  law of  mixing  and  separation
operated by Love and Strife117.  Empedocles'  account thus provides  a comprehensive
view of the universe in which the destiny of individuals finds its place and explication,
and thereby contributes to the development and improvement of those who apprehend
and follow it. 
113 On this passage, see further Rangos 2012, pp. 330-331. Empedocles appears here to appropriate the
rigid distinction between opinion and knowledge/truth which we found in Xenophanes and Parmenides.
Indeed,  B132 features an echo of Xenophanes' distinction between  doxa  and  saphēneia  concerning the
gods in B34 (cf. Chapter 2, pp. 74-75)
114 The roots are attributed names of traditional divinities in B6, B96 and B98. Similarly, Love: e.g in
B71.4, B73.1, B95. Strife is nowhere called with divine names or referred to as a god, but some fragments
appear to allude to Strife's divine status (e.g B128 and B122.3). On this point, see further Rangos 2012,
pp. 319-321.
115 DK 31 B21.13-14 (tr. Trépanier). The formula is also employed, with variants, at B23.5 and ensemble
a (i) 8-a (ii) 2. It is actually debated whether the genitive plural demonstrative refers to the elements only,
or also to Love and Strife. However, the issue does not directly affect my argumentation. For a discussion
of the formula and related issues, see Trépanier 2003, p. 33-34.
116 Cf. Hom. Il. 1.70; Hes. Th. 38. It is worth noticing that, while Hesiod sung only the past and the future
(cf. Th. 32), Empedocles' poetry explicitly includes the present. 
117 Cf. DK 31 B17.7-8, 16-17; B20.3; B26.5-6.
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The correlation between knowledge and divinity is further emphasized by the
fact  that  Empedocles  characterizes  the  mortal  condition  as  essentially  marked  by
epistemic limitedness. First, mortals are referred to as “ephemeral”, a term which does
not simply indicate men's short lifespan, but, more significantly, the fact that human
knowledge  is  inevitably restricted  to  what  men experience  each  day118.  In  addition,
Empedocles repeatedly scorns human beings because they mistakenly take as complete
the partial view of reality which they acquire during their brief lives119. By contrast, the
distinctive  mark  of  knowledge  consists  exactly  in  the  capacity  of  transcending  the
boundaries of mortal life, as emerges from the description of the exceptional capacities
of the unnamed man of fragment B129: 
                ἦν δέ τις ἐν κείνοισιν ἀνὴρ περιώσια εἰδώς,
                 ὃς δὴ μήκιστον πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον, 
                 παντοίων τε μάλιστα σοφῶν <τ᾽> ἐπιήρανος ἔργων·
                 ὁππότε γὰρ πάσηισιν ὀρέξαιτο πραπίδεσσιν, 
                 ῥεῖ᾽ ὅ γε τῶν ὄντων πάντων λεύσσεσκεν ἕκαστον
                 καί τε δέκ᾽ ἀνθρώπων καί τ᾽ εἴκοσιν αἰώνεσσιν. 
                 There was among them a man of exceptional knowledge,
                 who indeed obtained the greatest wealth of understanding,
                 master of all kinds of particularly wise deeds,
                 for whenever he reached out with all his understanding,               
                 he easily saw each of all the things which are
                 in ten or twenty human lifetimes120.
                                                                                   DK 31 B129
The fragment is preserved by Porphyry, Iamblichus and Digenes Laertius, who tell us
that Empedocles wrote it as a praise of Pythagoras121. Diogenes says that he derived the
information from Timaeus of Tauromenium, according to whom Empedocles had been a
pupil  of  Pythagoras122,  and  it  is  probable  that  even  the  accounts  of  Porphyry  and
118 On this point, see further Sassi 2009, pp. 209-210. 
119 Cf. DK 31 B2; B59. An eloquent example of such an error is provided by mortals' beliefs concerning
generation and destruction, which are considered as implying the existence of What-Is-Not (cf. DK 31
B11; B15).
120 Tr. Inwood with modifications.
121 See, respectively, Porph. VP 30, Iamb. VP  67, D.L. VIII 54.
122 Cf. D. L. 8.54 (= FgrH 566 F 14 Jacoby).
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Iamblichus ultimately rested on the authority of the Sicilian historian123. Since Diogenes
adds that others took the lines as referring to Parmenides, we may infer that Empedocles
did  not  explicitly  name  the  man,  and  that  the  latter's  identification  with  either
Pythagoras  or  Parmenides  was  due  to  their  influence  on  Empedocles'  thought.  In
particular,  the  sage's  ability  to  embrace  ten  or  twenty generations  of  men  with  his
understanding was easily taken as an allusion to Pythagoras' extensive knowledge and
his capacity of remembering his previous lives. In fact, the text's ambiguity is such that,
while it can accommodate both interpretations, it does not guarantee either of the two124.
However, regardless of the identity of the mysterious tis, Empedocles' description of the
man's  cognitive  abilities  reveals  an  interesting  aspect  which  has  been  generally
overlooked.  Empedocles  says  that  the  sage's  act  of  understanding  consists  in  an
extension of his  prapides, whereby he is able to mentally visualize the “things which
are” (onta) in twenty generations of men. Noticeably, the phrase μήκιστον πραπίδων
ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον is the same as that employed in fragment 132, with the difference
that  there  the  prapides  were  qualified  as  “divine”125.  This  implies  that,  I  argue,
exceptional  as  the  capacities  of  the  mysterious  man  may  have  been,  they  were
nonetheless inferior to those of a god or a man who has acquired divine understanding.
For a divine mind can encompass and see the cosmos in its entire temporal development
without limitations, exactly as Empedocles alleges to be able to do in his poetic account.
Indeed, whoever the mysterious man is, Empedocles is, in fact, superior to him126. 
123 Cf. Macris and Skarsouli 2012, pp. 359-362.
124 For a detailed overview of the textual elements which might have led to think that the fragment alludes
to Parmenides, see Rocca Serra 1987, pp. 269-272.
125 Cf. DK 31 B132.1.
126 Van der Ben correctly observes that it would be hard to think that Empedocles could credit one of his
predecessors of such exceptional mental capacities, given his belief in his superior understanding of the
natural world (cf. van der Ben 1975, p. 182). Van der Ben's remark, however, is based on the assumption
that B129 contains a description of the ideal man endowed with godlike knowledge, while I think that it
portrays  the  capacities  of  someone  who  still  does  not  possess  divine  understanding.  Indeed,  the
superlative “greatest” which qualifies the mysterious man's understanding should be taken as indicating
the maximum extension attainable by a man before becoming a divinity. 
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 As emerges from the foregoing considerations, Empedocles' self-presentation as
a divine being serves to ensure both the truth of his account of the cosmos and the
efficacy of his purificatory teachings. In fact, Empedocles' exceptional epistemic status
and  belief  in  his  own  divinity  also  explain  his  confidence  in  the  reliability  and
superiority of his poetry over that of his rivals. For, differently from his competitors'
partial  accounts,  Empedocles  can  provide  a  logos  which  offers  a  comprehensive
explanation and understanding of the reality in which men live. Significantly, however,
Empedocles' claim to poetic and philosophical primacy over rivals does not involve a
total  rejection  of  their  doctrines.  Rather,  Empedocles  appropriates  some  of  his
predecessors' doctrines and integrates them in his own account. This is the case, for
example,  of  Parmenides'  rejection  of  absolute  generation  and  destruction,  which
Empedocles accepts as a fundamental premise for his system and is presented in terms
which  closely  resembles  Parmenides'  formulation127.  Similarly,  god's  description  in
B134, which denies the divinity anthropomorphic physical traits and represent it as a
“holy  mind”  (phrēn  hierē)  features  Xenophanean  echoes128.  However,  Empedocles'
inclusion of Parmenides' and Xenophanes' ideas in his work does not prevent him from
stressing their inherent limitations. As shown above, Empedocles takes Parmenides as
polemic  target  for  his  rejection  of  change and movement which,  de facto,  rendered
cosmology illusionary, while, in B39, he labels as foolishness the idea that the earth is
infinitely extended endorsed by Xenophanes129. In fact, Empedocles' appropriation of
his predecessors' theories represents a further way of demonstrating his superiority over
them, as he shows that they told just a part of the truth and needed to be integrated in a
wider  and  more  satisfactory  cosmological  account.  Indeed,  as  a  divine  being,
127 Cf. DK 31 B12; B8; see also B17.30-33.
128 Cf. supra, Chapter 2, pp. 69-71.
129 Cf. DK 21 B28: “This upper limit of the earth is seen here a tour feet/ pushing up against the air, but
below goes on without limit” (tr. Lesher).
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Empedocles possesses a comprehensive understanding of reality which allows him to
transcend  the  limits  of  mortal  knowledge  which,  despite  their  insights,  even  his
illustrious predecessors could not overcome.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have analysed different instances of Empedocles' competitive stance
towards  his  poetic  and  philosophical  competitors  and  evaluated  them  against  the
background of his self-professed divinity. 
First, I considered the agonistic implications of the term  stolos  at B17.26 and
argued that it not only conveys a polemic reference to Parmenides, but also to Homeric
and Hesiodic epic. Next, I examined Empedocles' relation with the Muse as emerging
from the invocations of fragments B3 and B131. On the one hand, both passages reveal
that Empedocles is not just a passive recipient of divine inspiration, but rather actively
contributes to the poetic process; on the other hand, the use of the epithet πολυμνήστη in
B3 testifies Empedocles' conviction of the fact that the Muse granted her favour to him
only and, at the same time, that she deceived his poetic predecessors. 
Empedocles'  confidence  in  his  poetic  authority  and,  consequently,  in  his
superiority over rivals finds its ultimate justification in his alleged divine status. For
Empedocles'  divine  understanding  grants  him  a  comprehensive  knowledge  of  the
universe which inevitably outdoes the partial accounts of his competitors. Indeed, by
integrating  the  doctrines  of  his  predecessors  in  his  own  work,  Empedocles  further
emphasizes their inherent limitedness, as they acquire full significance only within the
wider  context  of  his  cosmology.  Thus,  Empedocles  envisages  a  way  to  defeat  his
adversaries  which,  differently  from  the  tradition,  does  not  consist  in  the  simple
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replacement of previous accounts with his own, but, in fact, in their circumscription
under a unified poetic logos which accounts for every aspect of the cosmic life. 
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Chapter 5
Epicharmus and the staging of competition
In this chapter, I evaluate Epicharmus' approach to philosophical and poetic competition
by analysing  the  so-called  “philosophical  fragments”,  which  reveal  his  interest  and
involvement in the intellectual debates of the 5th century BCE. Since there are some
doubts concerning the authenticity of these fragments, before starting the discussion, I
will  provide  a  brief  overview  of  the  issue,  along  with  some  information  about
Epicharmus' life and works.
Little is known about Epicharmus' life, and the testimonies in our possession are
far from being unanimous.  What can be regarded as certain is that he exercised his
activity as comic playwright in Syracuse during the reign of Gelon (491-478 BCE) and
Hiero (478-467 BCE)1. On the basis of this information, and considering ancient reports
on his longevity2, Epicharmus' life has been dated between 528-438 BCE3. He probably
was native of Sicily, of Syracuse itself or of Megara Hyblaea, but the question is subject
to debate4. Later sources associate Epicharmus with Pythagoreanism, as he was said to
have been a follower of Pythagoras, although not belonging to the inner circle of his
disciples5. Indeed, Iamblichus says that Epicharmus' published Pythagorean teachings
1 Marm. Par. 71; Clem. Al. Strom. 1.14.64; Suid. φ 609.
2 Diogenes Laertius (8.78) says that Epicharmus lived 90 years, while according [Ps.]-Lucian (Macr. 25)
he died at the age of 97.
3 Cf.  Rodríguez-Noriega  Guillén  1996,  pp.  ix-x.  On  Epicharmus'  chronology,  see  further Pickard-
Cambridge 1962, pp. 230-232.
4 According to the  Suda (ε 2766), other possible birthplaces of Epicharmus were the Sicanian city of
Crostos, the island of Cos, and Samos (cf. also D.L. 8.78). The testimonies about Cos and Samos are
discarded as later inventions aimed at buttressing Epicharmus' alleged medical expertise (Cos was the seat
of a famous medical school), or his connection to Pythagoras. As to Crostos, the information derives from
On Famous Men  by Neanthes (cf. St. Byz. 382.13), who usually is considered an unreliable source of
information. Baron observes that it  is unclear from Stephanos' text whether Epicharmus was actually
included  in  Neanthes'  book  (cf.  Baron's  commentary  to  fragment  BNJ  84  F13).  Schorn  thinks  that
Epicharmus was included (cf.  Schorn 2007,  p.  144).  On these points,  see further  Rodríguez-Noriega
Guillén 1996, pp. xi-xii; Pickard-Cambridge 1962, pp. 236-237.
5 Cf. Plu. Num. 8.17; D.L. 8.78; and especially, Iambl. VP 266.143: “And Epicharmus became one of the
disciples outside the school, but he was not from the inner circle of men” (tr. Horky).
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under  the  guise  of  comedy  in  order  to  avoid  Hieron's  opposition6.  Despite  doubts
concerning the nature and extent of Epicharmus' relation to Pythagoreanism7,  such a
tradition is significant, as it reflects the tendency, present in the Hellenistic world, of
depicting Epicharmus as a wise man, whose works reveal his active engagement with
the intellectual context in which he operated8. 
As regards his dramatic production, Epicharmus appears to have been a prolific
writer, at least according to later testimonies which ascribe to him a number of comedies
ranging from thirty-six to fifty-two9. Although detailed information about the content
and plot of the comedies is lacking, the titles of Epicharmus' works in our possession
suggest a thematic division in two main groups, i.e. comedies on mythical subjects and
comedies about everyday life10. A reference to the judges of dramatic contests in one of
the extant fragments11 suggests that Epicharmus' comedies might have been performed
in the context of dramatic competitions, on the model of those held in Athens during the
City Dionysia12. Epicharmus' work gained a far-reaching reputation, and he was soon
regarded as an authority in comedy. In fact, Epicharmus was credited, along with his
rival Phormis, with the invention of comedy by Aristotle, as they first provided their
works with plots which replaced previous improvisation13. 
6 Cf. Iambl.  VP 266: “When he [sc. Epicharmus] arrived in Syracuse, he abstained from philosophizing
openly because of Hieron's despotism, but he put the thoughts of the Pythagoreans in metre, and under the
guise of foolery, published the secret teachings of Pythagoras” (tr. Horky).
7 Pickard-Cambridge (1962, p. 235) and Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén (1996, p. xiii) say that Epicharmus'
relation to Pythagoras is chronologically possible, but the fragments do not contain any clear reference to
Pythagorean  doctrines.  Horky  has  recently  argued  that  Epicharmus  was  one  of  the  so-called
“mathematical”  Pythagoreans,  who  made  use  of  the  principles  of  mathematics  in  order  to  provide
demonstrations  in  their  enquiries  about  the  world  (cf.  Horky  2013,  pp.  131-137;  on  mathematical
Pythagoreans, see ibidem, pp. 3-35).
8 An eloquent indication of Epicharmus' fame is provided by the inscription engraved on his statue in
Syracuse, which celebrates his superior wisdom: “If the great shining sun surpasses to some degree/in
some measure the stars, and the sea is mightier than the rivers,/ I say that to the same extent Epicharmus
is superior in wisdom, whom [his] fatherland crowned, this of the Syracusans.”.
9 Cf. Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén 1996, pp. xiv-xv.
10 Cf. Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén 1996, pp. xv-xvi. For a reconstruction of the content of Epicharmus'
comedies, see Pickard-Cambridge 1962, pp. 255-276.
11 Fragment F 316 Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén.
12 On this point, cf.  Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén 1996, p. xiv, with references; Pickard-Cambridge 1962,
pp. 284-285. On the presence of dramatic competitions in Sicily, see further Wilson 2007, pp. 351-366.
13 Cf. Arist.  Po. 1448a30, 1449b5 (for later testimonies, see  Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén 1996, pp. 4-6).
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In addition to his comic production, Epicharmus was considered the author of a
series of works which,  according to the testimony of Diogenes'  Laertius,  dealt  with
natural philosophy, medicine, and gnomic wisdom14. Diogenes' information that these
writings  contained  acrostics  indicating  Epicharmus'  authorship  proves  their
spuriousness, since the practice of including acrostics in literary works is of Hellenistic
character. The inauthenticity of these works makes it plausible to think that Diogenes
refers to the Pseudoepicharmean corpus, whose existence was already known at the end
of the 4th century BCE, as testified from a passage by Athenaeus in which it is reported
that Aristoxenus of Tarentum and Philochorus of Athens (both operating between the 4th
and 3rd century BCE) declared  the  spuriousness  of  the  Politeia,  the  Canon  and the
Maxims, which circulated under the name of Epicharmus15. As in the case of the stories
about  Epicharmus'  relation to Pythagoreanism mentioned above,  Pseudoepicharmean
writings provide an important piece of evidence regarding the playwright's reputation as
a  wise  man16.  Indeed,  their  very  existence  is  a  further  indication  of  the  fact  that
Related to Epicharmus' invention of comedy is the debated issue about his influence on Attic comedy: for
an overview and discussion of the different positions, see Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén 1996, pp. xviii-xix;
Cassio 1985, pp. 39-43; Pickard-Cambridge 1962, pp. 285-288.
14 Cf. D.L. 8.78: “He [sc.  Epicharmus] has left memoirs containing his physical, ethical and medical
doctrines, and he has made marginal notes in most of the memoirs, which clearly show that they were
written by him” (tr. Hicks, with modifications). 
15 Cf. Ath. 14.648d: “The authors of the poems attributed to Epicharmus are familiar with the [word]
hēmina, and the following is said in the work entitled  Cheiron  [...]. Well-known individuals produced
these Pseudepichrmean texts and according to Aristoxenus in Book VIII of the  Civic Laws, the pipe-
player Chrysogonus wrote the one entitled Politeia. Philochorus in his On Prophecy, on the other hand,
claims that Axiopistus, whose family was from either Locris or Sycion, is the author of the Canon and the
Maxims” (tr. Olson 2011, with modifications). The work Cheiron is thought to have been about medicine,
since in myth the centaur Cheiron was famous for his healing art. Kaibel argues for the existence of an
independent poem  On Nature, but this hypothesis is considered as implausible (cf.  Rodríguez-Noriega
Guillén 1996, pp. xxxv-xxxvi; Pickard-Cambridge 1962, p. 240).
16 Significant in this respect is the portrait of Epicharmus emerging from the programmatic statement
contained in the introduction to the  Maxims  of Axiopostus, which has partially survived in a papyrus
dated  between 280-240 B.C.E.  The emphasis  on Epicharmus'  witty maxims and  pieces  of  advice  is
reminiscent of the traditional depiction of wise men, in particular the Seven Sages. The text is as follows
(P. Hibeh 1 = F [356] Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén): “Within this book are many and manifold advices for
you to use towards a friend or foe, while speaking in the courts, or the assembly, towards the rogue or the
gentleman,  towards the  stranger,  towards the  quarrelsome,  the drunkard and  the  vulgar  or  any other
plagues that you can find - for them too there is a sting within my book. Within it too are maxims wise;
obey them, and you will be a cleverer and a better man for all events. You need no lengthy speech, only a
single one of these proverbs; bring round to your subject whichever of them is apt […] I composed this
book of rules to make the world exclaim ʻEpicharmus was a wise man, who uttered many witty sayings of
many kinds in single verses: himself he let us test his skill in brevity of speech as wellʼ” (tr. Page). On the
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intellectual  and  philosophical  speculation  played  a  prominent  role  in  Epicharmus'
comedies17. 
With regard to Epicharmus' philosophical contribution, five18 fragments reported
by Diogenes Laertius are of particular interest, as they provide an example of how the
discussion  of  philosophical  issues  could  have  been  integrated  in  comic  dialogue.
However, as anticipated above, the authenticity of these “philosophical” fragments is
controversial. The major doubts come from the fact that Diogenes quotes the fragment
from the treatise  To Amyntas  by Alcimus, a fourth-century Sicilian historian author of
Sikelika19,  who wrote  his  work with  the explicit  intention  to  demonstrate  that  Plato
plagiarized Epicharmus'  philosophical  ideas.  This  led many scholars  to consider  the
fragments  as  forgeries  by  Alcimus  himself,  which  he  intentionally  composed  to
strengthen his charges against Plato, or as derived from Pseudoepicharmean writings20.
A detailed analysis of the problem is beyond the scope of the present work, but, for the
sake of the following discussion, let it suffice to say that, although the question cannot
be  settled  once  and  for  all,  many scholars  have  advanced  persuasive  arguments  in
favour  of  the  fragments'  authenticity,  which  can  be  thus  summarized:  1)  at  closer
inspection, the fragments do not show clear parallels to Plato's philosophy, which would
be strange if the fragments had been deliberately falsified by Alcimus21; 2) differently
tradition of Epicharmus as a wise man, see further Battezzato 2008, pp. 8-9.
17 On this point, see Álvarez Salas 2007a, p. 125; Cassio 1985, p. 43; Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén 1996,
pp. xxvi-xxvii.
18 Diogenes Laertius actually reports four passages from Alcimus, but the first one was divided in two by
Diels in his edition of the fragments, namely DK 23 B1 and B2. 
19 This according to a shared scholarly consensus. By contrast, the further identification of Alcimus with
the famous rhetorician pupil of Stilpo is debated. Cassio argues that Alcimus probably was a member of
the intellectual circle which gathered around Dionysus II,  political adversary of Dion and Plato, who
promoted a policy aimed at the exaltation of Sicilian patriotism (cf. Cassio 1985, p. 45). The addressee of
Alcimus' work, Amyntas,  was probably Amyntas of Heracleia,  a mathematician pupil of Plato, while
Jacoby thought that he could have been the Amyntas son of Perdicca III of Macedonia and nephew of
Philip. On Alcimus and his work, see further Álvarez Salas 2007c, pp. 27-28; Pickard-Cambridge 1962,
p. 247.
20 A recent example of this interpretative trend is provided by the edition of Epicharmus' fragments by
Kassel and Austin in Poetae Comici Greci, in which the fragments are assigned to the Pseudepicharmeia.
For an overview and discussion of the scholarly debate, see Álvarez Salas 2007c, p. 28 n. 20.
21 Cf.  Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén 2012, p. 89;  Menn 2010, pp. 66-67 (specifically for fragment B2);
Álvarez Salas 2007, p. 28; Pickard-Cambridge 1962, p. 247.
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from the Pseudepicharmeia, the fragments are written in dialogic form22; 3) they display
a parodic intent23; 4) they are written in correct Doric dialect, without artificial or false
forms24;  5)  they  do  not  contain  the  references  to  later  Pythagoreanism  which
characterized the Pseudepicharmeia25.
Working on the hypothesis that the fragments preserved by Alcimus are genuine,
in what follows, I will examine Epicharmus' allusions to contemporary philosophical
speculation contained therein (section 5.1). Then, I will consider Epicharmus' parodic
use of philosophy and evaluate it against the background of the development of rhetoric
in 5th century Sicily (section 5.2). 
5.1 – Epicharmus' philosophical fragments: paradoxes and parodies
Epicharmus'  philosophical  fragments  contain  parodic  allusions  to  contemporary
speculation which reveal an original and critical approach to the intellectual debate of
his time. In this  section,  I  will  evaluate  Epicharmus'  representation of philosophical
ideas starting from the analysis of fragment B2 on the so-called ʻGrowing Argumentʼ,
which  features  Pythagorean  and  Eleatic  echoes,  and  had  lasting  influence  on  later
philosophy. Next, I will consider fragment B1, B4 and B5 which hint at Xenophanes'
theological views and Heraclitus' conception of wisdom, devoting particular attention to
Epicharmus' use of the term φύσις against the background of Presocratic speculation.
Epicharmus' fragment  B2 stages a dialogue between two people, one of whom
tries to demonstrate the non-persistence of human identity by means of an argument
based on an analogy between numbers and natural objects. The text runs as follows:
22 Cf. Pickard-Cambridge loc. cit.; Álvarez Salas 2007, p. 32; Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén loc. cit.
23 Cf. Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén loc. cit.; Pickard-Cambridge loc. cit..
24 Cf. Álvarez Salas 2007c, pp. 29-30 and passim.
25 Cf. Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén loc. cit.; Álvarez Salas 2007c, p. 29.
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(A)—αἰ πὸτ ἀριθμόν τις περισσόν, αἰ δὲ λῆις, πὸτ ἄρτιον,
                ποτθέμειν λῆι ψᾶφον ἢ καὶ τᾶν ὑπαρχουσᾶν λαβεῖν,
ἦ δοκεῖ κά τοί γ᾽ <ἔθ᾽> ωὑτὸς εἶμεν; (B)—οὐκ ἐμίν γά κα. 
(A)—οὐδὲ μὰν οὐδ᾽ αἰ ποτὶ μέτρον παχυαῖον ποτθέμειν 
λῆι τις ἕτερον μᾶκος ἢ τοῦ πρόσθ᾽ ἐόντος ἀποταμεῖν,
ἔτι χ᾽ ὑπάρχοι κῆνο τὸ μέτρον; (B)—οὐ γάρ. (A)—ὧδε νῦν ὅρη
καὶ τὸς ἀνθρώπους· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὔξεθ᾽, ὁ δέ γα μὰν φθίνει,
ἐν μεταλλαγᾶι δὲ πάντες ἐντὶ πάντα τὸν χρόνον.
ὃ δὲ μεταλλάσσει κατὰ φύσιν κοὔποκ᾽ ἐν ταὐτῶι μένει,
ἕτερον εἴη κα τόδ᾽ ἤδη τοῦ παρεξεστακότος, 
καὶ τὺ δὴ κἀγὼ χθὲς ἄλλοι καὶ νὺν ἄλλοι τελέθομες, 
καὖθις ἄλλοι κοὔποχ᾽ αὐτοὶ κὰτ τὸν ... λόγον. 
(A)— If one wanted to add a pebble to an odd number, or, if you like, to an even 
number or also to take away one of those there, do you think that it would stay the 
same? (B)— Not I. (A)— Nor if you wanted to add to a cubit length another length,
or cut it off from what was there would the length remain. (B)— Certainly not.
(A)— Now look also at men in the same way. One grows, another dwindles
and all are in the process of changing all the time.
What changes by nature and never stays in the same state would be now something 
differently from what has undergone the change. Also you and I were different 
yesterday, and today we turned out to be different, and again different [tomorrow],
and never the same according to this …. argument.            
                                                                                            DK 23 B226
The  analogy  upon  which  the  argument  is  grounded  rests  on  the  assumption  of
Pythagorean derivation that number is  an essential  property of material  objects, and
thereby an object  can be individuated and identified through the specification of its
components in numerical terms27. Starting from these premises, since human beings are
in a constant state of change, that is, they grow and dwindle continuously, one cannot
say that a person is the same as he was yesterday, nor that he will remain the same
tomorrow. Striking and paradoxical as it may seem, in antiquity Epicharmus' dialogue
was regarded as the first  explicit  formulation of  the so-called “Growing Argument”
(auxomenos  logos),  which  became  the  object  of  an  intense  debate  in  Hellenistic
philosophy, especially between Stoics and Academics28. In addition, Menn has recently
argued that Epicharmus' Growing argument was a matter of concern for Plato as well,
who, in the Pheado (96c3-97b3), uses a similar argumentation to demonstrate that the
26 Text and translation after Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén.
27 On this point, see Horky 2013, pp. 134-136, Sedley 1982, pp. 256-257.
28 Cf.  Plut.  Comm.  Not.  1083a;  Anon.  in  Pl.  Tht.  71.5-26.  On the  Growing Argument  in  Hellenistic
philosophy, see  Sedley 1982, pp. 256-257 and passim; Sorabji 2006, pp. 38-39.
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equation of growth with addition, as in Anaxagoras' philosophy, fails to account for the
persistence of personal identity29. Broadly speaking, Epicharmus' dialogue appears to
reflect the broader interest  in growth and generation which characterized Presocratic
natural  enquiry.  In  fact,  in  the  Theaetetus,  Plato  credits  Epicharmus  with  a  fluxist
ontology  directly  opposed  to  Parmenides'  unique  and  unchangeable  Being,  and
associates  him  with  other  wise  men  who  endorsed  a  similar  position,  namely
Protagoras,  Heraclitus,  Empedocles  and  Homer30.  Indeed,  the  text  itself  reveals
Epicharmus' acquaintance with Eleatic ontology, as indicated by the phrase ἐν ταὐτῶι
μένει, which recalls Parmenides' B8.29: ταὐτόν τ᾽ ἐν ταὐτῶι τε μένον καθ᾽ ἑαυτό τε
κεῖται  (“remaining the same and in the same state, it lies by itself”)31.
Epicharmus' interest in contemporary philosophical debates is further revealed
by fragment B1, which contains an argument against the generation of gods:
      (A)— ἀλλ᾽ ἀεί τοι θεοὶ παρῆσαν χὐπέλιπον οὐ πώποκα,
      τάδε δ᾽ ἀεὶ πάρεσθ᾽ ὁμοῖα διά τε τῶν αὐτῶν ἀεί. 
      (B)—ἀλλὰ λέγεται μὰν Χάος πρᾶτον γενέσθαι τῶν θεῶν.  
     (A)—πῶς δέ κ᾽; ἀμήχανον γ᾽ ἀπό τινος μηδ᾽ ἐς ὅ τι πρᾶτον μόλοι32. 
29 Cf. Menn 2010, pp. 39-50. Menn also notices that a similar argument was later employed by the author
of one of the Dissoi Logoi (DK 90 5.13-15). On the connection between Epicharmus' Growing Argument
and the passage of the Phaedo mentioned above, see also Álvarez Salas 2007c, pp. 42-44.
30 Cf. Pl. Tht. 152e1-9. Plato's inclusion of Epicharmus among the fluxists is probably derived from the
Synagōgē  by Hippias of Elis, cf. Álvarez  Salas 2009b, pp. 227-241. On this tradition, see also Horky
2013, p. 136 n. 41. On the role of Hippias' work in Plato's and Aristotle's reconstruction of Presocratic
philosophy, see further Mansfeld 1990, pp. 22-96. 
31 Tr. Coxon. On this point, see also Horky  loc.  cit. Notice also that in fragment B8.6-10 Parmenides
appears to equate growth with generation (cf. McKirahan 2008, pp. 193-194): τίνα γὰρ γένναν διζήσεαι
αὐτοῦ;/ πῆι πόθεν αὐξηθέν; οὐδ᾽ ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐάσσω/φάσθαι σ᾽ οὐδὲ νοεῖν […] τί δ᾽ ἄν μιν καὶ χρέος
ὦρσεν/ ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν, τοῦ μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον, φῦν; “For what generation of it will you look for?
How and whence grown? I shall not let you say or think from What-Is-Not […] and then what necessity
in fact could have urged it to begin and spring up later or before from What-Is-Not?” (tr. Coxon, with
modifications).  This might be behind Epicharmus' idea that  accretion entails the generation of a new
individual. Similarly, Empedocles speaks of growth and destruction in terms of accretion and diminution
(e.g. DK 31 B26.2 ; cf. Horky 2013, p. 140).
32 The line is corrupted and has been variously emended by editors.  Here I follow Rodríguez-Noriega
Guillén's edition, as it is, I think, the most adherent to manuscripts. The first issue regards t he phrase πῶς
δέ κ᾽; ἀμήχανον, which is reported by all manuscripts, but is usually emended for metrical reasons (to
avoid a dactyl in the first tetrameter). Proposed corrections include: 1) πῶς δέ; ἀμάχανον (Lorenz), with
ἀμήχανον replaced by the Doric form of the adjective; 2) πῶς δέ κα; μὴ ἔχον  (Diels, Kassel-Austin).
However, such emendations are, in fact, not necessary when one considers that 1) Epicharmus frequently
employs the dactyl in that particular position (cf. Álvarez Salas 2007c, p. 34 n. 35); 2) given the presence
of other terms borrowed by Ionic dialect in the fragment (see below), the form ἀμήχανον can be accepted.
The other problem concerns μηδ᾽ ἐς, Diels' emendation of  μηδὲς/ μηδὲν reported by manuscripts. Some
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     (B)—οὐκ ἄρ᾽ ἔμολε πρᾶτον οὐδέν; (A)—οὐδὲ μὰ Δία δεύτερον               5
      τῶνδέ γ᾽ ὧν ἁμὲς νῦν ὧδε †λέγω μέλλει τάδ᾽ εἶναι†·  
     (A)— But the gods were always and never failed to be,
     and these things are always alike and in the same way always.
     (B)— But Chaos is said to be the first-born of the gods. 
     (A)—And how? Where it could come from or go to would be inconceivable.
     (B)— Then did nothing come first? (A)— No, by Zeus, nor second
     at least none of the things of which † we are now talking about.
                                                                                 DK 23 B133
Speaker A undermines the popular belief about the birth of gods held by his interlocutor,
first by claiming that gods always existed in the same state, and then by arguing against
the idea that Chaos came as first in the succession of divine generations, as told by
Hesiod in the  Theogony34. The notion that the gods are everlasting had been already
maintained by Pherecydes of Syros and endorsed by Xenophanes in the context of his
criticism of  anthropomorphic  conceptions  of  the  divine35.  Xenophanes'  influence  is
further recognizable in the doctrine of divine unchangeability,  which was one of the
attributes of the greatest god36. Noticeably, such views are supported by the employment
of Eleatic argumentation, as shown by the recourse to reductio at line 5, which echoes
Parmenides' demonstration that What-Is is ungenerated37. In fact, the passage as a whole
can  be  seen  as  an  allusion  to  Ionic  philosophical  speculation,  as  indicated  by  the
presence of terms borrowed from the Ionic dialect which deviate from the everyday
Syracusan language usually spoken by Epicharmus' characters. For instance, the Ionic
form παρῆσαν  replaces  the  Doric  παρῆν  in  fragment,  while  ἀμήχανος  at  line  4  to
editors  have  proposed  alternative  emendations  such  as  εἶμεν  (Hermann)  or  ενθὲν  (Kaibel),  which
however,  I  consider  too  intrusive.  Incidentally,  given  the  corruption  of  μηδὲς/  μηδὲν,  an  acceptable
emendation would be,  I  think,  ἢδ᾽ ἐς (cf.  Carrière 1979, p.  205) which would avoid a μηδέ without
correlative.
33 Text and translation after Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén.
34 Cf. Hes. Th. 116.
35 Cf.  Pherecydes,  fragment DK 7 B1: “Zeus and Chronos and Chthonie were from all  eternity”;  on
Xenophanes, cf. Chapter 2, p. 65.
36 Cf. DK 21 B26; on this point, see Chapter 2, pp. 68-69.
37 On this point, see also Álvarez Salas 2007c, p.35; Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén 2012, p. 91. While the
impossibility of  telling from what  Chaos would come recalls  Parmenides'  rejection of  generation  ex
nihilo, the claim that it would be inconceivable towards what Chaos would go should be taken, I think, as
an allusion to the Principle of Sufficient Reason: if Chaos came first, there would be no goal/reason
which could explain why it came to be. Compare Parmenides' B8.9-10.
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indicate  impossibility  recalls  Eleatic  usages,  as  shown  by  a  parallel  passage  in
Empedocles'  fragment  B12,  which  contains  a  rejection  of  generation  from nothing
modelled on Parmenidean arguments38. 
The recourse to philosophical argumentation was probably meant to produce a
parodic effect, especially since it actively contributed to the comic development of the
plot.  For example, Plutarch tells us that Epicharmus used the Growing Argument to
prove that a debtor who borrowed money yesterday does not owe it any more, since he
is no longer the same individual; or that a man invited for dinner yesterday can be sent
away today because, having become another person, in fact came without invitation39.
The comic intent of philosophical allusions is further suggested by two other fragments
quoted by Alcimus, namely B4 and B5, in which scientific-like observation on animal
behaviour serves to demonstrate, respectively, that animals possess sophia and that, like
humans, they are attracted by the members of their own species. The text of B4 runs as
follows:
Εὔμαιε, τὸ σοφόν ἐστιν οὐ καθ᾽ ἓν μόνον,
ἀλλ᾽ ὅσσαπερ ζῆι, πάντα καὶ γνώμαν ἔχει. 
καὶ γὰρ τὸ θῆλυ τῶν ἀλεκτορίδων γένος,
αἰ λῆις καταμαθεῖν, ἀτενὲς οὐ τίκτει τέκνα
ζῶντ᾽, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπώιζει καὶ ποιεῖ ψυχὰν ἔχειν. 
τὸ δὲ σοφὸν ἁ φύσις τόδ᾽ οἶδεν ὡς ἔχει 
μόνα· πεπαίδευται γὰρ αὐταύτας ὕπο. 
Eumaeus, wisdom is not confined to one kind alone,
but everything that lives also has understanding.
For if you will study intently the hen among poultry,
she does not bring forth the chicks alive,
but sits clucking on the eggs and wakens life in them.
As for this wisdom of hers, only nature knows how it has it:
for the hen has learnt it from herself40.
                                                                     DK 23 B4
38  Cf. DK 31 B12: “For it is impossible that there should be coming to be from what is not (ἔκ τε γὰρ
οὐδάμ᾽ ἐόντος ἀμήχανόν ἐστι γενέσθαι ), and that what is should be destroyed is unaccomplishable and
unheard of; for it will always be there, wherever one may push it on every occasion” (tr. Inwood). On the
language of Epicharmus' fragment, cf. Álvarez Salas 2007c, pp. 33-34.
39 Cf. Plut. De sera 559b. On this point, see further below.
40 Tr. Santoro with modifications.
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The idea that wisdom is shared by all  animals appears to be a parodic distortion of
Heraclitus' doctrine about the uniqueness of sophia, which he states in fragments DK 22
B32 in terms echoed by Epicharmus: “One thing, the only wise thing, is unwilling and
willing to be called by the name of Zeus” (ἓν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ
ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα)41. Indeed, Epicharmus' choice of the hen, an animal proverbially
renowned  for  its  limited  intellectual  capacities,  as  an  instance  of  wisdom  starkly
contrasts  with  Heraclitus'  divine  principle  which  rules  the  cosmos42.  The  wisdom
possessed by hens and, broadly speaking, all living beings appears to be a purely natural
instinct, as emphasized by the fact that they have learned it by themselves. Epicharmus'
appeal  to  nature  (phusis)  to  explain  hens'  instinct  has  been  the  object  of  scholarly
debate, especially as regards the meaning of the term φύσις. On the one hand, some
have  taken  the  term as  indicating  ʻNatureʼ,  that  is,  the  personified  order  of  things
distinct from things themselves, and therefore have cast doubts on the authenticity of the
fragment, pointing out that such conception of nature was first proposed in Sophistic
circles only at the end of the 5th century BCE43. On the other hand, it has been argued
that Epicharmus' use of  φύσις  is consistent with the common meaning that the term has
in Presocratic speculation, namely that of ʻindividual natureʼ, or ʻgenuine structure/real
constitutionʼ of a thing, which determines its characteristics/behaviour44. According to
this reading, then, hatching is integral part of the nature of the hen or, in other words, an
essential characteristic of what it is to be a hen. This interpretation is, I argue, to be
preferred, especially in the light of Epicharmus' fragment B10: “nature itself of humans:
41 DK 22 B32, tr. Robinson.
42 DK 22 B32. See also DK 22 B41: “The wise is a single thing (or, with different punctuation “one thing,
the wise thing [is]”): knowing the plan which steers all things through all things”. While these fragments
have  raised  many  interpretative  issues  which  I  cannot  address  extensively  here,  scholars  agree  in
considering them as an expression of Heraclitus' belief in the existence of only  one  kind of wisdom,
which appears to consist in the understanding of the cosmic order (for a discussion of the fragments, see
Robinson 1987, pp. 102; 107-108; Kahn 1979, pp. 17-172; 267-268; Kirk 1954, pp. 386-397; Marcovich
1967, pp. 444-448).
43 On this point, see Pickard-Cambridge 1962, p. 254 n. 1; Álvarez Salas 2007c, p. 60.
44 Cf. Kahn 1979, p. 99; Kirk 1954, pp. 228-231; Álvarez Salas loc. cit.
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puffed-up wineskins  (αὕτα  φύσις  ἀνθρώπων ἀσκοὶ  πεφυσαμένοι)45”.  Noticeably,  the
fragment is modelled on the definition-like sentences typical of Archaic wisdom, such
as the sayings attributed to the Seven Sages and Pythagorean akousmata46. The use of
φύσις  in  such  a  context  indicates  that  in  Epicharmus  the  term indeed refers  to  the
individual nature of a thing, as further emphasized by the use of αὕτα, which hints at the
essential and basic constitution of the thing whose definition is provided47.
A further indication that Epicharmus employs the term φύσις in the sense of
ʻindividual nature/constitutionʼ comes from fragment B5, in which he took animals as
an example to illustrate that like is attracted by like. The text runs as follows:
θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν ἁμὲ ταῦθ᾽ οὕτω λέγειν
καὶ ἁνδάνειν αὐτοῖσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ δοκεῖν 
καλῶς πεφύκειν· καὶ γὰρ ἁ κύων κυνί 
κάλλιστον εἶμεν φαίνεται, καὶ βοῦς βοΐ, 
ὄνος δ(ὲ) ὄνωι κάλλιστον, ὗς δέ θην ὑί. 
 No wonder that we say these things so
 and that we are pleasing ourselves and that we seem to ourselves
 to be beautiful: for also dog seems most beautiful to dog,
 and ox to ox, and donkey most beautiful to donkey, and pig to pig
                                                                    DK 23 B548
In order to describe men's belief in their own beauty, Epicharmus uses the phrase δοκεῖν
καλῶς πεφύκειν. In this context, the perfect πεφύκειν, from  φύω, bears, I argue, the
same “technical” connotation of φύσις of the previous fragments49. For the point of the
fragment  is  exactly  that  animals  find  attractive  the  members  of  their  own species,
namely individuals with a particular nature and specific characteristics.  Indeed,  it  is
because of such particular  characteristics/conformation that animals find their fellows
45 DK 23 B10 (= F 166 K.-A.). Tr. Horky 2013.
46 Cf. Horky 2013, p. 135 n. 39; see also Chapter 3, p. 112 n. 132.
47 It  is  beyond  of  the  scope  of  my work  to  evaluate  the  philosophical  implications  of  Epicharmus'
“definition” of human being. An interesting attempt can be found in Álvarez Salas 2007b, pp. 121-129. It
is worth noticing that the phrase αὕτα φύσις is employed by Philolaus (F 6 Huffman), cf. Horky 2013, p.
135 n. 39.
48 Text and translation after Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén.
49 Xenophanes, DK 21 B32: ἥν τ᾽ Ἶριν καλέουσι, νέφος καὶ τοῦτο πέφυκε,/ πορφύρεον καὶ φοινίκεον καὶ
χλωρὸν ἰδέσθαι; “And she whom they call Iris, this too is by nature a cloud/ purple, red and greenish-
yellow to behold” (tr. Lesher).
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“naturally”  beautiful.  It  is  worth  noticing  that  Epicharmus'  use  of  animals  in  the
fragment alludes to Xenophanes'  B15, in which anthropomorphic conceptions of the
divine are ridiculed by drawing a comparison with oxen, horses and lions, which, if they
had hands,  would depicts  gods with their  own physical  features.  As in Epicharmus,
Xenophanes' criticism is based upon the idea that like is attracted to like, as implied by
fragment B16, in which it is observed that ethnic groups attribute to the divinity their
own  physical  traits.  Indeed,  Xenophanes'  sarcastic  remark  is  rendered  even  more
pointed  by  Epicharmus,  as  he  replaces  the  nobler  lions  and  horses  mentioned  by
Xenophanes  with  more  rustic  and vulgar  animals,  which  hardly would  be  taken  as
examples of beauty50.
As  emerges  from the  foregoing  discussion,  by means  of  a  clever  system of
allusions,  Epicharmus  managed  to  create  striking  parodies  of  contemporary
philosophical  doctrines,  which  he  skilfully  integrated  in  the  plots  of  his  comedies.
However, as shown by the case of the Growing Argument, Epicharmus did not limit
himself  to  make  use  of  already  existent  doctrines,  but  also  formulated  original
arguments which had a lasting influence on later philosophical debate. This fact makes
one wonder whether Epicharmus' treatment of philosophical ideas has a function which
goes beyond mere parody. In fact, in a series of studies devoted to Epicharmus' relation
to Presocratic wisdom, Álvarez Salas argues that the playwright's use of parody served
to  attack  and  criticize  contemporary  philosophers,  especially  Xenophanes,  who
appeared to be one of his favourite targets, and Parmenides, whose theory of Being was
opposed by the fluxist  theory hinted at  in the Growing Argument51.  Although Salas'
interpretation  has  much  to  be  commended,  especially  for  drawing  the  attention  to
Epicharmus'  active  involvement  in  the  intellectual  debate  of  his  time,  some
50 Cf. Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén 2012, p. 95 and Álvarez Salas 2007b, pp. 129-135.
51 On Epicharmus' relation to Xenophanes,  see  Álvarez  Salas 2007b; on the Growing argument as a
criticism of Parmenides' ontology, see Álvarez Salas 2007c pp. 39-41.
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considerations suggest another reading of his use of philosophical arguments,  which
reveals, I argue, an original stance on philosophical and poetic competition.
First of all, while a parodic intent in the fragments cannot be denied given their
integration in the comic plot, it is hard to prove, as Salas aims to do, that they must be
read  as  a  criticism  of  the  philosophical  doctrines  contained  therein.  As  regards
Epicharmus' polemic against Xenophanes, for example, Salas bases his interpretation on
the  following  sentence  in  Aristotle's  Metaphysics  (Γ  1010a5-7),  which,  however,  is
desperately ambiguous: “For this reason they [sc. natural philosophers] speak plausibly,
but do not say the truth (to speak in this way is more fitting than the way in which
Epicharmus spoke with regard to Xenophanes)” (διὸ εἰκότως μὲν λέγουσιν, οὐκ ἀληθῆ
δὲ λέγουσιν (οὕτω γὰρ ἁρμόττει μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ἢ ὥσπερ Ἐπίχαρμος εἰς Ξενοφάνην)). To
solve the ambiguity of the phrase,  Salas relies on the commentary by Alexander of
Aphrodisias, who affirms that Epicharmus harshly insulted Xenophanes and ridiculed
him for his “ignorance of the things that are” (agnōsia tōn ontōn). However, as noted by
Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén, we have no evidence that Alexander's testimony was based
on actual knowledge of Epicharmus' passage alluded to by Aristotle and his reading
might just be a gloss on Aristotle's words52. Actually, personal insult does not seem to
have  been  a  characteristic  of  Epicharmus'  style53,  and  the  phrase  “ignorance  of  the
things  that  are”  sounds  more  like  a  gloss  on  Aristotle's  text  than  a  paraphrase  of
Epicharmus' actual words. As argued by Lesher, Aristotle's remark probably means that
Epicharmus affirmed that what Xenophanes said was true, but not plausible54. In fact, a
curious  comment  like  this  could  make  better  sense  of  Aristotle's  reference  to
Epicharmus, especially considering that he used the reverse formulation to qualify his
predecessors'  theories.  But  even  when  one  considers  the  parody  of  Xenophanean
52 Cf. Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén 2012, p. 95 n. 74.
53Cf. Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén loc. cit.
54 Cf. Lesher 1992, p. 201 n. 16.
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positions, such as in fragment B5, Epicharmus' purported criticism is not as evident as it
might seem. Salas argues for Epicharmus' parodic and critical intent by emphasizing the
gap between Xenophanes' serious theological objection and Epicharmus' downgrade of
the  argument  to  the  “vulgar”  level  of  aesthetic  attraction55.  However,  the  distance
between the two poets is dramatically reduced when we think that even Xenophanes'
fragment  B15  on  animals  can  hardly  be  considered  as  a  proper  argument  against
anthropomorphism and should be rather seen as an example of traditional mockery, such
as that typical of iambic poetry56. But even if one were to accept Xenophanes' satire as
an argument, as illustrated above, it would still appeal to aesthetic considerations: for
humans' representations of the divine are ultimately based on their belief concerning
beauty.  In  fact,  even  Salas  appears  to  concede  that  the  idea  of  parody  does  not
necessarily entail criticism. For, I would say, if this were the case, one should think the
same  for  the  Growing  Argument  which,  by  contrast,  Salas  interprets  as  a  serious
objection  to  Parmenides'  ontology  and  the  first  coherent  theorization  of  a  fluxist
ontology57. Indeed, given the ridiculous consequences of the recourse to the argument
on the  part  of  the  quack-philosopher,  we could  be  entitled  to  think  of  Epicharmus'
passage  as  a  parody  of  the  very  philosophical  doctrine  about  perennial  change
expounded in those lines. 
In fact, at closer inspection, Epicharmus' B2 neither appears to provide a general
theory of flux nor a proper argument against Parmenidean ontology. For it should be
noticed that the non-persistence of men's identity is due to the fact that human beings
belong to the class of things which change by nature (κατὰ φύσιν) and never stay in the
same state (κοὔποκ᾽ ἐν ταὐτῶι μένει). It is because of this property that the parallel with
numbers and measurable objects actually holds. Indeed, since, as I have argued above,
55 Álvarez Salas 2007b, p. 132.
56 On this point, see Chapter 2, pp. 64-65.
57 Cf. Álvarez Salas 2009b, p. 258
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in Epicharmus the term φύσις indicates an individual's particular nature/characteristic,
the argument is not based on the assumption that everything undergoes a perennial state
of change, as one would expect by a fluxist ontology, but only on the fact that there are
specific classes of things which, because of their constitution, are in a constant process
of alteration58. As regards the supposed criticism of Parmenides, it should be noticed
that,  although apparently contradicting Parmenides'  philosophy,  in fact,  the Growing
Argument does not disprove the doctrine of What-Is, since, according to Parmenides,
change is logically impossible. Actually, as shown by Sedley, the Growing Argument
might  be  used  as  a  way  to  demonstrate  the  concepts  of  change  and  growth  are
philosophically incoherent, since for a statement of the type “X has changed” to have
sense, the same X should have, for example, a property a at a certain time t1 and not at a
successive time t2. But the Growing Argument proves exactly that X is not the same at
any time of the process59. Quite strikingly, then, Epicharmus' argument might even be
used to demonstrate the absurdity of the notion of change and thereby to respond to the
critics of Parmenidean ontology, in a way not too dissimilar to that later adopted by
Zeno in his  paradoxes  against  motion.  For  from the assumption  that  things  alter,  it
follows the paradoxical  denial  of the persistence of personal  identity.  This does not
mean, however,  that I consider Epicharmus as a supporter of Eleaticism. In fact, I am
inclined to think that, rather than attacking or promoting specific philosophical theories,
Epicharmus  was  more  interested  in  exploring  the  competitive  potential  of
philosophically inspired argumentation. In order to better understand the latter claim, I
now turn to consider Epicharmus' philosophical fragments within the context of early
rhetorical argumentation.
58 Of course, such a statement could be easily read as (or even turned into) an endorsement of a general
theory of flux, like Plato did in the Theaetetus. It is worth remembering that in the same passage, Plato
claims that Homer is a fluxist because he said that all things were born from Ocean (cf. Pl. Tht. 152e1-9).
59 On this point, cf. Sedley 1982, pp. 257-258.
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5.2 – Epicharmus and the beginnings of rhetoric
I begin my analysis of Epicharmus' relation to rhetoric by considering the testimony
about the Growing Argument contained in an anonymous papyrus commentary on the
Theaetetus, according to which Epicharmus created a scene in which the Argument was
used in a judicial setting. The text runs as follows:
κα[ὶ ἐκω]μῴδησεν αὐτὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀπαιτουμένου συμβολὰς καὶ [ἀ]ρνουμένου
τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν προσγεγενῆσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἀπεληλυθέναι, ἐπεὶ δὲ
ὁ ἀπαιτῶν ἐτº[ύ]πºτºησεν αὐτὸν καὶ̣ ἐν̣εκαλεῖτ̣ο̣, πάλιν κ[ἀ]κε̣ί̣ν̣ου [φά]σκοντος [ἄλλ]ο μὲ[ν] ε[ἶ]ναι τὸν τ[ετυ]πτηκότα, ἕτερο[ν δὲ] τὸν ἐγκαλούμενον.                 Ș    ! Chapter 4.odt - OpenOffice Writerº ἐνºεκαλεῖτºο̣, πάλιν κ[ἀ]κε̣ί̣ν̣ου [φά]σκοντος [ἄλλ]ο μὲ[ν] ε[ἶ]ναι τὸν τ[ετυ]πτηκότα, ἕτερο[ν δὲ] τὸν ἐγκαλούμενον.                 Ș    ! Chapter 4.odt - OpenOffice Writer                            º, πάλιν κ[ἀ]κεºί̣ν̣ου [φά]σκοντος [ἄλλ]ο μὲ[ν] ε[ἶ]ναι τὸν τ[ετυ]πτηκότα, ἕτερο[ν δὲ] τὸν ἐγκαλούμενον.                 Ș    ! Chapter 4.odt - OpenOffice Writer                                                              ºνºο̣, πάλιν κ[ἀ]κε̣ί̣ν̣ου [φά]σκοντος [ἄλλ]ο μὲ[ν] ε[ἶ]ναι τὸν τ[ετυ]πτηκότα, ἕτερο[ν δὲ] τὸν ἐγκαλούμενον.                 Ș    ! Chapter 4.odt - OpenOffice Writer                            υ [φά]σκο̣, πάλιν κ[ἀ]κε̣ί̣ν̣ου [φά]σκοντος [ἄλλ]ο μὲ[ν] ε[ἶ]ναι τὸν τ[ετυ]πτηκότα, ἕτερο[ν δὲ] τὸν ἐγκαλούμενον.                 Ș    ! Chapter 4.odt - OpenOffice Writer                            ντο̣, πάλιν κ[ἀ]κε̣ί̣ν̣ου [φά]σκοντος [ἄλλ]ο μὲ[ν] ε[ἶ]ναι τὸν τ[ετυ]πτηκότα, ἕτερο[ν δὲ] τὸν ἐγκαλούμενον.                 Ș    ! Chapter 4.odt - OpenOffice Writer                            ς
[ἄλλ]ο μὲ[ν] ε[ἶ]ναι τὸν τ[ετυ]πτηκότα, ἕτερο[ν δὲ] τὸν ἐγκαλούμενον. 
He  [sc.  Epicharmus]  made  a  comic  scene  out  of  this  [sc.  the  Growing
Argument] about a man who is asked to pay his debts and says that he is not
the same person,  because something has  been added and something else
taken away; then, when the creditor has beaten him and has been taken into
court because of that, in turn he too replies that the one who has beaten is
one thing and the one who has been taken to court another.
                                                                              Anon. in Pl. Tht. 71.26-4060
The  scene  described  by the  anonymous  commentator  confirms  Plutarch's  testimony
about  the  plot  of  Epicharmus'  comedy  on  the  Growing  Argument61:  character  A
(presumably the main speaker of fragments B2) owes money to character B, but refuses
to pay by arguing that he is no longer the same person who contracted the debt. Thanks
to the commentary we are now told the additional information that, after A's refusal, B
beats him and thereby is taken to the tribunal. There, if you allow me the joke, B pays A
back in his  own coin,  since he defends himself  by arguing that he is  no longer the
person who beat A, and thus cannot be punished. Such a reversal probably provided an
effective finale  for the comedy,  in  a  way similar  to  Aristophanes'  Clouds,  in  which
Pheidippides turns against his father the philosophical arguments which the old man had
obliged him to learn to avoid paying his debts62.  The importance of the anonymous
60 Text  by  Kassel-Austin,  who  follow  the  edition  of  Bastianini  and  Sedley;  tr.  after  Willi,  with
modifications. On the text, see further Battezzato 2008, pp. 13-16.
61 Cf. above.
62 Cf. Ar. Nu. 1409ff.
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commentary, however, goes beyond the fact that it provides us with more details about
the comedy's plot and the role that the Growing Argument played in its development
and  conclusion.  Most  interestingly,  we come to  know that  Epicharmus  portrayed  a
situation in which the Growing Argument was used in a judicial setting. In fact, the
argument is conceived as a means of fooling one's interlocutor and eventually avoiding
prosecution  in  court,  whether  for  insolvency  or  physical  assault.  In  other  words,
Epicharmus  represents  the  Growing Argument  as  a  rhetorical  instrument  to  achieve
victory in a trial. 
Epicharmus'  portrayal  of  the  rhetorical  potential  of  the  Growing  Argument
acquires further significance when we consider that  the he must have been a direct
witness of the increasing importance of rhetoric, which, according to later testimonies,
was born in  Syracuse through the efforts  of Corax and Tisias63,  in  the wake of the
numerous lawsuits for the restitution of the properties confiscated during the tyranny of
Thrasybulus, whose expulsion from the city in 465 BCE had led to the establishment of
democracy64. In fact, the presence of rhetorical figures in some of Epicharmus' extant
fragments reveals that he was well acquainted with the devices of the new art, which, as
suggested by the fact that he used them for parodic purposes, must have been already
familiar to his public as well65. According to later testimonies, especially by Plato and
63 Even though we know relatively little about Corax and Tisias and many of the stories circulating about
them are probably inventions deriving from their image as prōtoi heuretai of rhetoric, the tradition about
them offers valuable information on the early stages of rhetoric. Actually, there are doubts about Corax'
historicity: for example, Cole has argued that ʻCoraxʼ was not the name of a real person, but only Tisias'
nickname (cf. Cole 1991; Kennedy 1994, pp. 34-35 and Gencarella 2007). 
64 Cf. Cic. Brut. 46. Cicero says that this information was contained in the Synagōgē Technōn of Aristotle
(cf.  Wilcox 1943, p.  1;  Kennedy 1963, p.  60 and Cole 1991, p.  68).  According to another  tradition,
rhetoric was born as a means to speak persuasively in the newly-born democratic assembly, but scholars
tend to consider it as a later modification of the tradition due to the primary role and importance which
political  speech  assumed  in  the  following centuries,  especially  under  the  influence  of  Aristotle  and
Isocrates (see Hinks 1940, p. 67 and Cole 1991, p. 70 and 73). The examples cited by Plato and Aristotle
(see below) are a further indication that Corax and Tisias dealt with judicial oratory. On the change of
regime in Syracuse, see Musti 2006, pp. 108-109.
65 On this point, see further Rodríguez-Noriega Guillén 2012, p. 90 and 1996, pp. xxv-xxvi. Willi has
recently argued that the Growing Argument constitutes a criticism of Pythagorean rhetoric. In particular,
Epicharmus would be targeting Pythagoras' alleged abilities as orator (Willi 2012, pp. 61-63; abridgement
of Willi 2008, pp. 170-175). Due to the scantiness of reliable evidence about Pythagoras, however, Willi's
interpretation remains inevitably speculative, as he himself admits, and, in fact, there are valid reasons to
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Aristotle, Corax' and Tisias' most notable and enduring contribution to rhetoric was their
study of arguments from probability/likelihood (eikos). Both Plato and Aristotle provide
an example of eikos argumentation associated with Corax' and Tisias' art about a case of
robbery  in  which  a  feeble  and  a  strong  man  are  involved.  Plato's  account  runs  as
follows:
[...] ἐάν τις ἀσθενὴς καὶ ἀνδρικὸς ἰσχυρὸν καὶ δειλὸν συγκόψας, ἱμάτιον ἤ τι ἄλλο
ἀφελόμενος, εἰς δικαστήριον ἄγηται, δεῖ δὴ τἀληθὲς μηδέτερον λέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν
δειλὸν μὴ ὑπὸ μόνου φάναι τοῦ ἀνδρικοῦ συγκεκόφθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἐλέγχειν ὡς
μόνω  ἤστην,  ἐκείνῳ  δὲ  καταχρήσασθαι  τῷ  «Πῶς  δ᾽  ἂν  ἐγὼ  τοιόσδε  τοιῷδε
ἐπεχείρησα;» ὁ δ᾽ οὐκ ἐρεῖ δὴ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κάκην, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο ψεύδεσθαι ἐπιχειρῶν
τάχ᾽ ἂν ἔλεγχόν πῃ παραδοίη τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ. 
[...] if someone feeble and courageous, having thrashed a strong and coward man and
robbed him of his cloth or something else, is taken to the court, none of the two ought
to tell the truth, but the coward should not say that he has been trashed by the brave
only. This one, on the other hand, should prove that they were alone and use that well
known argument “How could I, such as I am, have attacked a man such as this?”. The
other will not confess his cravenness, but attempting to say other lies, perhaps he will
give his opponent an opportunity to refute him in some way.
                                                                                                            Pl. Phdr. 273b4-c4
The case is quite straightforward: a feeble man assaults a strong one and robs him. Once
in court, while the robbed declares that he was not assaulted by the feeble man only,
because nobody would believe the contrary,  the latter should indeed prove that they
were alone and use an argument from probability by stating that it is not probable/likely
that a weak man like him could have beaten someone stronger than him. At this point,
Plato tells us that the plaintiff, rather than confessing his own cowardice, will probably
resort to other lies which the defendant could easily disprove. It is worth noticing that
Plato's presentation of the case is heavily biased against rhetoric, as emerges from the
repeated emphasis put on the lies which the two men use in their favour. Indeed, the
point of the whole passage is to illustrate that in tribunal people do not care about truth,
but only about what is persuasive, and, so Plato remarks, probability/likelihood is most
consider  the  idea  that  Epicharmus  meant  to  attack  Pythagorean  oratory  as  improbable  (Rodríguez-
Noriega Guillén 2012, pp. 92-93).  An interest  in rhetoric on the part  of Epicharmus is supposed by
Demand, who identifies a Gorgianic influence in some of the fragments (cf. Demand 1971; against this
view, Willi 2008 p. 166 n.14).
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effective in this respect66. Aristotle's account of the the same paradigmatic case, which
he ascribes to Corax, provides us with additional information, as it includes an  eikos
argument which could be employed by a strong man charged with the assault of a feeble
man. In that case, the strong man can argue that it is improbable that he committed the
crime,  since  he  would  have  been  the  obvious  suspect67.  Aristotle  assimilates  this
example of reverse eikos argument, i.e. something is argued to be unlikely in virtue if its
probability, to Sophistic eristic argumentation, as it constitutes an eloquent instance of
making the weaker argument the stronger, which was one of the distinctive traits of the
Sophists'  rhetoric68.  A similar  example  of  reverse  eikos  argument  is  contained  in
Antiphon's First Tetralogy, which stages a fictional case of murder in which the lack of
definitive  evidence  compels  both  the  accuser  and  the  defendant  to  argue  from
probability.  While  the former argues  that  the defendant  is  the most  probable culprit
given his well known grudge which he bore to the victim, the latter says that, in virtue
of this very fact, it is improbable that he committed the murder since he knew that he
would have been easily suspected69.
In the light of the foregoing examples,  it  is  worth noticing that the situation
portrayed  by  Epicharmus  in  his  comedy  about  the  Growing  Argument  features
interesting  similarities  with  the  earliest  examples  of  rhetorical  argumentation.  Like
eikos arguments,  the  Growing  Argument  proves  to  be  easily  adaptable  to  different
66 Cf. Pl. Phdr. 272c-e. On Plato's account, cf. Gagarin 2014, in which it is argued that, in actual judicial
practice, factual evidence was deemed stronger than arguments from probability.
67 Cf. Arist. Rh. II 1402a18-20: [...] ἄν τε γὰρ μὴ ἔνοχος ᾖ τῇ αἰτίᾳ, οἷον ἀσθενὴς ὢν αἰκίας φεύγει (οὐ
γὰρ εἰκός), κἂν ἔνοχος ᾖ, οἷον ἰσχυρὸς ὤν (οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὅτι εἰκὸς ἔμελλε δόξειν); “[...] for [in Corax's
Art it is illustrated that it is possible to argue from probability] if a man is not liable to the accusation, for
example a feeble man accused of assault (for it is not probable), and even if he is liable, for example a
strong man (for it is not probable, since it would have seemed probable)”. Note that Aristotle considers
the  second  eikos  argument  fallacious,  since,  in  order  to  refute  an  enthymeme  from  probability  the
defendant must state something that is more usually probable than what has been said by the accuser and
not to produce a particular instance to show that the conclusion is not necessarily true.
68 According to Aristotle, Protagoras was a specialist in this kind of argumentation (cf. Rh. II 1402a23).
On the  common perception of  the Sophists'  style  of  arguing,  cf.  Aristophanes'  dialogue between the
Stronger and the Weaker logos in the Clouds (Ar. Nu. 889-1104) and the accusation against Socrates (Pl.
Ap. 19b4-c1). See also what Cicero says in the Brutus (Cic. Brut. 30).  
69 On Antiphon's use of eikos argument, see Gagarin 2014, pp. 17-19.
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circumstances  and can  also  be  turned against  opponents  which  first  employed it  to
support their case. But analogies go further than that, especially if we consider the role
played by the appeal to φύσις in the Growing Argument. In order to illustrate this point,
I  want to draw the attention to Plato's  account of Tisias'  argument from probability.
When the feeble man argues that it is improbable that he assaulted the strong man he
says (Phdr. 273c1): “How could I, such as I am, have attacked a man such as this?”
(Πῶς δ᾽ ἂν ἐγὼ τοιόσδε τοιῷδε ἐπεχείρησα;). Noticeably, through the use of the term
toiosde, the speaker refers to an individual characteristic of his which, in his intentions,
should tell us something about his behaviour and, consequently, about the actual state of
affairs  of the case in which he is involved. Similarly,  in Antiphon's  First  Tetralogy,
when the defendant lists his merits as a citizens and his constant respect for the gods and
the laws, he says: “Being such as this (τοιούτου δὲ ὄντος μου), you must not deem me
guilty of anything sinful or dishonourable”70. In both cases, the argument is based on the
assumption that a person's actions depend on his specific characteristics. Indeed, the
persuasiveness  of  eikos  arguments  lies  in  the  fact  that  they  seem  to  establish  a
deterministic relation between one's constitution/character and his actual behaviour. But
such relation is, in fact, only probabilistic71. 
If we now turn to consider Epicharmus' Growing Argument, we can notice that it
basically follows a similar pattern, since it is used to draw conclusions based on the way
in which an individual is. However, differently from eikos arguments, the force of the
Growing Argument derives from the fact that it is presented as built on a “natural law”,
namely that a member of the class of things which continuously change because of their
nature  cannot  preserve  their  identity  over  time.  In  other  words,  human  beings  qua
70 2.2.12. For a similar argument see also Gorgias' Apology of Palamedes (DK B11a ).
71 With regard to this point, it is worth noticing that, in commenting on Tisias'  eikos  argument, Plato
eloquently remarks that probability owes its effectiveness to its “similarity to truth” (δι᾽ ὁμοιότητα τοῦ
ἀληθοῦς; Pl. Phdr. 273d).
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human beings cannot stay ever the same and thereby anything that follows from this
property is necessarily determined, including the fact that one cannot be asked to repay
a debt because he is no longer the person who took it. Thus, when compared with the
argument from probability, the recourse to philosophy as a rhetorical device appears to
bring a considerable advantage to the person who employs them. For, broadly speaking,
even  in  cases  in  which  decisive  evidence  is  lacking,  the  appeal  to  philosophical
doctrines, given their universal validity, could help to win the debate. Hypothetically,
for example, in a case of homicide like that described in Antiphon's First Tetralogy, the
accused could argue that he cannot be the murderer because, even if he committed the
crime, he is no longer the same person.
However, although the philosophical approach seems to provide the strongest
arguments  in  a  contest  of  speeches,  it  is  worth  stressing  that,  as  implied  from
Epicharmus' representation of the Growing Argument, in fact, it does not. For, beside
the fact  that  the Growing Argument could be easily turned against  itself,  the comic
consequences deriving from the attempt to use it as a means of argumentation imply that
there is also the possibility that philosophy might not be taken seriously if employed in
tribunal.  Indeed,  the  parodic  effect  of  Epicharmus'  scenes  featuring  philosophical
allusions stems from the inevitable clash between philosophical speculation and “lay”
common sense.  But  even  if  philosophy were  to  be  accepted  as  a  proper  means  of
argumentation  in  everyday  life  situations,  philosophically  inspired  arguments  have
another, fatal, weak point – namely, that their thesis might turn out to be false. In fact,
the  very  existence  of  competing  philosophical  theories  indicates  that  philosophical
arguments do not necessarily provide a definitive means to success, but actually leave
open the possibility for other contests. In this regard, Epicharmus' allusions to different
philosophical doctrines should be taken, I argue, as a way of emphasising that there are
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no privileged theories, but rather that the value of philosophical ideas depends on their
potential effectiveness in contests of speeches.
Thus, in Epicharmus' hands, philosophy becomes just one polemical instrument
among  others  to  defeat  adversaries  in  verbal  disputes.  Instead  of  entering  the
philosophical  contest,  Epicharmus  brings  philosophy  outside  its  purely  theoretical
dimension and transfers it in everyday life, with all the bizarre consequences to which
this  may  lead.  As  noted  by  scholars,  through  such  representation  of  philosophy,
Epicharmus  created  the  prototype  of  the  stylized  quack-philosopher  who  became  a
recurrent  character  in  later  comedy72.  But,  even  more  significantly,  Epicharmus'
parodies of philosophy constitute one of the first critical appraisals of the role and place
of  philosophy  in  the  polis,  which  soon  would  become  a  major  concern  to  later
intellectuals.
Conclusion
In  this  chapter,  I  have  evaluated  Epicharmus'  take  on  philosophical  competition  by
focusing  on  his  so-called  philosophical  fragments,  which  contain  allusions  to
contemporary  philosophical  debate.  In  particular,  I  have  considered  Epicharmus'
references  to  Xenophanes'  theological  doctrines  and  Eleatic  ontology,  whose
terminology  and  pattern  of  argumentations  he  skilfully  appropriated  for  parodic
purposes.  However,  as  emerged  from  the  study  of  fragment  B2  on  the  Growing
Argument, which was inspired by Pythagorean speculation, Epicharmus was not just an
imitator of existing philosophical doctrines, but actually gave his original intellectual
72 The most eloquent example is provided by Aristophanes' Clouds. Cf. Pickard-Cambridge 1962, p. 251;
Álvarez Salas 2007c, p. 35.
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contribution by elaborating a powerful argument against the permanence of personal
identity which was destined to have great influence on later philosophy. 
Although the integration of philosophical allusions in the plot of his comedies
involves a pointed parody of philosophers on the part of Epicharmus, I have contended
that such a parody should not be taken as a direct criticism of the doctrines at which he
hints. Eloquent from this point of view is the case of the Growing Argument: while it
has been taken as an attack on Parmenides' ontology, I have shown that it does not pose
a challenge to the Eleatic doctrine of What-Is and that, in fact, it might even be used
against its critics. Actually, more than in theoretically competing with philosophers, I
have  argued  that  Epicharmus  was  interested  in  the  potential  polemic  usages  of
philosophical argumentation. Considering the details of the plot of the comedy about the
Growing Argument, I have maintained that this particular way of looking at philosophy
was a reflection of the increasing importance of rhetoric and the consequent search for
the best arguments to employ in order to win verbal disputes. In particular, the appeal to
φύσις, when compared with that to  eikos  in arguments from probability, appeared to
provide an effective means of victory in contests of speeches. However, Epicharmus'
parodic representation of the consequences of the use of the Growing Argument implies
that,  in  fact,  philosophically  inspired  arguments,  although  employable  as  means  of
persuasion, do not guarantee final success.
Still,  the fact that Epicharmus did not enter the philosophical contest directly
does not mean that he was not involved in competition. Actually, Epicharmus competed
with philosophers, but he played outside the boundaries of philosophical debate itself.
For,  as  mentioned  above,  Epicharmus  did  not  aim  to  criticize  rival  philosophical
theories  and  then  replace  them  with  his  own.  Rather,  by  making  of  philosophy  a
rhetorical  instrument  to  compete  in  trivial  situations,  he  deflated  the  claims  to
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superiority of philosophers and, generally speaking, of other wisdom practitioners, by
putting them on the same level with other participants in the wider  agōn of the  polis.
Significantly, through such representation of philosophy Epicharmus created effective
comic scenes whereby he made his audience laugh, a matter of primary importance for
him,  as  he  competed  with  other  playwrights  to  gain  the  favour  of  the  public  and
eventually be crowned victor  in  dramatic  competitions.  For  Epicharmus,  philosophy
was then a game whose rules could be mimicked in order to achieve success in other
games.  In  fact,  I  think,  Epicharmus  was  well  aware  that  he  and  every  other  poet,
philosopher  or  wisdom  practitioner  was  involved  in  a  public  contest,  in  which
everything  could  be  used  to  beat  adversaries.  But,  differently  from  some  of  his
competitors, he recognized that the game could not, in fact, be ended and that victory
was as ephemeral as a laugh.
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Final remarks
The  foregoing  study  of  early  Greek  philosophical  poetry  has  been  conducted  in
consideration of the competitive context in which poetry was produced and performed
in the Archaic and Early Classical ages. In particular, I have examined the works of
Xenophanes,  Parmenides,  Empedocles  and  Epicharmus  in  order  to  evaluate  their
approaches to poetic agonism. In effect, for these philosopher-poets the strategy to beat
their adversaries and thereby prove their superiority involved an original reinterpretation
of the very terms of competition.  
As emerges from my analysis, although they all shared a marked competitive
stance  towards  other  poets  and  wisdom  practitioners,  Xenophanes,  Parmenides,
Empedocles and Epicharmus held different views on the nature of agonism itself,  in
particular  as  regards  the  possibility  of  putting  a  stop  to  it  once  and  for  all.  While
Xenophanes  and  Epicharmus  seem  to  agree  in  considering  competition  as  an
ineliminable  aspect  of  humans'  intellectual  enterprise,  Parmenides  and  Empedocles
believed that competition could be ended and, in fact, they presented their poems as
definitive accounts of reality superior to any others. It is worth noting that, with the
exception of Epicharmus, who deserves a separate discussion, for philosopher-poets the
question  of  the  end  of  competition  was  closely  related  to  the  problem  of  poetic
authority, which ultimately stemmed from the epistemological issue concerning humans'
capacity to attain knowledge. For these figures, competition could only be brought to a
close if a poet were able to demonstrate that he had come to possess the truth.
The origins of the epistemological question are traceable to the Homeric poems,
in which the truth value of narration depends on the poet's capacity to relate events by
reproducing the actual order in which they took place. This requires, as a necessary
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condition, that the poet know the exact course of events. However, given the archaic
visual model of knowledge, a poet can only claim to know what he has seen and that to
which he has been perceptually present1. Thus, the poet is epistemically incapable of
narrating the spatio-temporally remote events which constitute the object of his song
without divine aid. This situation is vividly portrayed in the invocation to the Muses
preceding the  Catalogue of  the  Ships  in  the  Iliad,  in  which  the  poet's  ignorance  is
contrasted with the goddesses' omniscience, which derives from their having been direct
witnesses  of  the  events2.  Given  this  rigid  dichotomy  between  divine  and  mortal
knowledge, the only way for the poet to fulfil his task is to ask the Muses for their
assistance  in  providing  him  with  the  information  that  he  lacks.  Thus,  despite  the
epistemic  gap between gods and humans,  the inspired  poet  can  have access  to  that
knowledge from which other mortals are excluded and thereby communicate it through
his poetry.
As shown in chapter 3, the apparently straightforward relation between poet and
inspiring divinity of the Homeric poems is problematized by Hesiod in the proem of the
Theogony. For the Muses' ability to tell both false things and truths leaves the poet in a
status of unsolvable uncertainty as regards the content of divine inspiration. We have
seen that, in order to escape this impasse, Hesiod seeks to guarantee the reliability of his
account by presenting himself as a poetic authority invested by the Muses. In this way,
Hesiod  also  proves  his  superiority  over  competitors,  since,  in  virtue  of  his  divine
investiture,  he is  able  to  reveal  universal  truths  which no other  poet  can know and
which, de facto, exclude any other poetic account. However, Hesiod's solution is far
from being satisfactory, since the epistemic limitations inherent to the mortal condition
1 Cf. Brunschwig 2000, pp. 76-77.
2 Cf. Il. 2.484-486: “Tell me now, Muses who have your homes on Olympus, for you are goddesses, and
are present, and know everything, while we hear only rumour and know nothing” (tr. Verity). The same
idea is behind Odysseus' praise of Demodocus (Od.  8.487-491), cf. supra, Chapter 3, pp. 92-93.
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still prevent him to determine whether what he has been revealed by the Muses is true or
false.  
Xenophanes appropriates the traditional pessimism concerning men's epistemic
possibilities, but, by rejecting the idea of divine inspiration, he undermines any claim to
authority  based  on  this  form  of  communication  between  human  and  divine.  By
rendering the epistemic gap between gods and mortals unbridgeable without exceptions,
Xenophanes denies human beings the possibility to acquire truth. However, this does
not condemn men to absolute uncertainty and helplessness, since they can still build a
stable  system of  opinions  grounded on the  objects  of  experience  which  god makes
accessible to them and whose reliability is guaranteed by the immutable nature of the
divine mind. In such a scenario, enquiry acquires a crucial role, because every object
which men encounter in their experience can be critically evaluated and employed to
improve their  set  of opinions about the world.  Indeed,  since men are involved in a
constant  process  of  discovery,  the  opinions  which  they  form are  subject  to  critical
evaluation, which inevitably leads to continuous confrontation and competition. In fact,
men can present accounts which are proven better than others, whether on the basis of
experience or their appropriateness/usefulness, but still they cannot provide the best and
most definitive account. The same holds for Xenophanes' theological and ethical views,
which, as it emerges from his professions of wisdom, he considered better than others
(for example with respect to the welfare of the  polis), but which nonetheless did not
amount to clear and certain truth. According to Xenophanes, then, poetic authority can
only derive from the capacity of  providing an account  which explains  the result  of
experience  better  than  others,  but  which  nonetheless  remains  subject  to  continuous
revision and improvement. 
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 When we turn to Parmenides and Empedocles, we can notice that they share
with  Hesiod  the  project  of  composing  “universal”  poems,  conceived  as  closed  and
complete systems meant to exclude and replace rival ones. Significantly, undertaking
such a poetic enterprise led them to find a solution to the issues raised by the Muses'
declaration in the proem of the Theogony. In chapter 3, I argued that Parmenides solved
the problem of poetic ambiguity by redefining truth in terms of logical deduction. In this
way, Parmenides also justified his claim to authority and superiority over competitors.
With regard to this point, we have seen that Parmenides' proem stands as a statement of
authority, since it constantly emphasizes the philosopher-poet's special status, eventually
sanctioned  by  the  goddess'  favourable  reception  and  her  promise  to  reveal  a  truth
undisclosed to other mortals. However, in contrast to Hesiod, the guarantee of the truth
of  divine  revelation  does  not  derive  from Parmenides'  having  been  chosen  by  the
goddess, but rather from the fact that the account of What-Is expounded in the poem is
the result of logical deduction. Hence, human beings can be assured of the reliability of
what they learn from the divinity because they can verify it by relying on independent
logical  criteria.  In  this  way,  the  epistemic  gap  between  mortals  and  the  divine  is
eventually  eliminated,  since,  by  means  of  deduction,  men  can  have  access  to  that
universal truth which previously had been reserved for the gods. Even more significant,
the acquisition of truth on the part of Parmenides renders his account of reality superior
to any other and thereby excises a priori any possibility of competition.
Similar  to  Parmenides,  Empedocles  too  presents  his  account  of  cosmos  as
definitive, especially by showing that it can integrate the doctrines of his predecessors
into a unique and coherent whole. However, instead of redefining the very notion of
truth, Empedocles offers a solution to the problem of poetic reliability more in line with
Archaic tradition. For Empedocles' poetic authority derives from his superhuman status,
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both as a daimōn and a god: as a daimōn, he has been a first-hand witness of the process
of mixing and separating of the elements in the development of the cosmos, while as a
god, he lays  claim to a comprehensive view of the universe and of the laws which
regulate the cycle of its generation and destruction. Empedocles thus appropriates the
Homeric idea that the capacity of telling the truth is based on direct experience, but
instead  of  resorting  to  divine  inspiration  to  obviate  the  problem posed  by humans'
epistemic limitations, he grounds his authority on his own divinity. Noticeably, being a
(literally) divine poet, Empedocles rules out the possibility that his account could be
challenged by those of other poets or philosophers who, due to their mortal condition,
possess only a partial view of reality.
As anticipated above, Epicharmus' position as regards poetic and philosophical
agonism shares  with  Xenophanes'  the  idea  that  the  competition  cannot  be  stopped.
Regrettably, the scanty evidence in our possession prevents us from knowing whether
Epicharmus' view stemmed from a particular epistemological conception3. As argued in
chapter  5,  what  can  be  said  with  reasonable  confidence  is  that  in  his  comedies
Epicharmus represented competition as an ineliminable aspect of social and intellectual
interactions. People are involved in verbal disputes which they try to win and thereby
gain some profit. In this widespread game, philosophical argumentation is regarded as
an instrument for victory which can be twisted and adapted to one's needs, but which
does not guarantee success and, in fact, can generate potentially infinite occasions for
contest.  In  this  respect,  Epicharmus marks  his  distance especially from Parmenides,
3 Some  scholars  have  identified  echoes  of  Xenophanes'  epistemological  position  (in  particular  that
expressed  in  B34)  in  Epicharmus'  fragment  B13,  whose  authenticity,  however,  is  dubious:  νᾶφε  καὶ
μέμνασ᾽ ἀπιστεῖν· ἄρθρα ταῦτα τᾶν φρενῶν, “Be sober and remember to be incredulous: these are the
limbs of  wit”.  In  fact,  regardless of  its  authenticity,  the absence of any context makes it  difficult  to
determine the exact import of the sentence. Salas rightly observes that it is hard to see an influence of
Xenophanes  in  the  fragment,  but  his  attempt  to  interpret  the  phrase  as  an  enunciation  of  the
methodological principle of scientific enquiry is, I think, far-fetched. On these issues, see Álvarez Salas
2007b, pp. 119-120.
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since philosophical argumentation, instead of representing the means to put an end to
competition, actually keeps it alive.
To  conclude,  we  may  note  that  the  different  approaches  to  competition
developed  by  philosopher-poets  were  appropriated  and  reinterpreted  in  later
philosophical  enquiry.  On  the  one  hand,  while  the  proliferation  of  alternative
philosophical accounts of reality proved that Parmenides' and Empedocles' project to
put  a  stop  to  the  competition  was  illusionary,  Parmenides'  idea  that  logical
argumentation  is  decisive  in  humans'  quest  for  truth  had  a  lasting  influence  on
successive philosophical speculation. On the other hand, Xenophanes' and Epicharmus'
views on competition  as  an  ineliminable  aspect  of  human condition  anticipated  the
increasing importance of dialectical exchange of ideas, which marked the flourishing of
Classical philosophy. Thus, even though the practice of philosophical poetry was soon
abandoned in favour of other forms of intellectual debate, its legacy was destined to
continue long after its end. 
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